Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

740.0011 E. W. Stettinius Mission/112½

The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] May 22, 1944.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: It gives me pleasure to transmit to you herewith a report on the conversations carried on in London on your behalf from April 7th to April 29th, 1944.

As directed by you and the President, the objective of our Mission was to exchange views with members of the British Government on any subjects of current mutual interest which the British desired to discuss with us. We sought also to establish with British officials relationships of frankness and mutual confidence, having in mind the vital importance of such relationships in the solution of our common problems both during the war and in the post-war era. In the carrying out of these objectives I was given most loyal and capable support by all the members of the Mission and by Ambassador Winant and other American officials in Britain.

We were accorded a most warm and hospitable reception by the British. They displayed throughout our talks the same spirit of frankness and cooperation which motivated our approach to them.

In the course of the conversations, the British raised with us a large number of topics of both immediate and long-range importance. I explored a large number of these topics with senior British officials discussing in particular detail a number of currently pressing matters such as the European Advisory Commission, the French directive, shipment of war supplies to the Axis from the neutral countries, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and the forthcoming economic talks. I met also on several occasions with the Soviet Ambassador and with the Chinese Ambassador in order to keep them informed of the course of our discussions. In addition, I met with representatives of all the Governments-in-Exile at their request and with numerous American diplomatic, military and civilian officials.

Dr. Isaiah Bowman gave the greatest part of his attention in London to post-war matters, particularly the world security organization, the world court, and colonial problems. Mr. John L. Pratt concentrated on problems of war supply and British planning for post-war reconstruction and reconversion. Mr. Wallace Murray discussed with members of the Foreign Office a large number of current Near Eastern and African topics. Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, who accompanied me on many of my talks with senior members of the British Government, carried on conversations also with members of the Foreign Office on European matters. Mr. Robert Lynch discussed administrative affairs, both at the Foreign Office and at our two Embassies in London.

As the result of our conversations in London, we are more deeply convinced than ever that the United States must play an aggressive role in the creation of the international machinery necessary to ensure world security and economic stability. It is clear that the British attach great importance to the active participation of the United States in the world problems of the post-war era. We feel that in order to ensure our participation they will go far toward meeting our wishes on the form and character of the machinery for international cooperation. In the field of international security, British thinking is already very similar to our own, and we are convinced that when formal negotiations begin, we and the British will find ourselves in substantial agreement.

In the meanwhile, we urge that the most careful attention be given to the workings of the inter-allied bodies already functioning and to the preparation for those which it may be necessary to create in the near future. Much of our attention in London was devoted to the European Advisory Commission, to the civil affairs planning of SHAEF¹ and to European control machinery which it may be necessary to set up as surrender becomes imminent, to the President’s proposal for a United Nations economic “steering committee”, to the proposed interim shipping commission, and to other United Nations bodies. It is vital that these United Nations groups work as efficiently and as fruitfully as possible, for it is there that the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence is being formed which will be indispensable to successful international cooperation in the post-war era.

In conclusion, may I take this means of expressing again the deep appreciation of myself and the other members for the privilege of having been able to undertake this Mission for you and for the splendid support and cooperation which you and the other officials of the State Department gave us at all times.

Sincerely yours,

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Report on Conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944

THE MISSION TO LONDON

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State

Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Vice Chairman, Advisory Council on Post-War Foreign Policy, Department of State

John L. Pratt, Consultant on Commercial Affairs, Department of State

Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs

Robert J. Lynch, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary and Executive Secretary to the Mission

Louis J. Hector, Assistant to the Under Secretary

The members of the Mission left the United States on March 30th, 1944 and arrived in London on April 7th. Conversations were carried on until April 29th with members of the British Government, with officials of other Allied Governments, and with United States diplomatic, military and civilian officials. The members of the Mission left London on April 29th and reached Washington on May 4th, spending two days en route in conferences with Ambassador Averell Harriman² and Ambassador Robert Murphy³ at Marrakech, French Morocco.

[Here follows table of contents.]

I. Current Political Topics

european advisory commission

British officials and Mr. Eden⁴ in particular, were most eager to raise with the Mission various questions concerning the European Advisory Commission.⁵

Scope of Reference of the E.A.C.

As the Department is aware, the British, since the Commission’s inception, have ascribed to it a much broader field of endeavor than we have. They stated to us that under its terms of reference the E.A.C. should concern itself with the whole short-term clearing up of Europe after cessation of hostilities, i.e., as distinguished from long-term peace and security arrangements which should be left to the world security organization.

The British admitted that under their conception the E.A.C. might grow into the instrument for governing the control machinery of Europe. They envisage it, indeed, as becoming the focus for Tripartite forward planning in both the pre-surrender and post-hostilities periods, particularly the latter.

The British laid great store on their interpretation of the Moscow Conference⁶ decision to refer to the E.A.C. the British paper on policy toward liberated areas. Mr. Eden insisted it was not merely this specific document—which the British no longer wish to present—that was referred to the E.A.C., but rather that all questions affecting liberated areas were to come before the E.A.C. We stated that this interpretation differed materially from ours, and further, that our military authorities are definitely opposed to having matters come before the Commission which concern military planning and operations because of the possible delays involved. We said that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement,⁷ covering primarily the pre-surrender period, fell in this category.

As one of the principal British arguments in support of their conception of the E.A.C. the British dwelt on the importance of obtaining Russia’s wholehearted support of cooperative action in the solution of European problems. They insisted that the only existing machinery for consulting Russia is the E.A.C. and, in support of this, cited Russian requests to the British that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement and the French Civil Affairs directive should be considered by the E.A.C. We pointed out to the British that the Russians had declined so far to consider any other questions until agreement is reached on the proposed surrender terms for Germany. The British seemed to feel that since the Russians themselves had now proposed several other questions for clearance through the E.A.C., they would probably not insist upon this position.

While we were still in London, the Russians presented their Civil Affairs Agreement with Czechoslovakia⁸ to the British Foreign Office and to the Department for comment without suggesting reference to the E.A.C. This had a moderating effect upon the British position and they dropped their insistence that such documents should be cleared through the E.A.C.

We endeavored in all conversations to correct the British feeling that there is a desire on the Department’s part to belittle the Commission or to underestimate the value of its functions. We emphasized the complexity, size and importance of the problems affecting the future treatment of Germany and the satellite countries and said that we doubted whether the Commission could, as a practical matter, handle other problems at the present time. Sir William Strang⁹ in private conversation admitted that the E.A.C. would have its hands full for some time to come with the problems affecting enemy countries already scheduled for consideration.

Progress on Surrender Terms¹⁰

We and the British were equally insistent that time did not permit of further delays in reaching agreement on surrender terms for Germany and beginning consideration of the other questions concerning the subsequent treatment and control of Germany.

As to the lack of progress thus far in disposing of the surrender terms, various causes emerged. The original delay was caused by the failure for some weeks of the Russian Ambassador to receive instructions on surrender terms. The subsequent delay resulted from confusion in Ambassador Winant’s¹¹ mind as to the degree of latitude he had to negotiate agreements not strictly in accord with the letter of the documents furnished him. As a result of our visit and that of General Wickersham, his Military Advisor, to Washington, we believe that Mr. Winant now realizes the importance attached to expediting the Commission’s work and understands that we expect him to negotiate, on the general basis of the documents furnished, the best agreements possible for submission to the three governments.

During our stay Mr. Winant informally submitted a new draft of the surrender terms to his British and Russian colleagues. In substance it is apparently acceptable to the British, and it goes a long way to meet the Russian point of view. When we left, Ambassador Gousev was daily expecting Moscow’s comment on this draft and all seemed hopeful that agreement could soon be reached.

As the E.A.C. passes from surrender terms to directives and proclamations for the Allied commanders and then to control machinery for Germany, Ambassador Winant will need an increase in his Commission staff. This is particularly true in the economic field. Sir William Strang can and does call upon the whole British Government for technical assistance. If Mr. Winant is to have the technical assistance he will require in presenting the American view, he must have on his staff persons capable of advising him on the economic problems which will come before the Commission.

Recommendations

1) We recommend that careful attention be given Mr. Winant’s personnel requirements. The Department should begin at once to consider personnel choices for the expanded staff Mr. Winant will need as soon as the detailed control machinery and occupation arrangements come under discussion.

2) In order that Mr. Winant may have the full benefit of this Government’s current views on problems under consideration by the E.A.C., it would seem desirable that officers in the Department who have participated in the formulation of these views make brief visits to London from time to time in order to assist the American representative on E.A.C. in understanding our Government’s approach and the factors behind it.

3) The Department should give careful consideration to the possible scope of the work of the E.A.C. during the interim period between the surrender of Germany and the final settlements, and to the relations between the E.A.C. and the military during that period. If the E.A.C. does, in fact, become the control machinery for Europe during this interim period, we must be prepared with the necessary personnel and machinery for American participation. If it is decided by the State Department that the E.A.C. should not assume these post-surrender control functions, immediate consideration should be given to alternative machinery since this may have to be set up with considerable speed.

occupation of germany—long-term implications

General Eisenhower¹² and General Bedell Smith¹³ stated to members of the Mission their conviction that there should be a single Anglo-American zone of occupation in Germany instead of two separate zones. The issue had been raised by them through military channels but no reply had been received. They ask that the matter be discussed with the President and with the Secretary.

It is General Eisenhower’s belief that it would be a very difficult task to separate the combined Anglo-American invasion force so as to create two distinct occupation forces. Moreover, he pointed out that the supply for the combined force is based on an intricate system of Combined Boards and pooled supplies which would be very difficult to disentangle in order to create two different supply systems for two separate zones of occupation.

The character of the zones of occupation in Germany must be considered, however, from the long-range political viewpoint as well as the immediate military viewpoint. Great Britain, because of her geographical position, will inevitably desire to play a more active role than will the United States in continental affairs, particularly French affairs. If the American occupation forces are integrated with the British forces in a single Anglo-American zone, we may be put in the position of seeming to back up all of Britain’s post-war European policies. On the other hand, the creation of two separate zones will give the Germans wider scope for playing off one occupying power against another. These are only two examples of the various long-range aspects of the problem which must be given careful consideration.

Recommendation

We suggest that this is a problem of great urgency, since the military planning for the zones of occupation must get under way immediately. We recommend that the Secretary call a meeting in the very near future, to include the Under Secretary, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Dunn,¹⁴ Mr. Matthews and such other officers of the Department as may seem appropriate, and that the views of the Department be promptly embodied in a memorandum to the President.

food relief for occupied europe

The Prime Minister¹⁵ stated that he objected strongly to any relief shipments of food to the occupied countries of Europe because of the danger of security leaks concerning the coming operations. He said that he is interested in the providing of relief, but that he feels we must take no chances whatsoever of jeopardizing the success of our military operations.

Mr. Eden stated that it was hopeless to raise the food relief question again with the War Cabinet. He said that they had taken a firm position that the best thing for the people in the occupied areas is to turn those areas into liberated areas as soon as possible and that any food relief plans must be turned down for operational and security reasons. This whole question is tied up, of course, with Britain’s historical dependence on blockade as a principal weapon of war.

The Under-Secretary told Mr. Eden that it is very important from the American political point of view to open negotiations promptly with Germany, through Switzerland or Sweden, on the subject of food relief. Mr. Eden felt that his Government would never agree to such action.

france

Status of Directive to General Eisenhower

Upon arrival in England we found that the President’s proposed directive of March 3rd, 1944 to General Eisenhower on the administration of civil affairs in France was still on the Prime Minister’s desk. The Prime Minister took the position that he did not want to “bother the President” at this time, and he was apparently unwilling to authorize acceptance of the directive or even its discussion in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

Following our arrival, we made every effort with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan¹⁶ and other Foreign Office officials to have action on the directive expedited. We explained at length that in practice General Eisenhower would deal with the French Committee in all his pre-invasion planning and to the extent that it proved possible after landing in France.¹⁷ We made it clear that neither the Department nor General Eisenhower has any intention of encouraging any rival group which may emerge in France, but that we did feel General Eisenhower’s hands should not be tied to the extent of forcing him to maintain the Committee with American bayonets should it prove unacceptable to the French people.

The British were delighted with the Secretary’s speech of April 9th¹⁸ and particularly his references to France. They felt, however, that there were elements in the speech incompatible with the President’s directive. We consistently explained that there was no divergence and pointed out that the Secretary’s speech had received the President’s prior approval.

Mr. Eden insisted that his statement in Parliament on September 22nd¹⁹ last made it “embarrassing” for him to accept the President’s directive unless it were amended so as to make General Eisenhower’s dealings with the Committee mandatory, i.e. “may” changed to “should” in Article II, paragraph 3 of the directive. Subsequent reading of Mr. Eden’s statement, however, does not reveal to us any real basis for such embarrassment.

During our stay in England, it developed that as action on the President’s directive was not to be immediately forthcoming, the time element compelled General Eisenhower to initiate informal discussions with the French Military Mission in London under General Koenig,²⁰ with a view to reaching working agreements. General Eisenhower at the same time requested approval of this procedure from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He feels, however, that, while this arrangement is a satisfactory stop-gap, he must eventually have some formal directive.

Mr. Churchill stated in his last visit with the Under-Secretary that he had devised a “formula” on the French directive. He would say in the House of Commons that the British Government’s position was identical with that outlined in the Secretary’s speech and that General Eisenhower and his staff were already in informal conversations with “a French general”. If asked about the directive, Mr. Churchill would say that it was a private matter between the two Governments concerning the prosecution of the war and not the concern of Parliament or the Press. He thought this formula would meet the situation in England, and he did not propose to communicate further with the President on the directive. (This is apparently the basis of Mr. Eden’s statement of May 2 [3?].²¹)

The Under-Secretary made it clear to the Prime Minister that while the present informal conversations provided a satisfactory “tentative” basis for working agreements with the French Committee, but that General Eisenhower must have some definite directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on which to base his policies.

Basis of British Policy Toward French Directive

We believe that the British reluctance to accept the President’s proposed directive stems from three causes:

1) The policy of the British Government has always been to give the French Committee the fullest possible support, and we believe that it is prepared to continue this support to the utmost once the invasion starts. It does not therefore wish to place on record with its stamp of approval any document which might, some time in the future, be taken to imply that the British contemplated dealing under any circumstances with some group or element other than the Committee.

2) It is contrary to the conception of the British system of government to permit important political decisions to be taken by a military commander. Such decisions are the functions of the Foreign Office with the prior approval, in important cases, of the War Cabinet. The British consider that relations with the French authorities of a non-operational character are primarily political in nature, particularly the decision as to the authority with whom to deal. They would be unwilling to grant discretion to a British supreme commander in such a matter, and they are naturally far less willing to grant this authority to an American supreme commander, however much confidence they may have in him.

3) There is much suspicion on the part of the British that after we get into France a “deal” may be made similar to the arrangements which were entered into with Admiral Darlan²² at the time of our landing in North Africa, the memory of which is still vivid in England. The British have never more than grudgingly admitted that however unfortunate the Darlan arrangements may have been from the political point of view, they nonetheless saved many lives and helped materially to shorten the African campaign. They fear that for strictly military reasons General Eisenhower may again take some action under the President’s flexible directive which might run counter to their determination to give full and undivided support to the French Committee of National Liberation.

The difference in British and American thinking with regard to the immediate situation we will find in France was brought out clearly during our stay. Whereas we consider that as France is liberated a period of some confusion, disorders and even a limited blood bath are possible, the British attitude is one of convinced optimism. They not only hope, but believe, that the entire country will rally to the support of General de Gaulle²³ and the Committee, and will accept their dictates without question. They state that they do not plan to recognize de Gaulle and the Committee as a provisional government until they are reestablished in Metropolitan France. It is clear, however, that the British will do everything possible to encourage support of the Committee and discourage opposition to it and that full recognition will probably not be long delayed once the Committee or certain members thereof have arrived on the mainland of France.

russia

British and American Policy Toward Russia

The British are determined to work in all ways for continued Russian cooperation with the Western Allies after the conclusion of hostilities. This is one of the cornerstones of present British policy. Given the background of Russian isolation and suspicion over the past quarter century—not to mention traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry—the British believe that the road will be long, slow and painful. But they feel—with occasional doubts—that the chances of ultimate success are favorable. They believe that the maximum of patience will be called for in the face of the inevitable setbacks and sudden incomprehensible Russian moves.

The British seemed curiously unaware of the fact that American relations with Russia are at present enjoying less friction than their own. They even seem to fear that we will exercise less patience with Russia than they. We assured the British that the Secretary is well aware of all the pitfalls that may confront us and of the patience which will be required if the habit of Russian consultation and cooperation with the Western world is to be gradually evolved. We emphasized that the outlook for a post-war world without such prospect of Russian partnership would indeed be grim.

On this fundamental objective of Russian cooperation there seems to be no difference in British or American viewpoint; on the means of bringing the policy to fruition there may, of course, be differences in approach. We explained to the British the greater difficulties which we face with public opinion in this country and mentioned the disillusionment on the part of some Americans which followed the Polish affair,²⁴ the Pravda peace feeler story,²⁵ and the Badoglio recognition incident.²⁶ We pointed out that the Secretary has taken every opportunity both in Washington and through our Ambassador at Moscow to emphasize how American public opinion fails to understand any unilateral course of action on Russia’s part and the need for working through mutual consultation and agreement. The British expressed full agreement with the wisdom of this policy and felt that it is already having results, notably in the “moderate” Russian Terms to Finland²⁷ and more recently in the Russian consultation with the British and ourselves on surrender terms for Rumania²⁸ and the Czech civil affairs agreement.²⁹

Russian Treatment of Germany

The British are convinced that the Russians will be decidedly “tough” with Germany after the termination of hostilities. They believe that the cornerstone of future Russian policy is to prevent Germany ever being again in a position to threaten the peace. They feel that any argument that a stable peaceful Europe requires a prosperous stable Germany will fall on decidedly deaf Russian ears. In fact, the British Foreign Office thought that one element in Russia’s offer of German territory up to the Oder to a friendly Poland is the belief that in thus giving the Poles a sizeable German minority problem, any possibility of a German-Polish alliance will be prevented. The British believe that Russia will maintain its determination to keep Germany weak long after the British and ourselves have fallen into forgiveness and forgetfulness.

Russian-Polish Relations

The British feel that there is nothing that can usefully be done at the moment with regard to Russian-Polish relations. They were encouraged in varying degrees by Polish reports—which they appeared to accept at face value—that the Polish underground has working arrangements with Russian military commanders on the spot. The British believe that the Russians have discovered that the Polish underground has some real military value, that it is loyal to the Polish Government in London and that failure to obtain its cooperation might hamper Russian military operations. The British seem to feel that if cooperation on the spot between the Polish underground and the Russian armies works well, a Polish Government with substantial popular support may gradually arise in Poland.

In spite of reiterated Russian hostility to the Polish Government-in-Exile, the British have not abandoned hope that perhaps Mikolajczyk³⁰ and one or two others might be brought into an administration set up locally in Poland. They admitted that this for the moment is pure speculation, but they are not inclined to accept Russian denials of cooperation with the Polish underground at face value.

Post-War Relations with Russia

We endeavored to learn whether there is any substantial body of opinion in England which believes that at some future time a stronger Germany may be necessary as a bulwark against the East and whether thinking in this direction has affected British policy. It was admitted that there exists and always has existed a minority fringe of people on the extreme Right who believe that Bolshevism is the real menace to Europe and that such people might argue for a strong Germany after the war. The vast majority of the British, however, so far as we could ascertain, are not thinking along these lines but are hoping and expecting—with occasional qualms—that Russian cooperation with the Western Allies will extend into the post-war future.

British officials do not believe that there are any tangible signs, in spite of the Polish question, that Russian policy as decided upon at Moscow³¹ and Tehran³² has undergone any fundamental change in the direction of isolation. They believe that Russian needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation and her natural desire to raise the standard of living of her war-stricken people will prevent Russian nationalism from going to extremes for some time after the war. They say, however, that this factor should not be exaggerated. They likewise believe with us that the fatigue factor is important and works in favor of cooperation with the West. It would be dangerous for the Soviet Government to strain the Russian people further by depicting another period of struggle against Western capitalist powers. This reluctance to confront his people with another period of tightened belts and preparation for another threat of war will constitute an important element, the British feel, making for Stalin’s³³ cooperation in a world security organization.

portuguese wolfram³⁴

Mr. Eden gave his assurances that the British would take a position on Portuguese wolfram comparable to that which is finally worked out with regard to Spanish wolfram. They feel themselves in a difficult position, however, to impose severe blockade sanctions before July 1, 1944, because of the supply commitments in their agreement with Portugal concerning the use of the Azores bases. The British implied, however, that the United States is under no such disability and that they would support such action on our part should it become necessary. As to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance,³⁵ the British are apparently not prepared to consider denouncing it if Portugal does not meet our wishes.

argentina

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden gave their firm assurances that Britain would support any position which the United States finds it necessary to take with regard to Argentina,³⁶ provided only that the problem of meat and other critical imports from Argentina can be solved. The British are quite aware of the danger of a South American bloc hostile to Britain and the United States being formed around an intransigent Argentina, and they realize the necessity for firm joint action to prevent this.

brazilian expeditionary force

Prime Minister Churchill stated on April 15th with great directness that he felt it would be a serious error to permit more than a token force or “a brigade” to be sent overseas from Brazil at this time, and that this force should be assigned to the Mediterranean theater because of similar climatic conditions there.

After receipt of Esdel³⁷ 22 on April 16th, the Under Secretary impressed upon the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden the political importance both within Brazil and from the standpoint of her prestige as an ally of avoiding any further delay in the embarkation of the B.E.F.³⁸ Mr. Eden promised the Under Secretary on April 24th that he would review the matter with the War Cabinet. He himself was favorably inclined and seemed hopeful that the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet would grant the necessary approval. We understand that the necessary British approval has now been forthcoming.

the governments-in-exile

American Diplomatic Representation

Many of the representatives of the Governments-in-Exile in London expressed genuine concern over the fact that an American diplomatic representative with the rank of Ambassador has not been appointed to them. This was particularly true of the Norwegians who explained that this was resented in Norway and that it had served to create doubts about the friendship of the United States for Norway. Mr. Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the change in Mr. Biddle’s status from an Ambassador to a Lieutenant Colonel has created fears that the United States intends to deal with Norway through some military organization such as AMGOT³⁹ rather than through diplomatic channels.

Participation in Work of E.A.C.

Representatives of the Exiled Governments were also much concerned over the fact that they have not been consulted about the surrender terms for Germany. Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, for instance, that there are certain questions involved in the German surrender terms with which the Netherlands Government is vitally concerned, but, that as things stand now it has had no opportunity to make its views known or to find out what decisions are being reached by the European Advisory Commission.

Refund of Currency made Available for Pay of United States Troops

The Belgian and Dutch Finance Ministers⁴⁰ stated to the Under Secretary their great concern over the position taken by the United States Treasury that currency made available by Western European countries for pay of United States troops might not be reimbursed by the United States. They feel that the Reciprocal Aid Agreements settled this point in clear unmistakable language, and they cannot understand why we are now proposing a different arrangement, particularly in the light of the fact that we pay dollars for the sterling used to pay our troops in Britain. The Belgian Finance Minister pointed out also that the British had agreed to pay in sterling for the Belgian currency made available to the British Army.

Recommendations

1) We recommend that a single Ambassador be appointed for all the Governments-in-Exile in London to fill the post left vacant by Mr. Biddle. Although Governments such as the Norwegian Government obviously feel entitled to a full-time Ambassador appointed to their country alone, they seem to appreciate the embarrassment which might result from appointment of ambassadors to each of the Exiled Governments in the event that the authority of some of these governments is challenged after the liberation of their homelands. The possibility of such embarrassment is greatly reduced, of course, by the device of having one ambassador for all the Governments-in-Exile.

2) We recommend that the question of the refunding of currency made available for payment of American troops be reopened with the Treasury. Whatever the merits or demerits of the original determination to exclude payment of troops from Reverse Lend-Lease, this policy was definitely embodied in the Reciprocal Aid Agreements and we feel from our conversations in London that what they regard as our sudden decision to abandon this policy has left a very unfortunate impression with the Governments-in-Exile.

II. Post-War Topics

world organization

There were frank and detailed comments by British officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan and others, on the world security organization. In general, British thinking on this subject seems very similar to our own.

The following points from the discussions on world security seem to us the most important from the point of view of future preparatory study and discussion within the Department.

The Executive Council

In order to provide larger representation for small states, the composition of the Executive Council is more broadly conceived by the British than by our Government. They feel that the experience of the League Council demonstrates that the small states do not combine against the large states at critical times or on critical issues. Only by increasing representation of small states, they believe, can we avoid two dangers: 1) The small states will claim that the Great Powers, possessing overwhelming military power, are ruling the world arbitrarily and by force; 2) The small representation of small states in the Council may tend to force the discussion of questions of security into the general assembly and to this the Prime Minister has expressed most emphatic opposition since he believes that futile debates would be the result.

The chief functions of the Executive Council as conceived by the British are:

1) The prompt exercise of force, if necessary, in the interest of security.

2) To harmonize policies and conciliate powers and regions.

3) To refer to regional councils certain questions for recommendation and report, if not for action. The example was given of the Flemish question as a type of question which could be referred to a possible European council for study and report instead of being taken up in either the assembly or the executive council of the world organization.

In order further to avoid the charge of arbitrary action by the Great Powers, some British officials have been considering the possibility of a “Defense Committee” of the Executive Council to assist the Council in dealing directly and swiftly with security issues. Such a Defense Committee would be advisory only. It would be in effect a subcommittee of the Executive Council, to receive the reports of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and make a preliminary study of them.

Regional Councils

With respect to the need for a World Organization, there is no difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and his Government. The form of it, however, is very much in question. The Prime Minister’s view stems from his belief in the need for the decisive exercise of power in order to keep the post-war world on an even keel. He doubts the wisdom of reestablishing a World Organization on vague general lines, preferring to make more precise the several fields of responsibility.

Regional councils for security are to the Prime Minister a primary objective. He would have three principal ones in the world: a Western Hemisphere council, a European council, and an Asiatic council. His Foreign Office and his experts generally would put the weight of world security upon the World Organization rather than upon regional councils. In conversation it was clear that Mr. Churchill has not thought out the operations and complexities of regional councils. For example, he would resolve interregional disputes by appointing a commission under the Executive Council. This seems to us a weak setup for a highly important dispute that might shake world security.

International Military Bases

Military bases under international authority seem necessary to the British, but they feel that they cannot be distributed throughout the world in great numbers. In our conversations, reference was made repeatedly to Pantelleria, the Marquesas Islands, New Caledonia, Truk, Singapore, the Caribbean Islands, Dakar and Madagascar, and one or two of the Japanese Mandated Islands to be selected for this purpose. From these examples, we have the impression that the British stand somewhat midway between the position of our military advisers at Washington, who incline toward few bases, and the position of those who desire many widely distributed bases.

Mr. Churchill repeatedly emphasized the need for international funds to support international bases, even under a trusteeship arrangement. He believes that in this way the United Nations will learn how expensive it is to maintain a security system such as the British have maintained in the past through national bases under Empire organization.

International Military Force

The use of military contingents with a distinctive insignia for international security is much in the Prime Minister’s mind. He seems somewhat theoretical and imaginative in his treatment of this aspect of the matter rather than soundly convinced himself of its feasibility. His officials in the Foreign Office and the study group associated with it do not share his enthusiasm, although they are willing to examine the question impartially.

Regulation of Armaments

The regulation of armaments is believed possible by the British only through positive action. Negative prohibitions will get us nowhere, they feel, in view of the probably Russian position that inspection, or indeed any implication of outside control, is unacceptable.

Positive action offers a fairly wide field for consideration, the British feel. The standardization of arms with uniform calibre might be discussed, for instance, although the wartime problems arising from this question as between just the British and Americans warn of difficulties in this regard. The large states, of course, will have the problem of preventing excess armaments by small states. The airplane introduces an element of special difficulty. We cannot stop aeronautical experimentation and it will be difficult to agree on standards of construction and operation, since the needs of various countries differ as to the type of plane and the type of services required.

Mandated Territories

The disposal of the Mandated Territories of 1919 was discussed apart from the colonial question. The legal position of the Mandates is a troublesome question which may or may not need to be resolved before the World Organization is set up with a section in it to deal with dependent peoples.

Since France as a nation is not in being at the moment, we cannot ask her to subscribe to a decision respecting the Mandated Territories. Only preliminary work on the legal aspects would seem to be useful now. Afterward the Mandated Territories can be treated in one of several ways: they can become parts of the general problem of dependent peoples, or they can form a part of a general system with a special status, or, theoretically at least, they can be treated separately and in an individual manner, depending upon the nature of the problems in each. Whatever solution is worked out, account must be taken of improvements, invested capital, etc., which form a part of the between-wars period of British and French administration. The legal questions involved are complicated and novel. Presumably the title of these territories reverts to the Allied and Associated Powers. A mandates have been largely settled or are in process of settlement. Iraq has become independent; Syria and Lebanon have been promised independence after the war; and Palestine must under any circumstances have special treatment. B mandates are not yet ready for self-government. C mandates are largely under the sovereignty of the Dominions who would have to be consulted about them.

world court

Discussion of a World Court, from the British point of view, begins with consideration of the “Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice” of February 10, 1944.⁴¹ It is the work of a committee of experts formed early in 1943, whose members were chosen from eleven different countries. The Chairman was Sir William Malkin.

It is our understanding that this report is now under consideration in the Office of the Legal Adviser⁴² of the Department of State. Sir William Malkin expressed the hope that comment from the Department upon the above report would be received by him at an early date.

So far as Sir William Malkin represents his Government, it is important to realize that he is apparently ready to accept within reason whatever plan of a World Court the Government of the United States finds “politically feasible”. He considers representation by the United States on the Court and in the preliminaries of organization as vital to its success.

Sir William stated that in his view the value of the Court’s work lies in enlarging the cooperating machinery and habits of the world. He recognizes that the cases brought before the Court in the twenty years between world wars do not represent the real causes of wars, which lie in the political and economic fields. Yet there is a great need for a Court in order to fasten the attention of the world upon the possibilities of international law. Conciliation and arbitration have their due place, but they do not represent consistent views on international behavior except in so far as they enlarge the hope of using machinery other than war for the settlement of disputes.

Sir William Malkin considers it desirable to limit the work of the World Court to justiciable disputes and advisory opinions. It cannot take up political disputes. On the question of universal jurisdiction there is considerable doubt. I gather that this is considered a more remote object in the development of world political thinking than the actual constitution and operation of the Court in the near future.

Sir William said that he realized the desirability of employing new terms in setting up the new World Organization, since League memories are not altogether happy ones. Moreover, some of the powers that withdrew from the League, in order to save face, desire to have the Court’s name changed and its functions redefined. For these reasons, the Report of the Inter-Allied Committee states that the existing connection between the Court and the League of Nations should be discontinued and should not be replaced by an organic connection with any new international organization in the sense of being established by an article of such organization.

A novel element introduced into the Report is presented in Chapter XI, “Regional Chambers”. It is especially designed to attract non-European countries to a system of international law and a World Court to interpret it. It is recognized that there is a danger in decentralization in that doubt may be cast on the legal merits or finality of the decisions given. To meet this doubt ingenious plans are proposed for securing prior assent to the selection of judges for the Regional Court by agreement between the parties or by nomination of the Court. This would secure “uniformity of jurisprudence and a coherent and self-consistent Court”.

Judges of different types of mind and methods of legal thought will almost inevitably be represented by the principal countries adhering to the Court. No specific attempt should be made to represent particular legal systems. Sir William emphasized the fact that the decisions of the Court at The Hague over twenty years showed that no fundamental difficulty arose because participants in an action came from different legal systems.

Sir William thought that the Court should continue to sit at The Hague.

Both Sir William and Professor Webster⁴³ remarked that they did not want to emphasize the World Court at the present time if it diverted attention from an over-all World Organization whose primary object was security.

Recommendation

Since it appears that the British are willing at the present time to follow our lead in the organization of the World Court, it is vital that our views be formulated and made known to them as quickly as may be possible. We recommend that this subject be considered by the Committee on Post-War Programs in the near future.

colonial policy

We were able to discuss the colonial question with practically the whole of the upper Foreign Office staff. There was also the opportunity of discussing it with Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and a study group attached to the Foreign Office.

British Attitude Toward United States Statements on Colonial Policy

In exchanges between our Government and the British Government during the past year and a half, we have presented for British consideration a set of principles for the guidance of the United Nations in the administration of dependent peoples. These principles are cast in the most general form, and emphasis was at first upon “independence”, later changed to “self-government”. It is the British view that these statements are vague and impractical. They claim that the diversities of life and environment among dependent peoples are so great that it is not possible to make any real improvement in the relations of such peoples to the metropole by setting up what they feel is a vague set of general ideals.

In one of the replies of the British Government, an Aide-Mémoire dated May 26, 1943,⁴⁴ the point is made that a definite time table to be followed in giving an independent status to colonial peoples is an impossible goal. One cannot say in advance when the processes of education will enable a given people to exercise self-government. This point was expanded in our conversations. Self-governing people, the British feel, are developed as a result of trial and error. To put all dependent peoples under a general set of principles is to pretend that all may be treated alike. Moreover, an enduring security system is not achieved by multiplying completely independent and small political entities all over the world.

United Nations Supervision of Dependent Areas

The line of approach used in our conversations with the British was the need for settling specific difficult questions, such as Italian Somaliland, Libya, the Japanese Mandated Islands, and the possible location of military bases on French possessions such as New Caledonia, Marquesas Islands, Madagascar, or French Indo-China.

At the beginning the general attitude of the British officials was cool toward any form of international control, which we presume reflected their disappointment with the previous documents from this Government. We pointed out that we are actually dealing in an international way with dependent peoples, including colonies, when we undertake to form a general security system under which both military bases and economic matters may be agreed upon. In the economic field, we have the standard of living of native peoples being affected by forms of international control of excess production of commercial agriculture in the tropics. This became so clear in the Caribbean region, when war interrupted normal commercial relations, that a Caribbean Advisory Commission had to be set up. We asked if similar commissions could not operate in other regions.

Colonel Stanley’s⁴⁵ first reaction to this question was not favorable but Dr. Bowman pressed the matter and requested further consideration of various possibilities. At their second meeting, Colonel Stanley thought that Southeastern Asia might well have a regional council for the benefit of dependent peoples there. He thought that a regional council might also operate in the case of the Japanese Mandated Islands, though like all other officials he expressed the hope that the flag of the United States will fly in that region after the war. He also saw valuable results from a regional council in East Africa where Italian Somaliland and Eritrea come into the picture. In the case of West Africa, he thought that a regional council was not desirable, or if one were formed that the United States should not be represented upon it because, speaking frankly, he thought we were not popular there.

We and the British found ourselves much closer in our thinking at the end of our several talks than we could have hoped. The need for entering the French colonial field was obvious to our British colleagues and the argument seems to have been accepted that this hope could be realized and the position of the United States in an international scheme clarified with respect to the Pacific islands, only if Great Britain were willing to have the question of dependent peoples brought into the area of international discussion.

Once we had reached this point the remaining question was: Should we continue to seek agreement on the text of a declaration by Great Britain and the United States with respect to dependent peoples? On this point Colonel Stanley said that the time had passed when such a joint declaration would have any political value either in Great Britain or, he thought, in the world. But he was willing to take up the suggestion that a section on dependent peoples should appear in the World Organization.

At the end of the conversations, Colonel Stanley summarized under four heads the general situation as he saw it, as follows:

1) Any statement of colonial policy should become part of a section on dependent peoples in the structure of world organization and should not be a joint declaration.

2) The principle of regional commissions is acceptable to the British if they are not executive in character but are set up to study, recommend, and advise. On them should be represented not only parent nations but nations that have major economic and strategic interests in such areas.

3) Local branches of functional world organizations should be linked up to the regional commissions in the fields of health, nutrition, labor, etc. The functional organization would consult on the recommendations of the regional commissions.

4) A definite obligation to publish annual reports on each area should be assumed. This should be an obligation on all the colonial powers. Such reports would be sent to a control body where they would be available and interchangeable.

Colonel Stanley was so hopeful of future agreement along the above lines that he said he was willing to place these four points before his associates in the Cabinet. Dr. Bowman told him that he thought consideration on the ministerial level was inappropriate at the present time, if Colonel Stanley were going to refer in such presentation to the position of the Government of the United States. The exchanges in our conversations had been informal and exploratory. On our side it was necessary to put the four points he had mentioned into the stream of discussion in the Department of State, after which Secretary Hull would in due course convey our decision or proposal. Colonel Stanley said that he understood this but that he thought it desirable to consult his associates in the Cabinet in an informal way and try out these four points as the beginning of another chapter in our discussion of dependent peoples.

arctic and antarctic

Dr. Bowman inquired if the British Government desired to include Arctic and Antarctic questions in the general settlement following the war. He stated that there were no questions in either region that could not be settled fairly without argument, but that before the situation got tangled by further explorations, such as the Japanese had made in the Antarctic some years ago, we ought to make a final territorial settlement of the conflicting or overlapping claims of the Norwegians, British and Americans.

Instructions were given to a representative of the study group attached to the Foreign Office to look into the Arctic and Antarctic question and advise the Foreign Office on the desirability of undertaking a broad examination of this group of problems with a view to its consideration in the final settlement.

III. Economic Topics

economic advisers to shaef

Mr. Philip Reed⁴⁶ expressed the opinion to the Under Secretary that on the basis of our experience in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the responsibility for the integration of American and British economic policies with military planning in the coming European operations should be centralized in SHAEF under the authority of the Supreme Commander. This responsibility should be vested, he feels, in representatives of the respective governments attached to SHAEF as economic advisers to the Supreme Commander.

This proposal was discussed with Ambassador Robert Murphy in Marrakech and he concurs in it. He pointed out that in North Africa it was necessary to set up the North African Economic Board as a staff section of the Allied High Command in order to centralize economic matters and integrate them with military planning, and that the Board constituted a convenient bridge between the economic activities of the operational period and the post-military period. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the problems which will be faced by SHAEF are far more complex than those faced in North Africa. It would be wise, he feels, to develop civilian economic coordination with the military as soon as may be convenient in order to deal both with the short-range and long-range economic problems more effectively.

Recommendation

We do not believe, of course, that economic advisers should be urged on General Eisenhower if he does not feel the need for them. We think it highly desirable, however, that the problem be put before him in the near future. We recommend that an informal letter be addressed to General Eisenhower asking him whether he believes that American and British economic advisers, occupying the same status as the American and British political advisers now attached to SHAEF, would be of value to him in the coming operations.

united nations economic discussions

Resumption of Anglo-American Economic Talks

The early resumption of the economic talks was urged on the British in numerous conversations. The officials of the Foreign Office seem willing to proceed promptly with the talks. The Prime Minister, however, feels that he must proceed with great caution in this field. Pie stated that thorough discussions with the Dominions and further discussions in Parliament are necessary before the British can resume the economic talks. He did state, however, that he recognized that the political situation in the United States may make it necessary to proceed at a faster pace, and he gave his assurances that he would bear this fact in mind.

Once the agreement of the Prime Minister has been obtained, there should be little delay on the British side, since the Foreign Office seems now to feel technically prepared to resume discussions. In fact, Mr. Richard Law⁴⁷ stated that he was very anxious that they get under way in May of this year.

United Nations Economic Steering Committee

The failure of the Prime Minister to answer the President’s two telegrams of February 23rd⁴⁸ concerning a United Nations steering committee for international economic discussion and the future of the Anglo-American Combined Boards, was pointed out repeatedly in our conversations.

Although this was not stated by the British, it is our belief that they are reluctant to set up a United Nations steering committee for economic discussions until there is already a considerable measure of agreement between Britain and the United States as to the topics to be raised and the countries which are to participate in the discussions. Mr. Eden, however, agreed to take the matter up with the War Cabinet and to secure an answer as quickly as possible. On the last day of our visit, Mr. Eden apologized for the fact that an answer had not yet been formulated and stated that he would communicate with the State Department within the next two weeks.

cartels

Cartels had apparently never been recognized as a problem by the British Foreign Office until the economic talks at Washington in October, 1943.⁴⁹ British thinking is still far behind ours on the subject. The Foreign Office is concerned with it now, in fact, only because we have taken a position and wish to continue discussions.

Some British officials were willing to admit the evils of cartelization, but they emphasized that the unscrambling process as far as Britain is concerned will be very long and difficult. Their feeling is that we should start on a case by case basis, taking the most flagrant examples first and gradually working toward the abolition of all forms of cartels that can definitely be shown to interfere with international trade.

Other British officials, however, believe that cartels are necessary to protect invested capital and commitments to labor such as stabilized wages and pensions. They feel that we in the United States will have to accept cartels after our economy ceases to expand at such a swift rate.

It is unquestionable that there are both powerful industrial and labor groups in Britain which will support the maintenance of cartels.

Recommendation

1) We recommend that the discussion of cartels with the British be conducted to a greater extent on a case by case basis and that the American representatives be thoroughly briefed on particularly flagrant cartel abuses which the British will not be able to defend.

2) Since the argument is frequently raised that cartels are a necessary machinery for the interchange of technical information, we recommend that studies be made of alternative methods for exchanging technical information which will not involve the restrictive aspects of cartelization.

shipping

Officials of the British Government, almost without exception, are acutely concerned over Britain’s place in post-war shipping and the threat of competition from subsidized American shipping. The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Lord Leathers⁵⁰ and Sir Walter Layton⁵¹ discussed this subject at considerable length in various conversations. The British feel that a large merchant fleet is of great importance to them not only as a direct source of revenue but also as the foundation of their export trade.

Lord Leathers stated that it is expected that he will have a conversation with the President on shipping before any final decisions are reached. It is clear that this subject must be discussed at the highest levels. It will be one of the most difficult of our mutual problems.

Recommendation

We recommend that studies be commenced immediately to determine the advantages of an enlarged merchant fleet to the economy of the United States and disadvantages of such a fleet to the British economy. While strategic considerations must play an important role in any final decision, it is our feeling that the purely commercial aspects should be more thoroughly explored before any position is crystallized.

british post-war reconstruction

Priorities in Post-War Planning

British post-war domestic planning authorities stated to Mr. Pratt that housing has been given first priority of manpower and materials in post-war domestic reconstruction plans. The housing shortage is already a serious problem, and it will become acute, the British feel, when the demobilization of the armed forces begins. Second in the post-war priority scale is the production of civilian goods for domestic use, e.g., clothing, hardware, china, and similar items, which are now almost impossible to obtain.

The British post-war planning authorities stated that they do not see how any substantial volume of goods can be manufactured in Britain for export until these urgent domestic needs have been met.

Notwithstanding that the present British planning gives exports a lower priority than housing and civilian goods, however, we believe that it would be unwise to expect that when final decisions are made, manufacturing for export will not have at least an equal priority with housing and civilian goods.

The Interim Period after European Hostilities Cease

British officials state that it is unlikely that even the urgent housing and civilian goods production jobs can be gotten under way on a large scale in Britain between the end of hostilities in Europe and total demobilization after the Pacific war. The greatest limiting factor in British reconstruction during this interim period will be manpower.

The British General Staff has estimated that after the end of the war in Europe, personnel in the armed forces and munition plants can be reduced by 25 percent. The civilian authorities have asked for a re-examination of this figure, but there is little possibility of more than a 30 percent reduction. Taking into account the retirement of over-age workers and the return of married women to their homes, this reduction will produce only about half a million workers for reconstruction purposes. It is estimated that the housing job alone will take 1,250,000 to 1,500,000 workers. Thus, there will probably be little increase in the production of civilian supplies until the end of the Pacific war.

Termination of Lend-Lease

The British are very concerned over the possibility of a diminution of the volume of Lend-Lease during the period between the end of the European war and the end of the Pacific war. Their import requirements will not decline, since they will need continued food imports and imports of raw materials for a substantial volume of continued war production. The British stated that they see no possibility of increasing their exports to any extent, however, in order to pay for these imports until after the Japanese war is over. They feel that financial assistance of some sort from this country during that period will be necessary.

It was pointed out to the British that whatever the financing arrangements for the period between the end of hostilities in Europe and in the Pacific might be, it is clear that Lend-Lease must draw to a close when general hostilities cease. It is therefore vital that our two Governments begin to plan now for financing arrangements, perhaps in the form of long-term credits, to ensure the continued flow of food and other necessary supplies from this country to Britain without a prolonged transition period of doubt and confusion which would work great hardships on the economies of both countries.

Recommendation

We recommend that studies be commenced on the volume and character of exports from the United States which will probably be necessary to the maintenance of the British economy, 1) in the interim period between the close of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, and 2) in the immediate post-war period. The relationship of these exports to the Lend-Lease program and the possibility of long-term credit arrangements should also be studied.

british reconversion and disposal of surplus war materials

It became apparent in discussions by Mr. Pratt on the disposition of war plants and surplus war materials, that these problems have had very little attention at the Ministerial level in Britain and that in general we in the United States are a good deal further ahead in our planning in this regard.

The disposition of Government-financed war plants is a highly controversial political subject in Britain, and the present coalition of government does not wish to raise it at the present time. Mr. Oliver Franks of the Ministry of Supply stated that a policy of short-term leasing of such plants would probably be adopted in order to provide an opportunity for a thorough national discussion of the long-term disposition of them.

The British feel that the only surplus war materials which will be a problem for them will be copper and wool. Mr. Franks estimates that the British Government will have in its possession at the end of the war a four years’ supply of each of these commodities. He is also concerned over the world surplus of cotton which may result from the great increase in Brazilian cotton production. It is his feeling that these three products should be controlled by commodity agreements in order to protect the British and American producers by preventing a serious decline in prices.

Sir David Waley of the Treasury⁵² stated that he believes Great Britain will not make again the mistake which was made at the end of the last war of attempting to dispose of surplus war materials too speedily. He stated that there would be no pressure from the Treasury at the end of this war for a hurried disposition of surplus materials and war plants in order to reimburse the Treasury.

IV. Middle East Topics

palestine⁵³

The British Government has undertaken to move to Palestine any Jewish refugees coming from Europe via Turkey and is prepared to cooperate actively in any efforts to rescue refugees which will not redound to the benefit of the Axis.

The British intend, however, to stand firmly on the White Paper⁵⁴ policy as regards Jewish immigration into Palestine until the end of the war. There are 27,500 remaining quota numbers, of which only 8,000 are presently earmarked, and the British regard this as ample provision for any foreseeable refugee traffic. Should the number of refugees unexpectedly exceed this provision, they are confident of their ability to provide places of refuge in the Near East, although not necessarily in Palestine itself.

The British do not expect any trouble from either Jews or Arabs in Palestine which they will be unable to handle, unless the local populations should be aroused by a revival of Zionist activity and agitation in the United States. They accordingly hope that we will do anything possible to prevent such development. At the moment the British regard this situation as satisfactory, following the initiative of General Marshall⁵⁵ in forestalling the passage of the recent Zionist resolutions in Congress. They therefore regard the present issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement on Palestine as more likely to stir than calm the American Zionists, but desire to consider the matter again should developments necessitate.

american consular representation in bahrein⁵⁶

The British maintained their long-standing refusal to allow an American consul to reside in Bahrein on the basis of their unwillingness to create a precedent which would require similar authorization for Persian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian consular officers there and result in endless intrigue and administrative difficulties.

The British, however, in discussions with Mr. Murray made satisfactory concessions to us by agreeing:

1) To allow the American Consul at Dhahran to include Bahrein in his consular district and pay frequent visits thereto.

2) To appoint American constables to act under the authority of the British political agent in matters involving American citizens.

3) To appoint American assessors—a type of juryman who advises the judge under the Indian Code applying to aliens in Bahrein—to sit with the British Political Agent, in his judicial capacity, in cases involving American citizens.

iran

The British affirmed their whole-hearted support of the American advisers to the Iranian Government and agreed to join with us in suggesting to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held in Tehran with a view to implementing more fully the provisions of the Tehran declaration⁵⁷ regarding Allied economic assistance for Iran. This suggestion was made to the Soviet Ambassador by Mr. Eden and The Under Secretary on April 25, 1944 and was favorably received.

The British are naturally and understandably concerned with the maintenance of order throughout the Middle East. They therefore proposed that an agreed Anglo-American program of arms supply for Iran be worked out, and that efforts subsequently be made to bring the Soviets into the agreed program. This proposal is being studied in close consultation with the War Department.

saudi arabia⁵⁸

Paramount British political and strategic interests and paramount United States oil interests in Saudi Arabia were explained and mutually recognized in discussions between Mr. Murray and officials of the Foreign Office. It was agreed that these special interests should not conflict. The British categorically disclaimed any intention to undermine or to prejudice American oil rights in that country and agreed that the larger financial and supply problems of Saudi Arabia should be dealt with as far as possible on the joint basis in consultation between the two Governments. It was felt by representatives of both Governments that:

1) Anglo-American discussions in Washington regarding the establishment of a currency and banking system in Iran should be expedited.

2) An agreed joint program for the supply of goods to Saudi Arabia should be worked out in Cairo.

3) Prompt consideration should be given to the organization of a joint Anglo-American military mission to assist King Ibn Saud in training and establishing a modern Saudi Arabian Army.

middle east supply center

The British expressed appreciation of the work of Mr. Landis as Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East. They fully agreed that his efforts to settle controversial matters as soon as they come up will in the long run contribute more to the effective maintenance of good Anglo-American relations than a policy of nursing grudges which might well be publicly and harmfully ventilated later. It was agreed that Mr. Landis, Lord Moyne,⁵⁹ and all other British and American representatives in the Middle East should be instructed to arrange local machinery whereby rumors, criticisms and complaints will be raised frankly, jointly examined and disposed of as soon as they arise.

The British were sincerely anxious that American participation in the MESC⁶⁰ should be strengthened by the addition of further American personnel.

As regards the future of the Center, it was agreed that the Middle Eastern Governments should if possible be drawn gradually into closer association with the Center so that they may be aided to co-operate with each other and provided with general and technical guidance for dealing with their common social and economic problems and for raising the standard of living and health throughout the Middle East. While it was recognized that the nature of British and American participation must be left for subsequent consideration, it was agreed that the ultimate objective should be the development of an autonomous economic institution serving the peoples of the Middle East and operated and supported by them.

list of conversations

[Here follows list of conversations.]

1. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
3. Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.
4. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
5. For correspondence pertaining to the European Advisory Commission, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
6. For correspondence regarding the Moscow Conference of October 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 513 ff.
7. Concluded May 16, 1944, in identical terms with the agreement concluded on the same day between the United States and Norway; for text of the latter, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1581.
8. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 744.
9. British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
10. For further correspondence regarding surrender terms for Germany, see vol. i , section entitled “Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission,” part V.
11. John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
13. Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force.
14. James Clement Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs.
15. Winston S. Churchill.
16. Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
17. For correspondence regarding concern of the United States over civil administration of France following liberation from the Germans, see pp. 634 ff.
18. Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1944, p. 335.
19. Mr. Eden stated he welcomed the development of the Soviet Union informing the French Committee of National Liberation on August 26, 1943, that it had decided to recognize the Committee and to exchange plenipotentiary representatives with it. (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 392, col. 174.)
20. Gen. Joseph P. Koenig, appointed by French Committee of National Liberation as Military Delegate for the French zone of theater of operations to be established after D–Day.
21. On May 3, 1944, Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons: “I am happy to take this opportunity to emphasize that His Majesty’s Government are in full agreement with the statement made by United States Secretary of State on 9th of April in regard to the administration of liberated France.” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 399, col. 1296.)
22. Adm. Jean François Darlan, French High Commissioner in North Africa. For correspondence pertaining to the landing of Allied forces in North Africa, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 379 ff.
23. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation.
24. For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in Poland and its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 1216 ff.
25. See vol. iv , section under the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled “Reports on developments of significance concerning Soviet relations …”.
26. For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States over the maintenance of responsible government in Italy, see pp. 996 ff.
27. For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in Finland and its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 608 ff.
28. See vol. iv , section under Rumania entitled “Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania at Moscow …”.
29. See pp. 515 ff.
30. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of Poland.
31. For correspondence regarding the Tripartite Conference at Moscow October 18–November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 513 ff.
32. For correspondence regarding the Conference at Tehran, November 27–December 2, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 459 ff.
33. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.
34. For correspondence on negotiations leading to embargo by Portugal on export of wolfram in order to cut off source of supply to Germany, see vol. iv , second section under Portugal.
35. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. i, p. 462.
36. For correspondence pertaining to United States policy of non-recognition of the Argentine Government, see vol. vii , section under Argentina entitled “Withholding of recognition from the regime of Edelmiro Farrell by the United States.”
37. Designation for series of telegrams from the Department of State to Under Secretary of State Stettinius in connection with his mission to London in April 1944. Telegram Esdel 22, not printed.
38. Brazilian Expeditionary Force.
39. Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory.
40. Camille Gutt and J. van den Broek, respectively.
41. British Cmd. 6531, Misc. No. 2 (1944).
42. Green H. Hackworth.
43. Charles K. Webster, Research Department, British Foreign Office.
44. Not found in Department files.
45. Oliver Stanley, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
46. Chief of the U.S. Mission for Economic Affairs in London.
47. British Minister of State.
48. Vol. ii, section entitled “Informal and exploratory discussions regarding postwar economic policy.”
49. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 1099 ff.
50. Minister of War Transport.
51. Chairman of News Chronicle.
52. Under-Secretary.
53. See vol. v, pp. 560 ff.
54. The White Paper was dated May 17, 1939; British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy.
55. Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
56. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 111 ff.
57. Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646.
58. See vol. v, pp. 658 ff.
59. British Resident Minister in Egypt.
60. Middle East Supply Center.