840.70/11–1744: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
Washington, November 18,
1944—9 p.m.
9731. For EITO Delegation, reEmbs 10071, of November 17, 6 p.m.
- I.
- Department desires to segregate political from technical issues of EITO as indicated in paragraph 2 of Department’s 9693 of November 17. It would seem that the Ronald formula would succeed in divorcing the political from the technical issues. We had considered this one of its main attractions and the purpose for which it was conceived. Therefore, the British tactics of delivering to the Soviets their reply with a comment that they would try to avoid embarrassing the Soviets by not holding a meeting at which the Polish Emigré representatives would be present and then tacking on a time limit of “a reasonable period of not more than 4 or 5 days” again inject technical issues at the political level. If the British adopt the Ronald formula it would seem that the need for a full meeting could be avoided and consequently obviates the necessity for any time limitation.
- II.
- Please advise Ronald informally that the Department views with concern the injection at the time the British deliver their reply to the Soviet note, of technical issues by referring to a meeting of the conference. You may support this position with the above comments.
- III.
- Insofar as consulting Massigli is concerned this seems to be a matter of tactics which was discussed in paragraph 4 of Department’s 9693 and which was left to your discretion. Department would have no objection to sounding out Massigli if the delegation sees benefits to be derived therefrom.
- IV.
- Department’s suggestion for informal notification to other delegations prior to the delivery of the notes was not based on any contingency but rather it was an effort to avoid precipitating an open break by the Soviets and to keep the situation fluid, as indicated in paragraph III of Department’s 9526.92
- V.
- A misunderstanding seems to have arisen concerning sentence in Department’s informational telegram 960893 referred to in Embassy’s 10071. The wording “may result in setting up some stop-gap arrangement” was used advisedly. This did not exclude an organization such as envisaged by the Ronald formula which would leave the [Page 878] door open for Soviet participation. It was thought possible that an agreement might soon be signed, possibly including the Ronald formula and that the organization might be set up forthwith. If this turned out to be the case, a stop-gap arrangement might not be necessary.
- VI.
- The Department’s main interest in the Interim Commission was to have a
working mechanism set up before now to assist the military and the
continentals and to have a flexible mechanism in the event that an EITO
agreement would be long delayed which is exactly what has transpired.
Under present circumstances the necessity for an interim organization
would seem to depend on
- (a)
- whether an agreement can be reached, and
- (b)
- if so, how long it would be before an EITO organization could be established and functioning.
- If the Soviets are not willing to participate in EITO it would seem inconsistent to have them as full participants in an interim organization which might be set up and which would be occupied primarily with matters of concern to the U.S., U.K. and the western continentals. Presumably provision for their possible participation would be made just as provision would be made for their possible participation in the final EITO organization.
- VII.
- If our full delegation feels that an interim organization under present circumstances is necessary (namely that ane EITO agreement and organization will be delayed) and the British alternative interim arrangement appears rasonable and workable, satisfactory to our military and would be acceptable to the continentals, there would be no objection to our delegation informing the Foreign Office that the arrangement had merit and would be recommended to the Department without committing the Department. As for bargaining for the acceptance of the procedure to be followed in advance of the delivery of the notes, as proposed by the Department in its 9526, this is left to your discretion, keeping in mind paragraph 2 of Department’s 9693, namely of divorcing political from technical issues. If the British decide to reply to the Soviets along the same lines as the Department, the Department would not wish to hold up the reply. Therefore, the Department does not wish to make an issue of its proposed procedure even though it seems to have obvious advantages.
Stettinius