Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

840.70/11–1844: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, November 18, 1944—5 p.m.
[Received 7 p.m.]

10121. From EITO Delegation. Embassy’s 9385 of October 30 and Department’s 9253 of November 4. After careful consideration we feel that it is appropriate to submit certain general observations which we believe should determine our policy in the further conduct of the EITO negotiations:

1. The long delay that has occurred necessarily tends to produce an atmosphere of disillusionment with the whole project among the Continental Allies. Statements by Hondelink tend strongly to confirm this view. We have not of course been at liberty to talk directly with the Continental Delegations.

Thus, while we lack proof of this development, in our judgment it would be unwise not to consider it highly probable.

2. The unity and concentration of purpose among the Continental Delegations that were apparent during the discussions in the Main Committee thus threaten to become dissipated. How far this trend may go cannot be assessed until we resume discussions on concrete proposals.

3. The factors that brought about this situation are secondary in importance to the fact that in our opinion it exists and has potentialities that may seriously jeopardize the ultimate result.

4. The ultimate result to be desired is some sort of organization (a) that the military and later the occupation authorities can rely on and make use of and that will meet relief and rehabilitation needs and (b) that the Continental Allies and the Soviets will support. It will be noted that (a) to a large extent depends on (b).

5. The possible uses of the organization after the military and occupation periods are of indirect interest to the United States and in any event may be determined chiefly by its initial usefulness.

6. Under the circumstances we conclude that:

(a) It is more important to get some sort of organization that can meet the requirements of 4 above into being as soon as possible than it is to lose time contending for many points that in themselves may be meritorious.

(b) To this end it is more important to judge proposed changes in the redraft by the criterion of whether they will secure the support of the Continental Allies for the agreement without jeopardizing Soviet support or vice versa than by our own ideas of how it would be desirable for the document to read provided it is not rendered unacceptable for military or political reasons.

By way of illustration it may well be that in contending as long as we did with the Soviets in the tripartite meetings and in the Main Committee for the preservation of the original powers provided for the organization and in not proposing earlier the sort of concessions contained in the redraft of the agreement we may have lost more in the end result than the powers for which we were contending were worth. In this connection we are influenced by the fact that, while the Continental Allies supported our position, we feel fairly certain they would also have supported such a redraft if it had had tripartite sponsorship.

We therefore respectfully recommend to the Department that the general principles actuating the proposed redraft be regarded as of at least as great importance as any specific provision and in passing on proposed textual changes that the Department consider them in the light of the above. [EITO Delegation.]

Winant