837.24/1249
The Ambassador in Cuba ( Braden ) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 20.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my confidential airmail despatch No. 2296 of February 2456 concerning relations with the BEW, and to state that as a result of the ill-advised submission of Decentralization Plan “A” to the Cuban Embassy in Washington, reportedly by Mr. Hector Lazo of the BEW, it may now prove impossible to obtain acceptance of Plan “A” by the Cuban Government.
At the outset I wish to refer to the provisions of the Executive Order of May 20, 194257 (clarification and interpretation of Executive Order No. 9128 of April 13, 1942,58 in respect of certain functions of the Department of State and the Board of Economic Warfare), which, inter alia, states as follows:
“The Board will continue to recognize that it is the function of the Department of State to conduct or authorize the conduct of all negotiations with foreign governments in Washington and abroad.”
In my despatch No. 2405, dated March 10, 1943,59 I reported that the adoption of Decentralization Plan “A” would be undertaken in Cuba [Page 193] on an interim basis on May 1, or as soon thereafter as it would be possible for the Agenda60 properly to organize for handling the additional work involved. To this end, a series of informal conferences was held between members of my staff and Dr. Sarabasa and Dr. Sarabasa, Jr., respectively the Agent and Assistant Agent of the Agencia, working toward a complete clarification and understanding of the Decentralization Plan. I had personally conferred with the Prime Minister,61 and he had agreed to approach the Secretary of Finance62 on the subject of additional funds for the Agencia. Everywhere the Embassy had been met with a fine spirit of cooperation, and my feeling and that of my staff was that the adoption of this plan could be put through on a satisfactory basis.
It therefore came as a shocking surprise to me when, on March 11, members of my staff, when meeting to discuss further details with the Drs. Sarabasa, were informed that Mr. Hector Lazo, Assistant Director in charge of the Office of Exports, of the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington, had presented to the Cuban Ambassador in Washington a copy of the outline of Decentralization Plan “A”, copies of which have in turn been forwarded by the Cuban Embassy to its Government in Habana. Dr. Sarabasa informed the Embassy that in Mr. Lazo’s transmitting letter to Ambassador Concheso, he had requested that the matter be kept confidential as it had not yet been officially presented to the Cuban Government.
This action in itself appears contrary to the Executive Order of May 20, 1942, and it was particularly inept and unfortunate in that certain matters were covered by the outline which should have been handled in the strictest confidence, such as the provision for the rejection by the Embassy of import recommendations made in the name of persons appearing on the Confidential List of Unsatisfactory Consignees,63 and that under which the BEW reserved the right to disapprove in Washington import recommendations which had already received the approval not only of the Agencia but of the Embassy.
When Messrs. Adam of the Department and Greene of the BEW were in Habana it was specifically agreed at Mr. Greene’s original suggestion that all disapprovals arising from the Confidential List should be kept in strictest confidence (i.e., not communicated to the Agencia), and that the BEW’s copies would be forwarded to Washington under cover of a strictly confidential despatch recommending that export licenses be not issued.
[Page 194]The Agenda likewise took strong exception to the fact that their determination of the end uses to which their imports may be put within Cuba would be subject to approval or denial by the BEW.
The following excerpt, from a memorandum given me by the officer who received the brunt of Dr. Sarabasa, Jr.’s comments on the subject, will throw further light upon the effect produced on this agency of the Cuban Government by making this confidential text available at this time. I may add that this conversation was conducted with Dr. Sarabasa, Jr., who stated that his father was so shocked at the implications of the BEW memorandum that he became ill and could not attend the office.
“In words expressing wounded pride and anger, Dr. Sarabasa, Jr., described his father’s and his reactions on reading the various points contained in the attached memorandum, especially the references made to screening by the Mission and by the BEW for end-use and for persons on the Mission’s and BEW confidential list, and to the right which the BEW reserves for itself to reject Import Recommendations approved by the Agencia and by the Mission. Dr. Sarabasa, Jr., and his father are indignant that an attempt should be made by an agency of our Government to impose upon the Agencia a Decentralization Plan containing conditions such as described in the BEW memorandum, which are totally unacceptable to Cuba. He firmly stated that the Agencia insists upon its right to determine what are essential and non-essential end-uses in Cuba for materials imported from the United States and will not admit of the prerogative of any agency of our Government to reject, for reasons of end-use, an Import Recommendation that has been approved by the Agencia.”
I wish to point out that this incident may have far-reaching effects when it becomes known to the higher officials and departments of the Cuban Government, Not only may it give the impression that the United States Government is conducting star-chamber proceedings in connection with matters vitally affecting Cuban economy, and as the Cuban Government may regard it, affecting its sovereign right of determination, but it has also undoubtedly set back, if not torpedoed, the delicate negotiations which I was conducting concerning the operation of Plan “A” and the appropriation by the Cuban Government of funds therefor. Finally, it has raised serious doubts in the minds of the two Cuban officials heading the Agencia of the frankness and good faith of the Embassy’s dealings.
In particular I wish to invite the Department’s attention to the unfavorable effect of furnishing in writing confirmation of the existence of the Confidential List of Unsatisfactory Consignees. The Proclaimed List is a public document for which our Government stands officially responsible and the inclusion of names on which we are prepared to defend. While the Cuban Government may have had reason [Page 195] to surmise that in addition to the Proclaimed List, we maintain another—secret and unpublished—list, no previous confirmation of the existence of such a list has to my knowledge been given and, moreover, the utility of the Confidential List is obviously very much impaired unless it can in fact be maintained as secret. This is obviously now out of the question, to say nothing of the possibility that the Governments of the other American Republics may have likewise been furnished by BEW with copies of Plan “A”.
The Embassy will of course put forth its utmost efforts to repair the damage which has been done by the unwise, ill-timed, and reckless submittal of the confidential text of Plan “A” by the BEW to the Cuban Embassy in Washington. Whether it will be possible in the circumstances to obtain the cooperation of the Cuban Government, remains to be seen. Obviously our task here has been made infinitely more difficult by the foregoing development and by the resentment already aroused by this action, which once again demonstrates the unwisdom of permitting any agency except the Department of State and its own diplomatic missions to handle matters of this nature.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- This was not an executive order but rather a statement entitled “Clarification and Interpretation of Executive Order No. 9128 of April 13, 1942 …”. For text of this Clarification, see 7 Federal Register 3843.↩
- For text of Executive Order No. 9128, see 7 Federal Register 2809.↩
- Despatch not printed.↩
- Agencia de Importación y Exportación.↩
- Ramon Zaydín.↩
- José Miguel Irissari.↩
- For an indication of the inclusiveness of the Confidential List, see footnote 44, p. 188.↩