841D.01/203: Telegram
The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 14—7:49 p.m.]
117. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Sir John Maffey, British representative, informed me shortly after my return that his Government required his presence in London to confer and advise regarding a proposed American note to Ireland. I told him that I assumed this to be the proposal and draft15 which I reported to you before leaving Washington. I made it clear both verbally and in writing that this was no more than a recommendation on which as far as I knew you had not taken action. I said that I therefore felt at liberty to discuss the matter with him and would appreciate his [Page 146] counsel and advice. He suggested that I also consult Kearney, the Canadian High Commissioner, in whom I have confidence. This I have done.
Both these believe that there is more than a reasonable chance of de Valera accepting the offer in question not because he wishes to but because he could not afford to refuse it. I hope this may be so but I cannot subscribe to it as a probability.
I explained that the object of my recommendation was to prevent the Irish partition issue being injected into post-war American politics by de Valera and exploited by the subversive elements in America which tried block preparedness and Lend-Lease in order to oppose your plans for cooperation with the British Commonwealth and other nations. We know these forces are still active and organized. I said that it seemed wiser to spread the facts and our point of view on the record before the attack came and while war conditions existed. Maffey asked me if we wanted a refusal rather than acceptance of the offer if it should be made. I said while I had no authority to speak for you or the President I believed the last thing you wished would be a quarrel; that in long view it was obviously best that Eire should join us on a friendly basis and de Valera be placed in a position where he would be controlled by conference conditions. But I said that I could not believe that there was much chance that he would accept the offer and that it was most desirable that note should be drawn to make the record for the American public. I further said that as he knew de Valera responded to none of the courtesies of diplomatic usage nor to the usual methods of persuasion but that a blunt and just statement of facts even though reciting unpleasant things carried most weight with him. Maffey agreed that this was so.
What will carry most weight with de Valera is that he will understand at once the strategy of the note and that it will forestall a successful appeal to American sympathy.
Maffey pointed out that if the note were sent de Valera would probably reply by saying that as long as the crime of partition lasted he could not be expected to cooperate with the British Commonwealth except on his own terms. This, of course, would be his probable line. It therefore seemed wise in order to forestall the necessity of a reply to his reply to state the American position as to the status of Northern Ireland at the outset and further to make it clear that any change in that status was a matter concerning the parties interest [ed] and not the American Government. I have therefore amended my recommended draft in this respect.
I am sending you by the first air courier this revised draft18 containing this and a few immaterial recommendations.