740.00114A Pacific War/401a
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)31
The full texts of the Japanese note32 concerning the execution of some of the Doolittle fliers now having been received and studied leaves no room for the doubt I hoped would exist that it was not a definite and positive statement that they had been executed.
There are several alternative methods of procedure. As I see them, they are:
- 1.
- To proceed immediately to retaliate by executing a comparable number of Japanese officer prisoners of war in our custody.
- 2.
- To publish the note for the information of the American people.
- 3.
- To make a strong protest.
- 4.
- To send instructions to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo to make to the Japanese Government some communication of our horror and revulsion at their action and to instruct the Minister to visit the members of the Doolittle expedition who are captives there and remaining alive and ascertain which of them are alive and which of them by name were executed.
We have submitted the texts of the Japanese communication to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It is my belief that we should await their replies and that the whole matter should then proceed through the Secretary of State to the President for ultimate decision as a matter of very high and very important policy.
In order to present the matter in definite form for the consideration of the President, I suggest that of the alternatives proposed above we adopt the fourth.
To adopt the first course outlined above would, in my mind, have no effect upon the Japanese Government except that it would provide it with a pretext to retaliate on that account and that it might lead to a [Page 973] progressive deterioration in the whole prisoner-of-war situation. I am not unmindful of the fact that the Japanese hold 18,000 of our prisoners and we a few handfuls of theirs. It is true we hold many of their civilians but I am differentiating between civilians and prisoners of war. There are various other arguments which I do not now go into which incline to a negative decision as far as immediate retaliation is concerned.
The second alternative indicated above would seem to be inopportune because we would unnecessarily inflame the anxiety of the families of those officers who are still alive but whose identity is not disclosed because we do not know which of the prisoners have been executed. Furthermore, under those circumstances publicity might be more widespread and the sentiments involved would run deeper and it might result in sporadic activities against Japanese in this country which in itself would lead to a further deterioration and give Japan a pretext for proceeding against our people. Before giving formal publicity to it, I think we should get information as to the identity of the persons involved. Another reason concerns the exchange agreement of civilian internees between the United States and Japan. Some six or seven weeks ago we made a proposal to the Japanese to exchange 4,500.33 Any deterioration in that situation would be deplorable if there is a chance for the exchange to be effectuated. Japan, from all we can understand, has not indicated in any way that she has decided not to proceed with the exchange. It is true that she is procrastinating and delaying it and in the meantime has detained all civilians within her military jurisdiction and has indicated that April 1 would not be acceptable but has indicated that May or June might be acceptable. Until there is an agreement or disagreement on the exchange, which would provide an opportunity for 4,500 Americans to be got out of Japanese hands, it would, in my opinion, be ill advised to act precipitately in a manner which would result in our failure to retrieve these persons. Consequently, I suggest that the arguments point to a very strong protest being sent to the Japanese Government and instruction to the Swiss Minister to ascertain the names and present location of those alive and to report upon them and to obtain from the Japanese Government a statement of the names, dates and places of the executions and that we include in the note a statement to the effect that this is such a barbaric departure from the rules of civilized warfare and such a violation of the definite agreements which Japan undertook in connection with prisoners of war that we reserve the right, though delaying its use until further information is received, to retaliate by the execution of an equal number of officer prisoners of war in our hands.
[Page 974]There might be included a statement to the effect that the United States Government as a humane institution is very loath to resort to retaliation and to inflict upon persons unfortunate enough to be prisoners of war penalties for the barbaric actions of their Government and that we have no present intention of resorting to a course which is pointed out to us by the cruel and uncivilized actions of the Japanese Government, but that even the patience of the United States Government might be strained to the point where it could not in complacency await the opportunity which is definitely approaching to deal with the officers of the Japanese Government on their own home ground in such manner as will punish them for their barbarity and serve as a lasting example to the Japanese people and to succeeding Japanese Governments that the laws and decency of humanity and punishment for breach of them are inexorable and in the gradual course of events will be definitely and deliberately carried out by the United States Government.
I consider the matter of such importance that I request that you disregard temporarily other matters of lesser degree and concentrate upon the preparation of a draft to the effect above indicated, choosing the fourth alternative, so that I may have it at the earliest possible moment. I should prefer to receive it in draft form and if possible by noon March 22.
May I add that until we know the exact number of prisoners involved in the execution, we are not in a position to announce the names or give publicity to the execution or to retaliate in kind—if retaliation should be decided upon.