740.00114A Pacific War/337
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
General Strong19 of the War Department telephoned me this morning to say that he had had under consideration the subject matter of the telegram20 which we had sent him and which digested the text of the Japanese note of February 15 [17], the full text of which has not yet arrived.21
It concerned the mistreatment of prisoners of war in Japanese hands.
He addressed a memorandum to the Chief of Staff22 in which he recommended one of three courses, (not further specified) but had further recommended that none of them be taken at this time.
The Chief of Staff had sent it to the Secretary of War who had returned it directly to General Strong with a statement to the effect [Page 968] that he felt that the time is rapidly approaching, if not here, to take reprisals—otherwise we would lose more than by continuing to extend decent treatment to Japanese in our control.
General Strong was inclined to regard the message from the Secretary of War as a directive and was very much concerned and said he wanted to consult with me.
I told General Strong that the question of retaliation seldom attained its objective and that it was very frequently the signal for a progressive deterioration of the whole situation. Consequently, I hesitated to agree with a proposal which would have as its immediate result a serious deterioration in the character of the treatment of our own people in the Far East and which would make their condition even harder to bear than it is at the present time.
Our object is to do what we can to improve the welfare of our people. To threaten retaliation or to actually practice retaliation would have the effect of causing to be brought upon our own citizens in Japanese hands the most terrible experiences of Japanese cruelty and barbarity. In addition to that, the Japanese Government and the persons responsible for Japanese policy in this respect would not be the sufferers but insignificant little particles of the Japanese population in our midst and under our control whom the Japanese had practically deserted would bear the brunt of our retaliation. This would not affect the policy of the Japanese Government except that it would intensify their attitude toward our people by giving them a pretext upon which to proceed further in the practice of cruelty.
I further called his attention to certain changes which were becoming apparent in Japanese general attitude alluding to that which he corroborated as being a more wholesome respect for the power of the United States. General Strong expressed it as an “increasing concern” on the part of the Japanese and a “considerable worry” of the Japanese military authorities on account of the aggressive action under way on the part of United States forces.
He and I discussed the fact that there was a proposal before the Japanese Government to effect an exchange of our civilians and that there were favorable indications that a more favorable attitude was to be taken by the Japanese with regard to the exchange. The exchange would be frustrated as far as the civilians were concerned and the fate of the prisoners of war as well as the civilians would be rendered all the more unbearable if there was a threat of retaliation or an actual act in retaliation.
I further called attention to the fact we had not received the full text of the note and felt strongly we should have the complete text before deciding on any course. After that we should consider the [Page 969] situation of our civilians subject to exchange and the status of those negotiations and prospects for repatriation.
General Strong said that he would seek an opportunity to present the subject again to the Secretary of War and seek to have him modify his attitude. He thought that the matter might be presented at Cabinet and he asked that the Acting Secretary and the Secretary be advised23 of the development in order that should it progress to be a major issue and be presented to the Cabinet they would not be unprepared.
- Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 (Military Intelligence).↩
- Telegram No. 1240, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 965.↩
- Received March 12 as enclosure to despatch No. 4357, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, not printed.↩
- Gen. George G. Marshall.↩
- Marginal notation by Mr. Long: “done B. L.”.↩