861.5018/98: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 1—4:20 p.m.]
2082. Reference Embassy’s 2025, November 23, noon, and 2068, November 29, 2 p.m.47 So far as the Embassy has been able to ascertain the reduction in the bread ration48 has been applied throughout the Soviet Union. This action has not been referred to in the Soviet press however and we understand that foreign correspondents have not been allowed to report it on the ground that to do so would give aid and comfort to the enemy. There has been considerable speculation here as to the reasons which impelled the Soviet Government to take such a drastic step at this time.49
Keyed up as the Russian people are by the successes of the Red army and the prospects of an early victory, it is not believed that the reduction [Page 790] will seriously affect morale for the present. Moreover, the reduction does not of itself directly affect large portions of the population such as the farmers and the army although it is possible that measures have been or will be taken affecting these groups. Its severity is mitigated by an unusually large potato crop (see Embassy’s telegram 1791, October 30, 11 a.m.50). Nevertheless, the cumulative long-range effect of the reduction upon a population that lives chiefly on bread, that has long been undernourished, and that is suffering severely from the strain of the war is potentially serious. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Government would take such a step only for important reasons.51
The Embassy estimates the saving in grain that will result from the reduction in rations in the uninvaded territory of the Soviet Union to be about 1½ million metric tons from now until the end of July when the next harvest will be made.
As reported in the Embassy’s telegram number 1617, October 15, 10 a.m.,50 it is estimated that the grain situation in the uninvaded territory of the Soviet Union is not materially worse than that which pertained in this area in 1942. Field production in 1943 is in fact estimated to have been greater than in 1942 but losses from delayed harvesting and threshing may have resulted in a slightly smaller production available for consumption this year than in ’42. It should be noted that the margin of error in an estimate of this kind is very great. A normal margin of error might easily account for a difference of 1½ million tons between the 1942 and the 1943 supplies of grain. If there has been this error in the estimates made by the Embassy the reason for the Soviet Government’s action in reducing the bread ration would be explained.
If on the other hand the Embassy’s estimates are accurate or err in the other direction the reason for the cut must be sought in something other than present scarcity as compared with the amount available last year.
At the time the reduction in rations was announced in Moscow it was stated at some distributing points here that the reduction was being made to permit the feeding of reoccupied territory. The Embassy has in preparation a study of the food situation in the Soviet Union and expects shortly to telegraph a report on this subject. Preliminary estimates indicate however that the reoccupation up to [Page 791] the present of Soviet territory has probably not worsened the food situation of the country as a whole. Assuming the correctness of these estimates there would seem to be no need for the Soviet Government to accumulate a reserve of grain to permit the feeding of territory which has already been reoccupied. There remains however the question of territory which the Red army expects to occupy before the next harvest. The Germans will have had more time in which to remove stocks from such territory than was the case in the areas already liberated. Also if areas such as Poland and the Baltic States are included in such territories there might naturally be expected in those areas a greater shortage of grain supplies than in the grain-producing areas farther to the south. The explanation given at Moscow distributing points would thus appear logical when applied to the Baltic States and eastern Poland. It is obvious that a Red army bringing bread into such areas would have an important political effect favorable to the Soviet Union. Regardless of plans for the eventual supplying of liberated areas from United Nations sources the political reaction of the population to the treatment they receive immediately following the entry of Soviet forces would undoubtedly not be ignored by the Soviet authorities.
Other possible reasons for the action of the Soviet Government are that it may be designed to build up a special reserve for the spring months when the food situation is normally especially stringent; to stimulate gifts of grain from collective farms; to facilitate governmental grain procurements; to make a saving made possible by the large potato crop; and to replenish army stocks that may have been depleted.
Whatever may be the reasons or the motives that impelled the Soviet Government to reduce the ration an effect will be to increase the longing of the Soviet people for peace and for a maximum effort by the British and American armed forces to achieve complete victory and a speedy termination of the war.
The foregoing comments are necessarily largely speculative but they may supplement estimates and items available to the Government from other sources.52
Inform Agriculture.
- Neither printed.↩
- The reduction of the daily bread ration effective on November 21, was reported by Ambassador Harriman in telegram No. 1995, November 20, 1 p.m. The reduction affected all ration categories in varying amounts. In telegram No. 2025, the Ambassador said that printed notices announced the measure as being temporary, but did not specify for how long (861.5018/96, 95).↩
- See telegram No. 2609, April 24, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 756.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The increasingly tight food situation in the Soviet Union was mentioned again by Ambassador Harriman in telegram No. 2216, December 14, 3 p.m. A Soviet authority admitted that “it is no secret that Soviet people are in great need of food” and that “there would have been no bread ration cut unless there had been real need for it.” Shipment of food from the United States in full accord with the supply protocol was declared to be absolutely necessary. (861.5018/102)↩
- Not printed.↩
- The Consul General at Vladivostok, Angus I. Ward, reported in his telegram No. 38, May 17, 10 a.m., that the ‘local food supply situation which is usually at its worst in May, is worse today than any other time in the 28 months I have been here”. (861.00/12016)) The Ambassador in the Soviet Union relayed a later review from Ward in telegram No. 741, June 25, 3 p.m., in which the latter had stated that the “food situation deteriorated [to a] new low level”. The less favored strata of the population were obliged to piece out their food supply “with grass and herb roots and young tree leaves” while it was feared that many children “will not survive until potato harvest”. (861.00/12018)↩