Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁵¹

London, 31 September [1 October?] 1943.

429. Former Naval Person^51a to President Roosevelt. I send you herewith a telegram we have received from Molotov last week, and the answer I have now sent. The running of these four convoys will be a great strain to us and also a valuable boon to them. We therefore thought it right to put before him the ill usage of our people, only a few hundred during their stay in North Russia.

You will see that I have taken for granted the fact that you would wish to participate in the convoys, as so much of your stuff is waiting to be shipped and of your extreme regret at the time when we had to abandon the convoys.

Following is text of telegram from H. M. Ambassador, Moscow, referred to. Begins:

“M. Molotov sent for me on the evening of Sept 21st to hand me a long memorandum about convoys.

“After recapitulating the substance of M. Molotov’s communication to Sir O. Sargent of Aug 25th and of reply sent to him on Sept 6th, the memorandum stated that the Soviet Government had naturally borne in mind the proviso contained in the Prime Minister’s message of March 30th to Stalin,⁵² but that reasons given by His Majesty’s Government for non resumption of convoys were not supported by facts. The Soviet Government wishes to remind His Majesty’s Government:

(1) of the statement contained in joint message of Aug 19th from the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt about ‘Lifebelt’⁵³ that the submarines of Germany abandoned the Northern Atlantic and were concentrating on the southern route; and

(2) of the claim in joint statement issued by MOI⁵⁴ and United States Bureau of Military Information on Sept 11th regarding naval losses in August that the enemy had not attempted to attack cargo ships in the northern part of the Atlantic and that the chances of attacks on submarines had been comparatively rare.

“These facts prove that navigation conditions in North Atlantic since May have not been dangerous for convoys proceeding to northern ports of Soviet Union.

“This more favourable position, the increased naval strength of the Allies and the elimination of the Italian fleet which allowed the convoys to pass through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape and thus set free escort ships for northern route, made a further postponement of convoys quite unjustifiable. The resumption was more necessary since the Soviet Union had this year received by the northern route less than one-third of last year’s supplies (249,097 tons as against 764,337 tons).

“His Majesty’s Government’s references to the inadequate carrying capacity of Persian railways in northern zone only made resumption of convoys more necessary, as had been pointed out in Soviet memorandum of Aug 25th and the Soviet Government therefore maintained that in deciding the question of resumption of convoys, due weight should be given to this factor, which is of the gravest importance for the whole question of Soviet supplies.

“In view of the above circumstances and of the fact that the Soviet armies were now for the third successive month undertaking wide and most strenuous offensive on almost the whole German front for the success of which every intensification and increase in supply of armaments and other material was important the Soviet Government insisted upon the urgent resumption of convoys and expected His Majesty[’s] Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days.

“Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government attached very great importance to the matter and in handing me this memorandum he repeated orally all its arguments which I countered with the obvious replies, reminding him of the unhappy fate of our convoys last summer owing to the presence of German capital ships in Norwegian fjords. If we were able to dispose satisfactorily of German fleet, I said that I thought convoys would be resumed without delay.” Ends.

Following is text of telegram I have just sent to Stalin.⁵⁵ Begins:

“I have received your request for the reopening of the convoys to North Russia. I and all my colleagues are most anxious to help you and the valiant armies you lead to the utmost of our ability. I do not therefore reply to the various controversial points made in Monsieur Molotov’s communication. Since June 22, 1941, we have always done our best in spite of our own heavy burdens to help you defend your own country against the cruel invasion of the Hitlerite gang, and we have never ceased to acknowledge and proclaim the great advantages that have come to us from the splendid victories you have won, and from the deadly blows you have dealt the German armies.

“For the last 4 days, I have been working with the Admiralty to make a plan for sending a few [new] series of convoys to North Russia. This entails very great difficulties:

• “First, the Battle of the Atlantic has begun again. The U–boats have set about us with a new kind of acoustic torpedo, which has proved effective against the escorting vessels when hunting U-boats.
• “Secondly, we are at very full stretch in the Mediterranean, building up an army in Italy of about 600,000 men by the end of November, and also trying to take full advantage of the Italian collapse in the Aegean Islands and the Balkan Peninsula.
• “Thirdly, we have to provide for our share of the war against Japan, in which the United States are greatly interested, and whose people would be offended if we were lukewarm.

“Notwithstanding the above, it is a very great pleasure to me to tell you that we are planning to sail a series of four convoys to North Russia in November, December, January, and February, each of which will consist of approximately 35 ships, British and American. Convoys may be [sailed in two halves] to meet operational requirements. The first convoy will leave the United Kingdom about November 12, arriving North Russia 10 days later; subsequent convoys at about 20 [28] day intervals. We intend to withdraw as many as possible of the merchant vessels now in North Russia towards the end of October and the remainder with returning convoy escorts.

“However, I must put it on record that this is no contract or bargain, but rather a declaration of our solemn and earnest resolve. On this basis I have ordered the necessary measures to be taken for the sending of these 4 convoys of 35 ships.

“The Foreign Office and the Admiralty however request me to put before you for your personal attention, hoping indeed that your own eye may look at it, the following representations about the difficulties we have experienced in North Russia.

“If we are to resume the convoys we shall have to reinforce our establishments in North Russia, which have been reduced in numbers since last March. The present numbers of naval personnel are below what is necessary, even for our present requirements, owing to men having to be sent home without relief. Your civil authorities have refused us all visas for men to go to North Russia even to relieve those who are seriously overdue for relief. Monsieur Molotov has pressed His Majesty’s Government to agree that the number of British Service personnel in North Russia should not exceed that of the Soviet Service personnel and trade delegation in this country. We have been unable to accept this proposal, since their work in [is] quite dissimilar and the number of men needed for war operations cannot be determined in such an unpractical way. Secondly, as we have already informed the Soviet Government, we must ask to be the judges of the personnel required to carry out operations for which we are responsible. Mr. Eden has already given his assurance that the greatest care will be taken to limit the numbers strictly to the minimum.

“I must therefore ask you to agree to the immediate grant of visas for the additional personnel now required and for your assurance that you will not in future withhold visas when we find it necessary to ask for them in connection with the assistance that we are giving you in North Russia. I emphasize that of about 170 naval personnel at present in the north over 150 should have been relieved some months ago but Soviet visas have been withheld. The state of health of these men, who are unaccustomed to the climatic and other conditions, makes it very necessary to relieve them without further delay.

“We should also wish to send the small medical unit for Archangel to which your authorities agreed, but for which the necessary visas have not been granted. Please remember that we may have heavy casualties.

“I must also ask your help in remedying the conditions under which our service personnel and seamen at present find themselves in North Russia. These men are of course engaged in operations against the enemy in our joint interest and chiefly to bring Allied supplies to your country. They are, I am sure you will admit, in a wholly different position from ordinary individuals proceeding to Russian territory. Yet they are subjected by your authorities to the following restrictions, which seem to me inappropriate for men sent by an ally to carry out operations of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union:

(a) No one may land from one of H. M. ships or from a British merchant ship except by a Soviet boat in the presence of a Soviet official and after examination of documents on each occasion.

(b) No one from a British warship is allowed to proceed alongside a British merchantman without the Soviet authorities being informed beforehand. This even applies to the British Admiral in charge.

(c) British officers and men are required to obtain special passes before they can go from ship to shore or between two British shore stations. These passes are often much delayed, with consequent dislocation of the work in hand.

(d) No stores, luggage, or mail for this operational force may be landed except in the presence of a Soviet official, and numerous formalities are required for the shipment of all stores and mail.

(e) Private Service mail is subjected to censorship, although for an operational force of this kind censorship should, in our view, be left in the hands of British Service authorities.

[“]The imposition of these restrictions makes an impression upon officers and men alike which is bad for Anglo-Soviet relations, and would be deeply injurious if Parliament got to hear of it. The cumulative effect of these formalities has been most hampering to the efficient performance of the men’s duties, and on more than one occasion to urgent and important operations. No such restrictions are placed upon Soviet personnel here.

[“]We have already proposed to Monsieur Molotov that as regards offences against Soviet law committed by personnel of the Services and of the ships of the convoys, they should be handed over to the British Service authorities to deal with. There have been a few such cases, no doubt, partially at any rate due to the rigorous conditions of service in the north.

[“]I trust indeed, Monsieur Stalin, that you will find it possible to have these difficulties smoothed out in a friendly spirit, so that we may each help each other, and the common cause, to the utmost of our strength.[”]⁵⁶

51. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
52. Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.
52. See footnote 4, p. 635.
53. Code designation used for operations undertaken against Portuguese islands in the Atlantic Ocean.
54. The British Ministry of Information.
55. This telegram is dated October 1, 1943.
56. The reply by Stalin on October 13, which so offended Prime Minister Churchill, his reactions to it, and the report by British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden of his important conversation on October 21 with Stalin and Molotov at the time of the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, in consequence of which the arrangements were completed for the resumption of supply convoys in November by the northern route to the Soviet Union, are described in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), pp. 266–276.