760F.61/101: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 17—12:23 a.m.]
Czechoslovakian Series No. 7. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. Referring to my despatch 66, June 1611 (paragraph 3 page 2) regarding Dr. Beneš’ proposed trip to Moscow and his hopes of making a mutual assistance treaty with Russia somewhat along lines of Anglo-Russian Treaty, Dr. Beneš informs me that he is postponing his trip to Moscow for the present.
He tells me that before going to Washington he informed the British authorities of his hopes to negotiate a treaty with Russia and they signified their approval but that on his return he found they had undergone a change of mind. According to Dr. Beneš, the British explained that in view of Poland’s suspended relations with Russia, they preferred that he postpone his Moscow visit, at least until there were some signs of improvement in those relations, since his visit to Moscow at this time might be construed by the Poles as taking advantage of their present adverse position vis-à-vis Russia and since any Czechoslovak-Russian treaty such as he envisaged might prejudice Poland’s position by leaving her isolated.
Dr. Beneš adds that since the British authorities’ approval originally was subsequent to the rupture of Polish-Russian relations he was somewhat puzzled by this change of attitude and in searching for a reason he has come to the conclusion that it is not unrelated to the following situation: The Russians some time ago made soundings with the Yugoslav Government regarding postwar political cooperation. The British had at the same time been conducting conversations along similar lines with the Greeks. On learning of the Russian soundings, the British proposed to Moscow that their respective conversations be postponed until a more opportune time. The Soviet Government agreed to this proposal. But according to Dr. Beneš, while the British considered that this understanding was general in its application, the Soviet Government considered that it applied only to their respective conversations with the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, and as a result the Russians are finding it difficult to [Page 678] see why there should be any postponement in negotiations for a Czechoslovak–Soviet treaty.12
Dr. Beneš adds that while he wants to take no steps which might conflict with the views of the British Government, he feels the latter may possibly have failed to give realistic consideration to certain angles. For example, as much as he would like to see an early Polish–Russian rapprochement, he does not think that this can be expected for several months to come. Events since General Sikorski’s untimely end13 suggest that the new Polish Government will require some time to become stabilized. If recent Polish inter-party struggles for position lead to further unsettled conditions within the Government, and in his opinion this seems likely, he fears this will not advance the task of healing the Polish-Russian breach. He would not want Czechoslovakia’s position vis-à-vis Russia to become dependent on the state of Polish-Russian relations. He states he has worked diligently to bring his Government’s position up to the point where it can effect a constructive agreement with Russia and he feels such an agreement could serve as a model of relationship between Russia and the states in the middle zone. Viewed in this light, be believes it could be a constructive influence in general and an advantage to Poland in particular.
As regards his own feelings concerning an early departure for Moscow Dr. Beneš states he would wish to delay it for a time in view of General Sikorski’s death. The British however envisage a delay of several months. In the circumstances the date of his visit is altogether uncertain but he hopes to proceed with conversations with the Russians with a view to eventual conclusion of the envisaged agreement.
- Not printed.↩
- In an aide-mémoire of June 27, the British Ambassador in the United States (Lord Halifax) explained that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) had told Molotov in London in 1942 that it was deemed undesirable for their Governments to conclude “treaties covering the post-war period with the smaller Allies, since this might give rise to competition.” After his return to Moscow. “Molotov sent Mr. Eden a message through the Soviet Ambassador saying that the Soviet Government agreed to abide by this self-denying ordinance.” (760F.61/99)↩
- Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, died in an airplane accident on July 4, 1943, near Gibraltar.↩