Mr. Joseph E. Davies, Special Representative of President Roosevelt to the President 58
My Dear Mr. President: Supplementary to the report which I am making to you orally, I beg leave to submit the following general observations as to conditions which I found in the Soviet Union.
I. The Military Situation
A. The Soviet Government’s view as I interpret it from discussions with high officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps.
- 1.
- Hitler’s power has been greatly diminished but he has still a very strong army and great potential which he will employ in a desperate all-out effort against Russia this summer.
- 2.
- The Tunisian campaign and other pending second front plans have relieved the pressure somewhat on the Russian front. They also have affected Hitler’s plans and have given him pause. Reliance is placed upon the Allied offensive this summer to relieve violent pressure which they are sure is coming.
- 3.
- Hitler’s attack will be directed through the center at Voronezh. Its purpose is to encircle Moscow and take it from the rear, or possibly the attack will be diverted to an effort to take the oil fields of the Caucasus. The desperate defense which Germany is making at Kuban and Novorossiisk is cited as evidence that Hitler has not yet abandoned the use of these bridgeheads as “jumping off spots” for the oil fields.
- 4.
- The object of the attack will be primarily to destroy the Red Army, to drive the Government from Moscow, to destroy it if possible, to undermine morale, and enforce a victor’s peace and secure oil desperately needed.
- 5.
- They have a quiet confidence that they can again successfully resist attack. They express an “indomitable” purpose to fight through to the end.
B. My Own Inferences and Conclusions.
- 1.
- If Britain and the United States fail to “deliver” on the western front in Europe this summer, it will have far reaching effects upon the Soviets that will be effective both on their attitude in the prosecution of this war and in their participation in the reconstruction of peace.
- 2.
- They will carry their war into Germany if it is a part of a concerted plan, and if carried on simultaneously by the Allies. Otherwise they will stop at their western boundary and be content with driving the invader out of their territory, if they can do so.
- 3.
- “The legacy of suspicion” is still very strong. The belief exists in some quarters that the United Nations want a weakened Russia at the peace table and a Red Army that is bled white.
- 4.
- I found some indications of an appeasement group in Russia. They advocate Russian withdrawal into itself, no further acceptance of lend lease, in order that it may not be hampered by any obligations after it has won the war.
- 5.
- On this trip I have seen much of the territory east of Moscow, along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in the Urals, and far into the eastern regions of Siberia. From what I have seen, I am more than ever convinced that Hitler cannot conquer Russia. The immensity of the territory, its resources, the vigor of its people and their morale, in my opinion, doom Hitler to failure in Russia. The vast expanses of tillable land, its fertility, its high state of cultivation and the extent of the agricultural resources to the east of Moscow for 2,000 miles [Page 659] and more are most impressive. No less so are the vigor and power of the great new industrial cities and plants in the Urals and even in remote Siberia. It is much beyond anything that I had expected.
- 6.
- I have the very distinct impression that the leaders of this Government and the people have found themselves and are engrained with new and deep self-confidence. They feel secure in their ability to preserve their Army intact and to protect and maintain their Government and their country, quite independent of anything save themselves and their vast territory and their own strength.
II. The Political External Situation
In my opinion:
- A.
- They will quietly insist upon a return of their old boundaries ias a restitution of an ancient wrong.
- B.
- They will not be over-tolerant of non-realistic assumptions (as they term it), of Polish importance and of alleged fallacious Polish arguments. They are going to take back what they considered was wrongfully taken from them. This will be modified by consideration for England, somewhat; but only on the surface.
- C.
- Their present disposition as the situation now stands is scrupulously to stay out of any interference with internal political affairs of other Governments. This is not for the reason assigned for the dissolution of the Comintern; but to have a “live and let live” good neighbor policy with the world if that is possible.
- D.
- They insist that they have no further territorial aspirations, including specifically Iran.
- E.
- They want a peaceful world; they believe that all nations of the earth will be so depleted after this war that all energies will be required to restore the earth and its peoples for a long time to come. But they will be alert to the possibility that they may have to “go it alone”.
- F.
- As to Germany, they are prepared to go the limit with the Allies in making it impossible for her again to break the peace of the earth.
- G.
- They want a strong Poland and are prepared to recognize a strong, but not “reactionary”, state, but they will not relinquish the Curzon Line.60
- H.
- They would not look with favor on the use of Polish divisions on a second front in Yugoslavia. There is strong assertion in some quarters that Mikhailovitch61 is an Italian stooge. There are rumors that he is dead or is in the custody of Nedich.62 There is undoubtedly sympathy for the partisans but under present conditions there would be no active aid extended by them as long as England is interested. They place great reliance upon the May 26, 1942 treaty with Great Britain.63 Their one regret is, as Molotov said on the occasion of the celebration of its first anniversary, that it was not entered into many years ago.
- I.
- Their attitude toward England is cordial and strong.
- I [J].
- Their attitude toward the United States is appreciative and favorable.
III. The Diplomatic Situation
- A.
- The Soviet attitude from what little I could see seemed to be cool both to China and Japan.
- B.
- I was impressed with the power, capacity and good judgment with which the British had conducted and are conducting their relations with the U.S.S.R. They are doing many things to create good will and better mutual understanding. They are doing a good selling job. Their Ministry of Information is publishing a paper in the Russian language which is undoubtedly helping the United Nations effort. Their Ambassador and their officers apparently are getting along with the Soviet officials with signal success. Even their differences are conducted in a spirit of great good temper and a fine tolerance in disposition.
- C.
- As to the particular mission I was engaged upon, I believe that the result thereof has been completely successful.64
Respectfully,
- Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.↩
- This is the date on the document, although Mr. Davies left Moscow at 6:25 a.m. on this day, and some of the description in it obviously is later.↩
- For information regarding the origin of the Curzon Line, and for a description of it, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 793–794. Further information on this subject is in H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1924), vol. vi, pp. 233–283, and summary descriptions in S. Konovalov, Russo-Polish Relations, An Historical Survey (London, 1945), pp. 33–38, 57–63.↩
- Gen. Dragolyub (Drazha) Mihailovich, Minister of Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Yugoslav Government in Exile, leading guerrilla resistance (Chetniks) inside Yugoslavia. See vol. ii , section under Yugoslavia entitled “Concern of the United States regarding disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces”.↩
- Gen. Milan Nedich, Premier of a puppet government for Serbia at Belgrade from September 1941.↩
- Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed in London between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 490–566, passim.↩
- With respect to the particular mission of Mr. Davies, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 3–7.↩