103.9166/6854: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 10—12:39 p.m.]
1879. Division of Current Information Liaison for OWI for Sherwood,30 Kuhn,31 Warburg32 from Spewack.32a Following information may be useful: I had a long and frank talk with Ilya Ehrenburg who has been spending a great deal of time at the front and in reoccupied areas.
As you know he represents European intellectual circle, but he is able reporter. Before outlining his attitude I would like to emphasize certain basic facts.
First of all, Russian people are war weary. “Shortening the war” is not an official line created in a Government office. It is expression of the will of the people. This doesn’t mean they will settle for less than total victory. But they are not getting enough to eat. Their homes are cold. They hang in clusters from the street cars. They can’t buy clothes, shoes or any civilian goods. They work long hours and they have been through 20-odd years of successive crises. And there’s the stark fact there isn’t a family that hasn’t lost someone or doesn’t fear the loss of these left. It is because of this war weariness that camouflage is being taken off buildings, that street lights are brighter, that new army and diplomatic uniforms are resplendent, that guns boom and fireworks flare as each important victory is announced.
People are being given a foretaste of peace and victory. They can’t wait for war to end. Against this background here is Ehrenburg’s view of what the Russians really feel about the Conference. He thinks that it will be regarded generally as a “marriage of convenience” which can be built into genuine relationship. He believes [Page 597] that they will want to know why the Red army can cross the Dnieper and we can’t cross the Channel.
It must be remembered that no one has told them publicly of the difficulties of amphibious operations. Furthermore, according to Ehrenburg, there is feeling if we really wanted to crack the West Wall and end the war this year we would.
While events will settle that debate, it seems to me that there’s dangerous issue involved that goes beyond any official proclamations. When we do move there may be large section of Russia firmly believing we waited to the last possible moment and let Russia bleed.
Ehrenburg advanced many arguments for his views. We had found North Africa and Sicily easier than we had anticipated. Hence we must be wrong again. That is if our motives are pure which he doubts.
Please remember I’m reporting his version of what people feel. Russians have been told their leaders are satisfied with our plans. The Conference is a success and is proclaimed as such. The Government has published extensive foreign despatches in the last few days. There is every indication of the desire of the Government to speed alliance by widespread internal propaganda.
But according to Ehrenburg the average Russian’s idea of American participation in the war is what he sees—fine trucks, planes and Spam. Ehrenburg says there isn’t much interest in operations in Italy except wonder what takes us so long.
Of course some of this will undoubtedly change if Government continues to publish more stuff from abroad.
But we have truly enormous pioneering job to do.
In assembling our material for this country it seems to us we must always bear Russian background in mind. For example, they are most impressed by actual combat on a large scale, ground or air. It’s only natural when they are participating in gigantic war that they’ll cscoff at what they consider diversions.
We must be careful in telling our story of production to eliminate any note of bragging. Their answer to miracle stories about Willow Run or Kaiser is that they moved airplane factory and workers by train to a barren field and 4 days later planes were being assembled by workers without food or homes.
Their scientists and engineers are perfectly willing exchange information but they’re not in mood of late twenties when they regarded us as master mechanics and their teachers.
National pride has penetrated all professions and they’re in the “greatest country, greatest people in world” mood which in view of victories is understandable.
[Page 598]Therefore, they’re not inclined to accept stories or pictures which imply we are wonderful. For even when we can legitimately boast, their answer is that if they hadn’t squandered millions men and machines, if they were in our geographic position in this war, they would have accomplished greater miracles.
Program we are discussing takes this attitude into consideration.
Please remember this: We may break down official reluctance to allow us direct contact with people and organizations. We may improve transport and communications. But we are going to operate with unspeakable telephone service and fantastic shortage of clerical personnel. Everything takes enormous time. I have no typist. We need elementary help as well as key personnel from Washington or London. We will need immediately basic equipment such as mimeograph machines, typewriters, two cars, truck, and patience. [Spewack.]
- Robert E. Sherwood, Director of Overseas Operations, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.↩
- Ferdinand Kuhn, Deputy Director, United Nations Information Policy, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.↩
- James P. Warburg, Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Policy, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.↩
- Samuel Spewack, Press Attaché at the Embassy in the Soviet Union.↩