740.0011 European War 1939/30916: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—9:37 a.m.]
1208. For Secretary and the President. Reference Stalin’s messages to the President dated August 2269 and 24.70 It is my judgement that the proposal (to create a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—the USA, Great Britain and the USSR—for the consideration of questions regarding negotiations with governments falling out with Germany) and to meet in Sicily should be accepted and motivated at once. The agitation for a second front in Europe which originated with the communiqué71 issued in Washington after the visit of Mr. Molotov in June of last year72 has continued in a more or less virulent form ever since and while in recent months I have heard no references to the second front from the officials with whom I have been thrown in contact, the press continues to refer to the second front and to the fact that because of the lack of a [Page 568] second front the Red army is suffering unnecessary losses. I hear from all sides reports that the civilians are still echoing the old song about the second front. For some time there have also been critical statements in press and criticisms from the general public of the fact that Soviet Russia has not been brought into the various conferences which have been held by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. There has been an obvious ignoring or playing down of the importance, to the Russian operations, of the bombing of industries in Germany and France and other occupied countries, and of campaigns in North Africa and Sicily. All of these happenings have led to a rather unanimous belief among the press and the representatives of other foreign countries here that Anglo-American relations with Soviet Union here are steadily deteriorating. Although Mr. Molotov in making the announcement of the recall of Maisky and Litvinov emphasized fact that their recall was necessitated by the need for their advice in Moscow and that there was a dearth in the Soviet headquarters of advisers who had their breadth of knowledge and experience which would qualify them to advise Premier Stalin in his relations with the USA and the British Empire, the press and foreign representatives are still of opinion and belief that this action on part of the Soviet Government was a confirmation of the deterioration of Soviet-Anglo-American relations. It is my opinion that estimates of the deterioration of Soviet-Anglo-American relations are all wrong and there is a trend and an indication that the Soviet Government desires discussions but it is obvious that before collaboration can be had discussions must be entered into. I believe that recall of Maisky and Litvinov indicates an intent on the part of Soviet Government to engage in these pre-postwar discussions and that their presence here in Moscow will be to the advantage of Allied cause. It is my opinion that prompt acceptance of the proposal to set up this committee will have the effect of counteracting the various rumors and beliefs based on these rumors and will go a long way toward assuring Soviet authorities that we are really serious in our desire to have them cooperate and collaborate with us.
Furthermore it will assure the Soviets that we seek and want their assistance in the various conferences which must and will be held in connection with the settlement and construction of the occupied countries of Europe and will obviate the possibility of the Soviets setting up backfire committees in Moscow.
- Vol. ii, p. 353.↩
- Portions of this message are printed in vol. i, pp. 782 and 783.↩
- See press release issued by the White House on June 11, 1942, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 593.↩
- For correspondence concerning negotiations on the occasion of the visit of Mr. Molotov in Washington (May 29–June 4, 1942), see ibid., pp. 566–595, passim. ↩