740.0011 European War 1939/30635: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 11—10:11 a.m.]
1043. The campaign for a second front is now in full swing. The article published in War and the Working Class reported in the Embassy’s [Page 561] telegram No. 1027, August 6,59 contains little that is new on this subject but the arguments are more bluntly stated than in the past. This is probably the strongest article on this subject that has yet appeared in the Soviet press.
The special communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau published August 7 summarized the results of the recent fighting and concluded “The successful military operations of the Red army have chained to the Soviet-German front all the main forces of the Hitlerite army, deprived the German Command of the possibility of freely maneuvering its troops and thus have created even more favorable conditions for the development of active offensive military operations of our Allies on the Continent of Europe.”
Pravda of August 8 carries a long article which draws a parallel between the situation now and that which existed in August 1918 and after stating that in the last war the enemy could have been defeated at least 6 or 7 months earlier the author writes: “The events of 1918 have much to teach us. The lessons of 1918 confirm that the choice of the most fortunate moment for striking the decisive blow at the enemy is of supreme importance. To delay means to permit the enemy to recover, to prolong the sufferings of millions of inhabitants of the occupied countries and to compel mankind to shed new torrents of blood when success can be attained with much less sacrifice.”
In addition to the foregoing the Embassy has received reports that party speakers at political and factory meetings are taking an even stronger line than the press.
The Embassy has no possibility of determining the motives which actuate the Soviet Government in pressing this campaign. It must be admitted that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Soviet Government believes that the invasion of the Continent of Europe is feasible and is sincere in the declaration of its conviction that the war can be ended this year by such invasion. In this connection General Martel, the head of the British Military Mission here, stated in conversation with a member of my staff on August 7 that in his opinion the Germans are stretched to the limit. He said that on the Orel-Kharkov front they had only one division in reserve and that although the Germans are fighting well he thought it possible that the war might end this year.
Although some weight must be given to the fact that the Soviet Government has always shown a predilection for conducting foreign affairs through the medium of the press the obvious disadvantages in this case make it unlikely that such a method would be used in the absence of very strong reasons therefor.
[Page 562]While admitting that the Soviet Government may feel justified in believing that the time is now ripe for a second front, it is difficult to believe that it really thinks that by a press campaign it can cause the United States and Great Britain to change in any fundamental way military plans which presumably have already been determined. This is more true because of the abortive attempt of last year.
The second front campaign of 1942 was made against the background of the Red army reeling from the powerful blows it had received, the good faith of Britain and America not tested, Lend-Lease supplies slow in arriving and the shipping outlook black, the food situation grave and army and civilian morale shaken. The Soviet leaders would have been imprudent had they not taken all possible measures to prepare for disastrous reverses. Today the Soviet people are tired from the long strain of war but they are encouraged by the conviction of eventual victory and by the successes of the Red army. Military prospects are bright and the Soviet regime is internally probably more secure than at any time in its history. Such a press campaign is therefore less necessary both for political and for internal reasons than was the case last year and there is greater reason to believe that its motives are political.
Considered together with the tendency while giving publicity thereto to minimize the importance of Allied successes in Sicily and the unusual efforts to dramatize recent Soviet successes the second front campaign creates in the minds of the Soviet public and doubtless of many people abroad the impression that the United States and Great Britain are guilty of bad faith and that the Soviet Union is winning the war with little assistance from its Allies.60 This had the advantage of shifting to the Allies the blame for the continuing burdens of the war. It also prepares the ground for a strong stand in the field of foreign policy. To the extent that people believe that the Soviet Union carried the major burden of winning the war and that the United States and Great Britain withheld assistance which they could have given, they will be the more inclined to support a claim that the Soviet Union should have the greatest voice in determining the peace. This may be of particular importance with respect to the population of the enemy-occupied territories.
Furthermore the United States and Great Britain have acquired a considerable amount of good will with the Soviet people for their assistance both in the form of military action and of supplies and food. [Page 563] This, together with the generally good press which we have had for some time, has created a situation in which the Soviet Government is to some extent committed to collaboration with us. Observers differ as to the extent to which the Soviet regime considers its own public opinion but there can be little doubt that in wartime it does exert considerable influence. If the implication of bad faith is believed the second front campaign will tend to offset this good will and restore to the Soviet Government its freedom of action. (It would, for example, strengthen the hands of the Soviet Government if it desired to resist any pressure from us for assistance against Japan after the defeat of Germany.)
It should be noted that even if the Soviet Government does in fact have political motives in conducting the second front campaign these may or may not be aggressive in intent. Conscious of its great power the Soviet Union may desire to achieve a position in Europe or elsewhere which its leaders realize will bring it into conflict with the United States and Great Britain or it may plan an eventual return to the program of world revolution. On the other hand there appears to be a deep-rooted suspicion of Great Britain and to a lesser extent of the United States and there are some indications that the Soviet leaders are alarmed and somewhat resentful at the closeness of Anglo-American collaboration while unwilling to engage in full collaboration themselves. Recent events have probably increased rather than diminished these suspicions. Thus the political motives of the Soviet Government in this campaign may be defensive.
In the Embassy’s opinion, however, it is more likely that the Soviet Government has not yet determined its postwar policy and that to the extent that the second front campaign is a political move it is an effort of the Soviet Government with its habitual realism to prepare itself for any eventuality.
- Not printed; it summarized the article in Pravda of August 6 which had appeared in the August 1 issue of War and the Working Glass (740.0011 European War 1939/30583).↩
- In telegram No. 665, August 9, 6 p.m., the Department asked for full translation of portions of the article published in Pravda (see footnote 59, p. 561) which contained “Soviet accusations that Russia’s allies have failed to live up to their obligations in regard to the opening of a second front”. The Department further stated, “At this particular moment the press work of the Embassy is of extreme importance as it constitutes the most reliable source for such information regarding Soviet foreign and internal policies.” (740.0011 European War 1939/30583)↩