865.00/2108: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 31—8:14 a.m.]
977. For the President and the Secretary. Ilya Ehrenburg42 told AP correspondent Cassidy43 today that the President’s disavowal of the OWI44 broadcast attacking Badoglio45 and the King of Italy had seriously disturbed Moscow.46 He said that the Tass despatch reporting this incident had not yet been published as they wished to avoid stirring up public opinion but he intimated that the Soviet Government might ask for an explanation. He was very frank and tended to be bitter about the failure of Great Britain and the United States to consult with the Soviet Government on such questions. He said that the Russians felt they had a right to be consulted as they had been fighting Italians on this front for some time and that the fact that Germany was so heavily engaged in Russia that it could not support Italy was one of the main reasons for Mussolini’s downfall.
Ehrenburg said that the Russians had understood the use of Darlan because of military necessity and had not protested because the North African affair was to them a relatively unimportant question.47 Dealing with Badoglio, however, he said was a question of major importance. He asked whether this indicated that we would eventually be prepared to deal with Goering48 in Germany.
Cassidy pointed out that the President had in his speech reiterated our demand for the unconditional surrender of Italy. Cassidy then referred to the “Free Germany” movement, to which Ehrenburg replied in effect that two could play at this game and that this was the Soviet answer in advance to any attempt to extend the “Darlan” policy to Europe.
I am not aware of the extent to which Ehrenburg may be reflecting the attitude of the Soviet Government. I am also not aware of the extent to which we and the British may have informed the Soviet authorities of our plans in respect to Italy, especially with reference to such matters as what regime we expect to function in Italy during the period of the military occupation and the manner in which and the degree to which we shall permit that regime to discharge governmental [Page 556] and general administrative functions. I realize that there may be compelling reasons why we should desire to leave decision regarding such matters with the appropriate authorities of the countries whose armed forces are actually carrying on military operations in Italy. I have in mind also the fact that the Soviet Government has as yet declined to enter into general discussions on an overall basis as evidenced by Stalin’s decision not to attend the Casablanca Conference. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to point out the great importance of everything feasible being done as the campaign in Italy progresses and as other military operations ensue to avert developments which would give the Soviet Government plausible ground for believing or affirming that a sufficiently cooperative attitude had not been shown toward the Soviet Government.
The communication to the Soviet Government of information in regard to our Government’s plans and intentions is, of course, only one step in a possible program of coordination of policies and the Department and other agencies of the Government may have in mind additional steps toward that end.49
I have no knowledge of the policies and procedure which our Government is following other than as reflected in the press and public statements. I am, therefore, making the foregoing comments in the dark. The British or the American Governments may already have established procedures for keeping the Soviet Government currently informed on the subject under discussion. If not, I feel that the most, serious consideration should be given to establishing a procedure, whereby such information will be promptly and currently communicated to the Soviet Government through me or through such channels as you and the President may deem most appropriate.
- Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a Soviet literary figure and journalist.↩
- Henry Cassidy, Associated Press correspondent in Moscow.↩
- Office of War Information.↩
- Marshal Pietro Badoglio had succeeded Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy on July 25, 1943.↩
- For President Roosevelt’s address broadcast from the White House on July 28, see Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1943, p. 57.↩
- See memorandum of January 7 by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, p. 497.↩
- Reichsmarshal Hermann Wilhelm Goring, designated successor to Hitler, ‘Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, President of the German Reichstag, etc.↩
- For text of an aide-mémoire to be handed to Molotov setting forth the plans for an armistice with Italy and inviting comments from the Soviet Government, see telegram No. 637, August 3, 2 p.m. to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, vol. ii, p. 344. For correspondence concerning the overthrow of the Fascist regime, and the surrender and recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent, see ibid., pp. 314 ff.↩