861.00/11984: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 p.m.]
177–178. The appointment of Stalin to the rank of marshal as reported in the press of March 7th has of course been widely commented upon in leading editorials and news items consisting mainly in accounts of meetings in factories, farms, army units, et cetera. In general the press has taken the line that Stalin was given the title as a reward for his military services to his country and for his leadership during the Five-Year Plan in developing in Russia a powerful economic base for its military strength. The majority of editorial comment credited Stalin with perfecting Red army strategy, planning the Stalingrad campaign, developing and training the Red army’s officers, and providing it with the finest modern equipment.
The appointment appears to be taken in Kuibyshev diplomatic circles as merely reflecting Stalin’s decision to assume military rank. It is not regarded as particularly important unless also possibly indicating his wish to give evidence by it of the welding of army and party.
Some observers in Moscow are included to attribute more significance to the appointment and have offered the following views:
- 1.
- Like the institution of the shoulder insignias reported in my 49, January 22, the appointment may well be another step toward increasing the prestige of the army and it’s not impossible that Stalin in accepting military rank for the first time has taken this means to indicate that he has complete confidence in the loyalty and ability of his military leaders.
[Here follow comments in regard to the significance of possible internal reactions to this event.]
- 4.
- From an external point of view I refer to my 143, March 10, in which I stated that some observers here consider that the army [Page 514] which may now dominate the Kremlin advocates a foreign policy of voluntary and proud isolation; that it is distrustful of other governments and that it feels that it must rely only on its own strength in providing for the security of the Soviet Union. As I have reported there are evidences that this group does not hold the American and British armies in high regard and it would seem likely that it will maintain its present policy of minimum collaboration with the United Nations at least in the absence of powerful second front on the European Continent. I have found few observers here who are willing to admit that real collaboration is likely even upon such an eventuality or in the post-war period irrespective of what internal influences guide the destinies of this country.