740.0011 European War 1939/28434: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 11—1:43 p.m.]
143. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. In my last conversation with Stalin on January 26, I stated that I would ask to see him upon my return to Moscow. Before doing so I should like to receive your views on some of the matters I propose to discuss with him and in this connection I desire to review some of the recent developments in Soviet policy particularly insofar as they concern the United States.
In my opinion present Soviet policy is based upon the principle of maintaining a completely independent position at least until the end of the war and of avoiding any commitments which would prejudice a later determination of Soviet aims. This policy may well be motivated by domestic considerations as well as by those of foreign policy.
I have little doubt that there is divided counsel in the ruling Soviet circles and it may be convenient for Stalin to defer any decision on proposals advocated by various groups within the Soviet Government. For example the army is considered by many observers here to be one of the centers of Soviet “isolationism” and any deviation from that policy at this time when the army is flushed with its success might have far-reaching repercussions. Stalin’s becoming a marshal38 may be an indication that for the present he is associating himself with this group and its policy.
Moreover present Soviet policy has the advantage of leaving the Government free to determine its policy until such time in the future as some of the important factors upon which this decision must be [Page 510] based will have become more clear. Among these may be mentioned the sincerity of Anglo-America [sic] which there appears to be genuine doubts in this country; the military and economic strength of the Soviet Union at the end of the war relative to that of the other great powers in the Far Eastern situation; and finally the degree to which the United Nations will remain united at the end of the war and the extent to which they are willing to go to establish a practical political system in Europe which will offer real economic political and military security to the Soviet Union.
In the meantime the Soviet Government has clearly indicated that its minimum aims include the restoration of its 1941 frontiers which may in itself be indication of its lack of faith in the ability of the United Nations to provide for its security.
The agitation for a second front has coincided well with the Soviet policy of isolation for it provides a ready excuse for any military failures, gives the Russian people the impression that Russia is fighting and winning the war single handed and should need arise it would provide a basis for a charge of betrayal.
In its relations with the United States, so far as the Embassy is aware, the Soviet Government has whenever possible consistently refrained from making any concessions that would in any way hamper it from later following a policy opposed to ours. It has continued to base its relations with us upon a trading basis although because of the fact that we are giving much and asking little this has not always been clear. I am becoming convinced that we can only deal with them on a bargaining basis for our continuing to accede freely to their requests while agreeing to pay an additional price for every small request we make seems to arouse suspicion of our motives in the Oriental Russian mind rather than to build confidence.
Despite occasional grudging concessions the Soviet Government has withheld vital military and other information that would be of assistance to the United States in its prosecution of the war against the common enemy. This applies not only to information about the Russian Army the withholding of which may be understandable but also applies to information about the German Army and its methods and weapons. The reluctance to give this information which might result in the saving of many American lives and be of material assistance in our military effort seems to me to be inexcusable.
Following the recent Soviet military successes it would appear that the Soviet policy of minimum collaboration is becoming more pronounced and among others the following specific instances may be cited: The delay in replying to my request for information on the usefulness of Lend-Lease aid39 (so far as I am aware the Soviet [Page 511] people have never been informed of the contribution of the American people to Soviet relief funds and have no conception of the extent to which military supplies have been furnished by the United States and Great Britain40); the indication that the Russians intend to exact the highest possible price for information on their synthetic rubber process, the difficulties and delays in obtaining permission for an American plane to enter the Soviet Union, the failure to reply to my request for an amelioration of the situation of the interned American bomber crew,41 the failure to provide adequate information upon the treatment of burns (see my 99, February 1942), the refusal to allow the American Typhus Commission to enter the Soviet Union; the failure to reply to my inquiry on the rehabilitation program, et cetera; and similar difficulties experienced by the British as reported in my 131 and 138 of March 9.43
I believe that there is great danger that this policy will eventually lead to a reaction in the United States and Great Britain from the present attitude of friendly and wholehearted cooperation with the Soviet Union and that this reaction will strengthen the bonds of those elements in the Soviet Government who are suspicious of our intentions or who advocate a policy of opposition to us and I would like to emphasize this danger in my conversation with Stalin. I propose to put the matter on the basis that I had come to the Soviet Union with two purposes in mind, namely, to further the flow of supplies and to promote friendly relations between our two countries. I should say, however, that although those continue to be my objectives I feel that the time has come when I must report to my Government the failure of my efforts in the second of these two objectives. I should point out that whereas my Government has actively encouraged the development of a friendly feeling in the United States toward the Soviet Union, his Government had prevented the Soviet people from even knowing that this friendly feeling existed. I should say that this could scarcely fail to make Americans suspicious of the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union and I should express my concern that elements in the United States opposed to the Soviet Union might make capital of this attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. I should then stress the need for cooperation and to prepare for the difficult post-war period.
I feel sure that in answer to such an approach Stalin would inquire as to the specific questions on which I felt that the Soviet Government [Page 512] had not cooperated and I should like to be prepared to give him a comprehensive list. I should emphasize the supply freely, and not on a basis of purchase, of information concerning the common enemy and the withholding of information from the Russian people of the friendliness of the American people toward them and of the assistance which we have given them. I would appreciate receiving any directive you may wish to give me in this matter.
- See telegram No. 177–178, March 18, 2 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 513.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 737 ff.↩
- Remarks made by Ambassador Standley on March 8, 1943, to American correspondents in Moscow in this vein were reported in his telegram No. 139, March 9, 7 p.m., p. 631.↩
- For correspondence regarding the conditions of interned American airmen forced down inside the Soviet Union, see pp. 613–736, passim.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Post, p. 630.↩