Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

711.61/2–343

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] February 3, 1943.

The following is an outline of a conversation I had with Mr. Joseph E. Davies¹¹ regarding our attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

After discussing at some length the difficulties which Admiral Standley had had in connection with the visit of Wendell Willkie to Moscow¹² in which Mr. Davies expressed complete sympathy with Admiral Standley in this regard, he asked me whether I had read his declaration which appeared in the press last Sunday.¹³ When I replied that I had read the declaration he stated, “I’m afraid I’m out on a limb”. He added, however, that he felt that because of the position he has already taken in regard to the Soviet Union it was incumbent upon him to make such a declaration particularly regarding the trustworthiness of Stalin, in order to counteract the all too prevalent feeling among a large group of the American public, especially big-business men, to the effect that under no circumstances could we place any trust in the Soviet word.

Mr. Davies added that although he had not been in touch with affairs regarding the Soviet Union for the last six months except through the newspapers, and although he realized that his somewhat exaggerated statement was not borne out by known facts, he nevertheless felt that it would be in the best interest of the United States to endeavor at this time to attempt to reach a more basic understanding with the Soviet Union and if possible to eliminate the mutual suspicions that have been prevalent in our relations for the past 25 years.

Mr. Davies then asked whether I felt that it would be possible to bring about a better basis of understanding between our two countries. I replied that I felt that every effort should be made to reach a more practical, sound, and realistic understanding with the Soviet Government based on a realistic approach to the problem and that if such an understanding could be reached it would be mutually beneficial and permit more satisfactory cooperation to exist not only in regard to post war problems but also in regard to the prosecution of the war. I added that although I personally was very much in favor of bending every effort to this end, I nevertheless felt that this was not an easy problem to solve, particularly in view of the deep-seated suspicions on both sides and the record of the Soviet Government in regard to sworn commitments which it had made during the past 25 years. I cited as examples the non-aggression pacts which the Soviet Union had contracted with its neighbors, Finland,¹⁴ the Baltic States,¹⁵ and Poland,¹⁶ which for various reasons had been broken by the Soviet Government. Mr. Davies agreed but added that he felt that if we did not reach such a basic agreement we would be in for another war in the not too distant future and this time against the Soviet Union.

In this connection, Mr. Davies stated that he felt that there were four possibilities open to us:

1. A basic understanding and full cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

2. Cooperation and understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. Each of the three countries acting independently of one another.

4. Cooperation and understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, more or less in opposition to the United States.

Mr. Davies stated that he feared that the latter possibility would most likely take place unless we were able to prevent it and reach the understanding with the Soviet Government that he hopes for. He cited in this connection the 20 year mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and the Soviet Union of 1942¹⁷ and stated that it was his belief that the British are bending every effort to reach a satisfactory basis of understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union and are approaching this problem in a very realistic light even to the extent of conceding at this time territorial changes favorable to the Soviet Union. He added that last year he had a talk with Lord Halifax¹⁸ in which he gained the impression that during Mr. Eden’s visit to Moscow in December 1941¹⁹ the latter had given serious consideration to recognizing the Soviet claims to the Baltic States and eastern Poland.

In the latter connection Mr. Davies stated that although he was an idealist he hoped that he was a practical idealist and, therefore, felt that in order to show our good will and make a concrete effort to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Government, as a practical matter we should at this time concur in the Soviet contention that the Baltic States and eastern Poland form part of the Soviet Union. Mr. Davies added that he felt that these areas were of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union and therefore they should be permitted to retain them.

I pointed out that although I realized that the Soviet Government has steadfastly maintained that these areas had been legally incorporated in the Soviet Union, I could not concur that they were of great strategic importance to that country. I explained that there were no strategic frontiers of any importance between the Rhine and the Urals and that, therefore, a slight rectification of the frontiers between Poland and the Soviet Union would not be of great strategic importance. In regard to the Baltic States I expressed the view that although the possession of these states by the Soviet Union²⁰ would give them a “larger window on the sea” this window would open onto an inland sea and that from a naval point of view the possession of naval bases on this sea would not, in view of the vulnerability of service craft to land craft, be of great strategic importance. Mr. Davies agreed that although this might be true he still felt that in order to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Union it might be advisable for the United States to accede to these Soviet requests.

I replied that there was another possibility that if a workable plan of collective security was set up in Europe and throughout the world the Soviet Union would not have any fears of attack from the west and therefore would not have any need to obtain strategic areas on its western frontiers and that since the Soviet Union had no reasonable right to demand additional territory per se, it might be persuaded to drop its claims to these areas of eastern Europe.

Getting back to the advantages of reaching a basic agreement with the Soviet Union Mr. Davies stated that last autumn he had many talks with Ambassador Litvinoff²¹ during one of which he had discussed with him the Comintern.²² According to Mr. Davies, Ambassador Litvinoff replied that he could assure Mr. Davies that at no time in recent years has the Soviet Government had any official or other contacts with the Comintern except on rare occasions when a Soviet official may have received a courtesy call from officials attached to that organization. Mr. Davies felt that on the basis of this assurance it might be possible to convince the Soviet Union that in its own interest it would be advantageous to liquidate the Comintern and its organizations abroad. I replied that I felt that any basic agreement with the Soviet Union would have to include a very concrete and definite understanding that the activities of the Comintern would have to be liquidated but added that the statement made by Ambassador Litvinoff was the same argument he had used for years whenever anyone discussed the Comintern with him. Although the activities of the Comintern²³ had been carried on in various degrees since 1933 when the United States recognized the Soviet Union,²⁴ Mr. Litvinoff had steadfastly stated that the Soviet Government had no connection whatsoever with that organization. This, of course, could not be accepted as a fact.

Mr. Davies in a very frank frame of mind stated that he had been “very lucky” in the attitude which he had deliberately adopted regarding the Soviet Union. He added that predicting international events and trends was really a matter of speculation and that he had been lucky in his speculation on the Soviet Union while Mr. Kennedy²⁵ had been unlucky in his speculations while he was Ambassador to the Court of St. James. In expanding this theme to some length Mr. Davies explained that because of his lucky predictions regarding the Soviet Union and particularly the prowess of the Red Army he had gained the reputation of being an expert on the Soviet Union. He stated that while he had endeavored to the best of his ability to learn all he could about that country during his comparatively short stay there he realized fully that he did not have a complete and basic knowledge of the country. He stated that because of this fact he felt that at the present time, particularly in connection with his statement of last Sunday regarding the trustworthiness of Stalin, he was “whistling by the graveyard” since he realized that in making such a prediction he was going contrary to the facts of the past but felt that it was necessary to make such a statement in order to try to prepare the ground for a basic understanding. He explained that for this reason he had desired to discuss this question with me since I have been in more recent touch with official information regarding the Soviet Union than he had. He added that because of his reputation as an expert on the Soviet Union the President and Mr. Harry Hopkins²⁶ had asked him on several occasions to advise them in regard to our policy toward the Soviet Union. He, therefore, had been giving careful consideration to the question which he first raised as to the possibility of endeavoring at this time to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Government which would eliminate the mutual suspicions on both sides and make it possible to win the peace on a sound basis which would eliminate as far as possible the recurrence of another world war.

11. Ambassador to the Soviet Union during 1937 and part of 1938.
12. Reports on the visit of Wendell L. Willkie, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Soviet Union during September 1942, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 637–653, passim.
13. For Mr. Davies’ press statement made in New York on his way back from Hollywood to Washington, see New York Times, January 30, 1943, p. 8, col. 2.
14. For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States over Soviet demands on Finland and the outbreak of the Winter War, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 952 ff.
15. For correspondence on the pressure by the Soviet Union upon the Baltic States compelling them to conclude pacts of mutual assistance, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 934 ff.
16. For correspondence on the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland in September 1939, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 428 ff.
17. The Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance thereafter, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union was signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams No. 2897, May 24, 1942, and No. 2922, May 26, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see ibid., pp. 490–566, passim.
18. Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.
19. For correspondence on the visit of Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for discussions with Stalin, December 16–22, 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 192–205.
20. For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 357 ff.
21. Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.
22. The Third (communist) International, founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.
23. Concerning these activities and the protest to the Soviet Union by the United States at the time of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 218 ff.
24. For correspondence regarding the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933, see ibid., pp. 1 ff.
25. Joseph P. Kennedy, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 1938–41.
26. Special Assistant to President Roosevelt; chairman of the President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.