760C.61/2119¼: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London
[Polish Series No.] 38. The pertinent parts of the communications received by you from the Polish Government contained in your 82, November 17, 6 p.m. have been transmitted to the President.
When the Polish Ambassador called on November 19 he displayed an extremely agitated state of mind which undoubtedly reflects that of the Polish Government which seems to feel itself in a desperate position. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and urged Mr. Molotov to find a basis for resuming diplomatic relations. I also expressed the hope that should diplomatic relations be reestablished ways could be found to adjust the differences between the two countries. I added that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity, just as I did at Moscow, to be of service to both Governments.
Having in mind certain unfriendly statements published here which cast doubts upon the effectiveness of the Moscow declarations and which I have reason to believe may have been inspired by the Polish Embassy, I expressed my regret that such a hostile attitude toward the Four-Nation Declaration was apparently being adopted by the Polish authorities when this agreement means so much to the future Poland. I likewise indicated to the Ambassador my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which had manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.
Although I have transmitted to the President Premier Mikolajczyk’s request to visit him I explained to the Ambassador that I did not believe it would be possible for the President to receive the Prime [Page 487] Minister since the President and Mr. Churchill will be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.
Since the President has so far not indicated what reply should be made to the latest request of Premier Mikolajczyk it is suggested that you confine any remarks you may make to him to those I made to the Ambassador.
In view of the extremely agitated and almost unreasoning attitude of the Ambassador here and Polish officials in London, informal efforts are being made to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not alienate public sympathy for their cause by undue agitation or public outbursts regarding our policy. I wish you to exert all your influence to this same end.
For your personal and private information I have suggested to the President56 that with the approach of the Red Army to Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. I have also suggested that if this should not be possible for the moment we should use all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to begin, at an appropriate moment, a full-fledged attack on the Germans and thus assist the Red Army in its struggle against our common enemy. We feel that the Polish Government should recognize that if they adopt this policy the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government that the Polish Government desires to shorten the war by making this material contribution on the Eastern front.
- For a memorandum of November 23, 1943, from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, giving “a rather full summary of developments” concerning Poland, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 381.↩