760C.61/11–1743
The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)47
My Dear Jimmy: I deeply regret that the Secretary of State has not yet found time to receive me in connection with the results of the Moscow Conference and that, according to your secretary, you are likewise too busy to see me. I am especially anxious to have the opportunity of a frank talk with you after reading the press reports of the Secretary’s two press conferences of November 15th and 16th. I have no means of ascertaining whether the Secretary’s statements have been accurately reported by the press, but these press reports are causing me grave apprehension regarding Poland.
While the Secretary’s statements, as reported by the press, to the effect that the formula applied to Italy on geographical and political self-determination is to be regarded as a pattern to be applied to all liberated nations, gives me a feeling of relief, his further comments, [Page 479] according to press reports, particularly those of the conference of November 16th, have aroused my deep concern.
The interpretation of the vital and immediate problem of military occupation of territories as they are being liberated, appears to justify the anxieties of the Polish Government that the USA is willing to admit the occupation of Polish territory exclusively by Soviet forces, without the participation, in some form at least, of American, British and Polish forces.
You know the truth of the situation too well for me to have to stress the fundamental difference between the disinterested occupation of any territory by American or British forces, without Soviet participation, and an occupation exclusively by the Soviets, of Poland or part of Poland in view of clearly stated Soviet annexationist claims on Poland. This matter is all the more serious when one recalls the conduct of the Soviet authorities on Polish territory after their invasion on September 17, 1939, and in the course of their occupation until the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. At that time the Soviets partitioned Poland in agreement with Germany and carried out a ruthless denationalization and sovietization of that territory, applying methods of extermination and deporting about a million and a half of leading and nationally conscious Polish elements.
According to the Joint Four Nation Declaration signed in Moscow48 (par. 6), as well as from the press reports of the two last press conferences of the Secretary of State,—no steps appear to have been taken to ensure the reestablishment by the Polish Government of civil administration in Poland as the liberation of Poland’s territory will proceed. On the contrary, the press reports of the Secretary of State’s yesterday’s press conference quote him as having expressed the opinion that the administration of the occupied territory will be taken over by the military authority of the Allied Power which will be the first to enter such territory in the course of war operations. In Poland’s case this would mean that the Soviet military command will be empowered exclusively to take over the administration of occupied Polish territory.
On the basis of past tragic experience, as well as of our intimate knowledge of Soviet methods, this would be equivalent to delivering Poland to the USSR for immediate and complete sovietization.
The press reports further state that after the termination of such military occupation, the temporarily suspended application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter would take place. One of the expressions of this belated application of these principles would be the right of the population freely to express by popular vote or plebiscite its will regarding its national allegiance and form of government.
[Page 480]In the case of Poland, after a considerable time of uncontrolled Soviet occupation, such application of principles would remain but an empty wish. One cannot hold a plebiscite on a cemetery and, undoubtedly, by that time Poland would have virtually become a cemetery. Moreover, free expression by popular vote in a sovietized country is a contradiction in terms and totally out of the question.
How can one persuade the Polish people,—whose splendid resistance, unique of its kind, to enemy pressure in this war, and whose behavior, has given to Poland the distinction of being the only European country without a Quisling,—that they are to be treated worse than Ethiopia and Italy. The Negus has already taken over his liberated country and its administration, while in Italy, although she was one of the leading Axis Powers, the local Italian civil administration is already allowed to function.
I must return once more to the unfortunate wording of Paragraph 6 of the Joint Four Nation Declaration of Moscow. In this Paragraph it is said: “That after the termination of hostilities they (the signatories) will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.”
This wording clearly implies that while hostilities are still in progress, the occupying power may use its forces for purposes not envisaged in the Declaration and without any previous consultation with the three remaining nations.
For Poland this creates a situation of the gravest peril when viewed in the light of the occupation of Poland exclusively by the forces of the USSR. The fact that the USSR Government refuses to resume diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, further aggravates this situation.
To sum up the apprehensions which I consider it my duty to communicate to you without delay, I admit that I still lack your official interpretation regarding the dangerous wording of Paragraph 6 of this Declaration, as well as your authoritative version of the Secretary’s remarks at his press conferences. However, if my interpretation, based on that of the press, is correct, I must regretfully say that the situation of Poland and, for that matter, of other European countries, must be regarded as extremely serious inasmuch as it appears that they are being surrendered to the mercy of the Soviets rather than encouraged to expect the liberation repeatedly promised them in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and so many other more specific statements on the part of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, guaranteeing the restoration of their independent existence.
[Page 481]I am sure that in view of the urgency of the situation which my country faces at this moment, you will forgive my insistence on trying to find the means of bringing these considerations to your immediate attention. I should be most grateful if you would communicate them to the Secretary of State and if I could be given the earliest opportunity of discussing them with you and of being received by the Secretary of State.
I am,
Yours ever
- The letter was delivered to the Department by Michal Kwapiszewski, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy. As Mr. Dunn was temporarily absent from the Department, the letter was at Mr. Kwapiszewski’s request forwarded to the Secretary of State. In a memorandum of November 17, 1943, the Under Secretary of State. Edward R. Stettinius, recommended to Cecil W. Gray, of the office of the Secretary: “The matter is rather urgent. I have mentioned it to the Secretary and I think if you could squeeze the Ambassador in for a fifteen-minute appointment either Friday or Saturday it would be wise because of the pressing nature of the Polish matter at the moment.” In another note to Mr. Gray on November 18, H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, stated: “This is pretty bitter stuff—and not one word of gratitude for Moscow Conf. or one word against the Nazis! I think the Secretary should look at this just before seeing the Pole.”↩
- For text, see vol. i, p. 755.↩