760C.61/2116

The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the American Embassy in the Soviet Union 32

[Translation]

Aide-Mémoire

On August 11, 1943, the American Ambassador, Mr. Standley, and the British Ambassador, Mr. Kerr, made to the President of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, J. V. Stalin, a joint statement concerning Soviet-Polish relations,33 submitting at the same time in the name of their Governments aide-mémoires on this subject. In the joint statement it was pointed out that the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain were alarmed at the differences which have separated the Governments of the USSR and of Poland, since these differences were harmful to the common war efforts and were capable of disrupting the unity of the United Nations and of encouraging the enemy. In this statement the Ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain submit to the Soviet Government a proposal to adopt certain measures which, in the opinion of the American and British Governments, will lay the foundations not only for the resumption of normal relations between the [Page 462] Soviet and Polish Governments on an equitable and lasting basis, but for friendly, neighborly cooperation after the war.

[Here follow contents of (1) the American aide-mémoire, which followed the lines set forth in Department’s telegram No. 427, June 12, 9 p.m., printed on page 428, and (2) the British memorandum, printed on page 451.]

The Soviet Government duly appreciates the motives guiding the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain in the matter of regularizing Soviet-Polish relations. The Soviet Government, however, cannot fail to express its regret that at the same time they did not make use of their influence in order to prevent acts of the Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union and injurious to the cause of unity among the United Nations which obliged the Soviet Government to take the decision to interrupt diplomatic relations with the Polish Government.

The Soviet Government has always sought friendly relations with the Polish Government, being certain that the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Poland were in fact interested in friendly and close Soviet-Polish relations, particularly in the face of the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany.

However, good will toward the maintenance and strengthening of Soviet-Polish relations was not displayed on the part of the Polish Government. It is well known that the Polish Government took a position completely at variance with such relations on a number of important questions, including those questions to which the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain have now given their attention in the statements made to the Soviet Government on August 11, 1943, and the solution of which, in their opinion, would lay the foundations not only for the resumption of normal relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments on an equitable and lasting basis, but for friendly, neighborly cooperation after the war.

The Soviet Government does not share the foregoing opinion concerning the significance of these questions and considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that the disruption of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Poland was directly connected not with these questions but with the generally hostile direction of the policies of the Polish Government in relation to the USSR, which found its specific expression in the attempt of the Polish Government to use the German fascist provocation concerning the Polish officers killed by the Hitlerites in the Smolensk District for the purpose of wringing from the Soviet Union territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia, and Soviet Lithuania.

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It is impossible not to draw attention to the fact that the British and American proposals almost coincide with the pretensions of the Polish Government formulated by General Sikorski, notably in his speech of May 4, 1943, and at present supported by the Polish Premier, Mikolaiczyk, which refer in demagogic fashion to the necessity for “liberating” and evacuating from the Soviet Union “unfortunate” Polish citizens. This type of statement is lacking in any foundation whatsoever and cannot be considered other than as an insulting attack against the Soviet Union to which the Soviet Government does not consider it necessary to react.

Referring to the questions raised in the above-mentioned aide-mémoires, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to communicate the following:

1. Concerning Polish relief and welfare work in the Soviet Union.

In the first place it is necessary to note that the establishment in the Soviet Union of agencies of the Polish Embassy to extend assistance to Polish citizens was not at all the cause for misunderstandings between the Soviet and Polish Governments, as is stated in the proposal in the note of the American Government. If one is to speak of such misunderstandings, the reason for them was not the establishment of such organizations, but the fact that the Polish agencies and a number of their personnel and trusted representatives, instead of honestly doing their duty and fulfilling their obligations for cooperation with the Soviet authorities, embarked on espionage activities which were inimical to the Soviet Union.

It is well known that the Soviet Government from the very beginning of the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations in the summer of 1941 systematically gave its most energetic assistance to the Polish Government on a wide scale in organizing material assistance for Polish citizens evacuated from areas occupied by the German invaders. In permitting the establishment in twenty important cities throughout the entire Soviet Union of agencies of the Polish Embassy, which in actual fact were consular agencies, and furthermore in permitting the creation of an extensive network of more than 400 trusted representatives, the Soviet Government adopted measures which were altogether unprecedented in the manner in which the Soviet Government met the Polish wishes and which went far beyond the framework of customary diplomatic practice. The Soviet Government also put into effect a series of important financial and economic measures for the purpose of extending relief to indigent Polish citizens, such as the granting of a 100,000,000 ruble interest free loan, in addition to an interest free loan in the amount of 300,000,000 rubles for the formation and requirements of the Polish Army on Soviet territory.

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It is further necessary to state that with the assistance of the Soviet authorities there were opened in the USSR 589 Polish welfare institutions (popular dining rooms, children’s crèches, children’s homes, homes for the incapacitated and invalids, etc.) for the maintenance of which special reserves of food and clothing were set aside; various privileges were accorded such as even a special railway tariff on goods destined for Polish nationals. And this colossal assistance to the Poles was carried out by the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet Union was exerting all its forces to repulse the attack of 240 divisions of the Axis powers.

All this makes completely indisputable the fact of assistance of every kind on the part of the Soviet Government and of local Soviet authorities in developing the matter of assistance to Polish citizens. Meanwhile the Polish agencies, many of their personnel and trusted representatives, as well as a number of responsible members of the former Polish Embassy in the USSR, answered all these measures of the Soviet authorities with black ingratitude, embarking on espionage activities hostile to the Soviet Union. This is a fact which is attested by documentary evidence such as the records of judicial investigations and court decisions.

These are the real and not the imaginary grounds for those “misunderstandings” which are mentioned in the aide-mémoire of the Government of the United States of America dated August 11, 1943.

It is therefore entirely understandable that it is impossible to link the question of these “misunderstandings” to the question of the organization of relief for Polish nationals and to the question of the forms and methods of extending such relief. It is apparent that the causes of these misunderstandings do not lie in this plane at all. They lie in the fundamentally hostile policy of the Polish Government toward the USSR.

With reference to the proposal of the Government of the United States of America for the concentration of all matters pertaining to the relief of Polish citizens in the hands of Soviet organizations, that is exactly the manner in which relief for Polish citizens is organized’ in the USSR at the present time. To the foregoing it is necessary to add that Poles who were evacuated to regions in the rear of the USSR, in addition to the relief extended to them on an equal basis with all Soviet citizens, receive additional relief through a specially created system of Soviet institutions which look after Poles evacuated to regions in the Soviet rear. The submission of this proposal by the American Government is evidently explained by the insufficient information thus far at its disposal.

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2. Citizenship.

All former Polish citizens who resided in the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics at the time of the admission of these regions into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (November 1–2, 1939) acquired Soviet nationality by virtue of the freely expressed will of the population of these regions and on the basis of the laws for the incorporation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through their reunion with the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted by the Supreme Council of the USSR on November 1–2, 1939, and also on the basis of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of November 29, 1939, and in accordance with the “Law Concerning Soviet Citizenship” of August 19, 1938.

[Here follow texts of the laws of November 1 and 2, 1939, which are printed, together with the decree of November 29, 1939, in Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents, pages 102–105. See also Foreign Relations, 1941, volume I, page 210, footnote 16.]

Consequently, the inclusion of the Western Ukraine within the Soviet Union and its reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as the inclusion of Western Belorussia in the USSR and its reunion with the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is the result of the free will of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the peoples of the Western Ukraine and of Western Belorussia and became the law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of November 1–2, 1939.

In the same way the question of the territorial status of the Western Ukraine and of Western Belorussia and the citizenship of persons who were residents of these territories was fully decided at that time. The Soviet Government cannot agree with the considerations set forth in the aide-mémoire of the Government of the United States in favor of some other decision of this question with relation to separate categories of Polish citizens, in as much as such a decision would be a violation of the laws of the USSR. It is impossible, of course, to agree with arguments such as those advanced to the effect that all persons of Polish nationality who were formerly Polish citizens and are now in the Soviet Union should be recognized as Polish citizens because they formerly were domiciled in Poland. Does the Government of the United States of America consider as Polish citizens Poles who formerly were domiciled in Poland, but who at the present time are domiciled in the United States of America, any more than the British Government recognizes as French citizens Frenchmen who are domiciled, for instance, in Canada? It is clear that the question of citizenship cannot be decided from the point of view of the former [Page 466] citizenship or place of residence of these or other persons but must be decided on the basis of the laws in effect in the given country.

With reference to persons who were not residents of the Western Ukraine or of Western Belorussia who found themselves on Soviet territory because of war conditions, the Soviet Government has never raised and does not raise the question of their recognition as Soviet citizens against their will. These persons have always been allowed and are being allowed the full possibility of deciding for themselves the country of which they wish to be citizens.

In view of the foregoing the proposals of the American Government set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2 of the aide-mémoire of August 11 are inadmissible for the Soviet Government.

3. The evacuation of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union.

As the Governments of Great Britain and the United States know, the Soviet Government, guided by its good will, in due course met the wishes of the Polish Government and permitted the evacuation from the Soviet Union, apart from 75,491 Polish troops, of 37,756 members of their families, among whom were also a considerable number of Soviet citizens. The Soviet Government on several occasions has stated and states again that from the side of the Soviet Government no obstacles were placed in the way of the departure from the Soviet Union of Polish citizens in the USSR, the number of which was not large, or of the families of Polish soldiers who have been evacuated to Iran. There are, furthermore, no obstacles with regard to this category of persons at the present time.

With reference to the statement of the Government of the United States of America to the effect that “Polish children cannot be properly cared for” in the Soviet Union, it is entirely apparent that such an assertion is based on unreliable information.

In its aide-mémoire the British Government, in considering the question of steps for the improvement of Soviet-Polish relations and the removal of possible causes of friction in these relations, declares that it has been imposing and will continue to impose upon the foreign newspapers published in the United Kingdom a control which, it hopes, will have the effect of putting an end to discussion in the press of controversial issues affecting inter-Allied relations. The Soviet Government cannot fail to express serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of measures of this kind on the part of the British Government, since the measures taken thus far, judging by the unceasing hostile campaign against the Soviet Union in certain parts of the Polish press, have led to no positive results whatsoever.

The Soviet Government shares the opinion of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America concerning the great [Page 467] importance of the resumption of friendly relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government. The Soviet Government, however, for the reasons set forth above, cannot agree that the task of reestablishing Soviet-Polish relations can be resolved on the basis of the proposals presented to the Soviet Government by the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain in their aide-mémoires of August 11, 1943.

  1. Sent to the Chargé in the Soviet Union by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs with a covering note dated September 27. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 281, October 4; received November 3.
  2. Not printed; it embodied the views set forth in the first two paragraphs of the aide-mémoire contained in telegram Polish Series No. 16, July 19, to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 444.