Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/2099½

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] September 6, 1943.

Reference is made to the Polish Government’s aide-mémoire of September 2 protesting the action reputedly taken by the Soviet Government in sending into battle with the Red Army the Polish division formed in the USSR under Soviet auspices. While there would appear to be no justification in international practice for one government to form an armed force on its territory ostensibly composed of nationals of another state and to send this force into battle under the flag of that foreign state without the latter’s consent, it is believed that the following review of the previous difficulties encountered by the Polish Government in establishing a Polish Army in the USSR may be of particular interest for background purposes.

It will be recalled that one of the principal difficulties which arose after relations were reestablished between Poland and the Soviet Union in July 1941 was the question of recruiting, equipping, feeding and clothing the Polish Army in the Soviet Union. Particular reference is made in this connection to the statement made by Vyshinski, Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Anglo-American press in Moscow on May 6, 1943.²⁸ In view of the manner in which Mr. Vyshinski’s statement was given out it received considerable attention in the United States and Great Britain and enhanced the belief disseminated by leftwing elements in the United States that the Polish Army in the USSR although fully armed and ready for battle categorically refused to fight against the Germans, and therefore these troops were summarily evacuated from the Soviet Union. A marked copy of Vyshinski’s remarks is attached for convenient reference.

When this statement was made it was checked against official information available to the Department and it was found that in general, although the figures and dates given by Vyshinski were more or less accurate, the reasons for the evacuation of the Polish Army to the Middle East did not conform to the facts as we knew them. I recently received in strictest confidence an evaluation of the Vyshinski remarks made by the British Foreign Office on May 8, a copy of which is attached.²⁹ A comparison of the two attached documents confirms the original impression gained in the Department that the Vyshinski statement was to say the least very inaccurate.

The general tenor of Vyshinski’s statement endeavors to prove that the Soviet Government did everything in its power to feed, arm and clothe the Polish units in the USSR but that despite these efforts “the question of the participation of Polish troops in common with Soviet troops in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany was removed from the order of the day by the Polish Government”; that is, the Polish units were withdrawn from the USSR on the insistence of the Polish Government.

In contradiction to Vyshinski’s contentions the Foreign Office report, which is confirmed by additional information in the Department’s files,³⁰ indicates clearly that although the entire blame cannot be placed on the Soviet Government the principal difficulties arose from the fact that for various reasons the Soviet authorities were unable to furnish sufficient food supplies for the 96,000 Polish troops which it was agreed by Stalin and Sikorski in December 1941 would be recruited to form the Polish Army in the USSR and that the Soviet authorities, moreover, were unable to equip fully these divisions as they had undertaken to do. In view of these difficulties the Soviet Government in March 1942 informed the commanding Polish General in the USSR that his Army would have to be limited to 44,000 men and that the surplus force of some 30,000 would have to be evacuated to the Middle East. This was agreed to and the troops departed immediately.

In regard to the evacuation of the remaining 44,000 Polish troops in the Soviet Union which Vyshinski erroneously indicates was done on the insistence of the Polish Government it is of particular interest to note in the Foreign Office report that in June 1942 Molotov on instructions from Stalin took the initiative in this matter and asked the British Ambassador in Moscow whether in view of the German advance on Cairo and Alexandria the British Government would like to have made available to them in the Middle East these remaining Polish troops in order that they might be equipped by the British Government and used in that area. This Soviet proposal was accepted by the British and Polish Governments and the troops were evacuated to the Middle East in September 1942 where they have since been rehabilitated and armed and are now under the direct orders of the British High Command.

This particular example of Soviet technique in clearing its record on controversial matters regardless of the apparent facts might well be borne in mind in evaluating Soviet propaganda.

Elbridge Durbrow

28. The text of Mr. Vyshinsky’s statement was printed in the Information Bulletin, issued by the Soviet Embassy in the United States, May 11, 1943, and also in the New York Times, May 8, 1943.
29. Not printed.
30. See despatch Polish Series No. 137, March 30, 1942, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 133.