Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/2097

Memorandum by the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr)¹⁵

August 11, 1943

As the Soviet Government are aware, His Majesty’s Government are greatly concerned to promote and to maintain solidarity between the United Nations and have recently been considering whether they could make any constructive proposals regarding the improvement of Soviet-Polish relations and the removal of possible causes of friction between the two Governments. This seems to them to be all the more important on account of the unhappy death of General Sikorski. His Majesty’s Government have been imposing, and will continue to impose, upon the foreign newspapers published in the United Kingdom a control which will have, they hope, the effect of putting an end to discussion in the press of controversial issues affecting inter-allied relations.

It will be remembered that in his message of the 6th May to Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin said that the Soviet Government had never put obstacles in the way of the departure from the U.S.S.R. of Polish subjects and the families of Polish troops evacuated to Iran. In the light of this assurance, His Majesty’s Government have been in consultation with the United States Government about the possibilities and advantages of such an evacuation. The two Governments have been considering whether, by the evacuation of certain categories of Poles, it would not be possible to lighten the burden of the Soviet Government in feeding and maintaining on its territory a considerable foreign population, and, at the same time, to mitigate the hardship of separation for a large number of Polish families. Such a result could, in the opinion of both the British and the United States Governments, serve only to strengthen and improve relations between the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union.

With this end in view, His Majesty’s Government wish to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government proposals for the evacuation of certain categories of Poles to the Middle East whence they would subsequently be dispersed to those destinations where they could be most suitably accommodated or employed in the interests of the common war effort. The categories in question are as follows:

(1) The families of all Polish troops who were not evacuated with their men folk in 1942, and also the families of those Polish troops who, although they have never been in this country, are at present serving in the Polish forces in other parts of the world. It is believed that this category would not be likely to exceed 30,000 people;

(2) Polish orphans whose numbers are uncertain;

(3) The families of Polish civilians at present outside the U.S.S.R.;

(4) Certain Polish technicians and the personnel of the former Polish welfare organizations, who would together amount to something over 5,000.

The evacuation would be spread over such a period as might prove to be appropriate and necessary.

It is understood that His Majesty’s Australian Legation, as the representative of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R., would be prepared to supply lists of the persons comprised in the categories enumerated above, and would also discuss with the competent Soviet authorities the most satisfactory arrangements for their evacuation.

Finally, it is suggested that the Soviet Government would be well advised to consider the evacuation of Polish nationals from Western Poland, whose nationality is not in dispute.

His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that the foregoing proposals would, by reducing the number of Polish refugees in this country, go a long way towards putting an end to the present abnormal conditions which, in their view, can only serve to aggravate relations between two of the United Nations. The disappearance of these abnormal conditions would, it is felt, help to restore mutual confidence and render more easy an eventual resumption of friendly relations between the two Governments. Such a solution by putting an end to inter-allied differences, would at once deprive the Axis propaganda machine of a fruitful field of exploitation and would assist in re-establishing that harmony between the United Nations which is so necessary for the solution of common problems both during the war and after it.

15. Presented on August 11 by the British Ambassador during a conversation at the Kremlin in which Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov, and the British and American Ambassadors participated. Copy transmitted to the Department by the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 228, August 24; received September 23.