Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/2053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)⁹⁷

Washington, July 10, 1943—2 p.m.

548. The Department appreciates the force of the argument contained in your 799, July 5, 9 p.m., that the raising of the citizenship question might make negotiations more difficult. It feels, however, that the United States Government cannot remain silent in the face of an action taken by the Soviet Government which has the effect of unilaterally forcing hundreds of thousands of citizens of another United Nation, at present weakened as the result of war, to become Soviet citizens regardless of what the desire of the persons affected might be.

It is realized that the Soviet authorities will probably continue to insist that on the basis of the plebiscites of 1939 all the inhabitants of the territories of Eastern Poland lost their claim to Polish citizenship and became Soviet citizens; that as a gesture of good will they were willing, following the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941, to regard as Polish citizens persons of Polish blood from this area; that such willingness on their part had no legal force and did not actually change the citizenship status of these persons at least so long as they remained on Soviet soil. This Soviet contention is weakened by the fact that the 1941 Polish-Soviet Agreement which granted amnesty to “all Polish citizens” without any qualification, contained no indication that the Soviet Government continued to consider Poles in the Soviet Union from these territories to be Soviet instead of Polish citizens and by the fact that immediately following the conclusion of the Agreement the Soviet Government permitted Polish authorities in the Soviet Union to treat these persons as Polish citizens.

Note is taken of your understanding expressed in sub section C of your telegram under reference that the Soviet Government does not maintain that there are no Poles in the Soviet Union. So far as the Department is aware the Soviet authorities have never abandoned the position taken in their note of January 16, 1943 to the Polish Government⁹⁸ which in effect was an announcement that all Poles in the Soviet Union who were in the territories of Eastern Poland in the fall of 1939 are Soviet citizens. Although Marshal Stalin indicated to Mr. Churchill that he might be willing to permit certain categories of Poles to leave the Soviet Union, he has made no statement so far as the Department can ascertain which would indicate that he did not consider these Poles by blood to be Soviet nationals.

Although we hope that we can avoid entering into polemics with the Soviet Government with regard to the citizenship question we nevertheless feel that an approach should be made with regard to this question along the lines indicated in previous telegrams in a friendly yet firm manner.

We realize that if the question of citizenship is raised the Soviet Government may advance the question of frontiers. We believe, furthermore, that the Soviet authorities may introduce the frontier question in case any approach is made to them which might offer the possibility of a real rapprochement between the Polish and Soviet Governments. We do not feel, however, that fear that the question might be raised should deter us from pursuing a course which in our opinion is in the interest of the war effort and of postwar cooperation. We are of the opinion that we are in a position to meet the frontier question if pressed by the Soviet Government, in a frank manner which would not give offense if the Soviet Government displays the spirit of cooperation which we have a right to expect of a fellow member of the United Nations.

In case during the discussions the Soviet Government should advance the question of frontiers we may point out that the United States Government does not feel that at this time, when the energies of the United Nations should be concentrated upon the winning of the war, controversies with regard to future boundaries should be permitted to develop; that we are convinced that the liquidation of differences with regard to boundaries, unless such differences may be settled amicably and without friction between the governments concerned, should await the termination of the war and be included in the general postwar settlement. We may stress the fact that the solving of the citizenship problem along the lines suggested by us need not in any way weaken or prejudice the claim of either the Soviet Union or Poland to the territories under dispute. Our suggestions on the subject of citizenship relate to human beings—not to land or property. We feel that the unfortunate persons resident in Polish territory in the fall of 1939 who were uprooted from their homes as a result of the war and who now find themselves in the Soviet Union should at least be given the opportunity of deciding the country of which they desire to be citizens. If consideration of this kind is shown to these war victims it will strengthen their own morale and will cause peoples throughout the world to have increased confidence in the interest of the United Nations in the welfare and happiness of persons who are in their power.

We do not of course desire that the prolonged conversations which may follow our proposals with regard to citizenship should interfere with any plans for the evacuation of special categories of Poles. It is our suggestion therefore that when making the basic approach outlined by the Department you make it clear that in our opinion the evacuation of certain groups of Poles should not await a more basic settlement of the Polish-Soviet disagreement. You may emphasize the fact that in our opinion a generous attitude on the part of the Soviet Government reflected in the immediate evacuation of certain groups of Poles will not only represent a concrete contribution to the united war effort but will also assist in the creation of a more favorable atmosphere for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union on a basis which will make possible an era of real friendship between the two countries.

It is felt, in view of the sudden death of General Sikorski, that it is even more imperative that we immediately take steps to make it clear to the Soviet authorities that we desire to assist in bringing about the resumption of relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government-in-exile. If in attempting to bring this about we do not approach the problem in its fundamentals we might give the impression, particularly in view of our long silence and the changed situation in the composition of the Polish Cabinet, that we have changed our attitude toward the Polish Government.

We have communicated our ideas in this matter to the British Embassy here and this telegram has been repeated to Ambassador Winant in the event that Mr. Eden should desire to take up the matter with him.

We hope that with as little delay as possible you and the British Ambassador will be able to agree upon and make an approach to Stalin along the lines suggested by us.⁹⁹ When you reach an agreement with the British Ambassador please telegraph as early as possible when you are to see Stalin in order that our proposed approach can be explained simultaneously to the Polish Government.¹

Hull

97. Quoted in telegram No. 4184, on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
98. See telegram Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 323.
99. In telegram No. 857, July 13, 5 p.m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union stated that he and the British Ambassador had agreed to make the approach along the lines suggested by the Department. He added that Stalin was then at the front, and might not return for some time, so that there might be some delay in seeing him. (760C.61/2063)
1. In telegram No. 1049, August 11, 11 a.m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that he had just been informed that Stalin would receive the British Ambassador and himself that evening (760C.61/2081).