760C.61/2053: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 p.m.]
799. Department’s 496 [497], June 29, 2 p.m. I have given careful study to the considerations set forth in the Department’s telegram and have discussed the question in detail with the British Ambassador [Page 438] who has also received additional instructions which have been repeated to Washington and presumably communicated to the Department. In view of the motivating factors underlying the Department’s approach to the problem which now contain new considerations I feel that we may well take up this question with the Soviet Government along the following lines.
1. The fundamental basis for the approach should be along the lines indicated in the Department’s 427 of June 12 and 497 of June 29; that is, the necessity for unity among the United Nations. The main objective should be the formal resumption of diplomatic relations, endeavoring at the same time to remove as many grievances of the past as possible.
2. No attempt should be made at this time to induce the Polish Government to make changes in its government. If upon discussing the general terms of rapprochement the Soviet Government should raise the question of the reconstitution of the Polish Cabinet the basic policy of the American Government as outlined in the Department’s telegrams should be clearly explained. I understand that the British are now in substantial agreement with this approach.
3. The question of relief and evacuation of Polish citizens should be discussed along the lines of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Department’s 427 of June 12 and I anticipate some success in view of the following developments:
The Soviet authorities have informed the Australian Chargé d’Affaires that:
- a.
- A special organization has been set up to provide for the relief of Polish refugees in the Soviet Union, that this organization has taken over various depots in the provinces and that it is administering them in cooperation with a committee selected by the Polish refugees themselves. The Chargé has been promised frequent reports on the operation of the depot and the welfare of the refugees.
- b.
- A group of 300 Polish orphans in Ashkhabad whom Molotov is stated to have assured Romer would be permitted to leave the Soviet Union will be allowed to depart as soon as arrangements are made for their reception abroad. Twenty adult Poles will also be permitted to accompany the children.
- c.
- The Soviet Government will now permit publication in the press of an announcement that the Australian Legation has taken over Polish interests. (This announcement appeared in the Soviet press on July 3.)
In view of these developments I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Government may be prone to consider questions of Polish relief and evacuation of certain groups of Polish citizens sympathetically. Indeed I was told yesterday by the British Ambassador that Stalin in a message to Churchill dated May 6 maintained that the Soviet Government would not object to the evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union. It is therefore not my understanding that the Soviet Government maintains that “there [Page 439] are no Poles in the Soviet Union and therefore there is no problem of Polish relief or evacuation. On the contrary there are indications that racial Poles are considered by the Soviet Government to be Polish citizens. Consequently I feel that progress can be made in this field and that by its exploitation a basis may possibly be laid for a more friendly understanding between the Polish and Soviet Governments preliminary to a formal resumption of relations.95
4. Both the British Ambassador and I strongly advise that the fundamental question of citizenship must be avoided in the present preliminary conversations as outlined above since we feel sure that if advanced by us it will unquestionably lead to discussions of frontier problems which we will refuse to countenance and a deadlock in the negotiations will result.
I realize, of course, that this approach does not solve one of the fundamental questions of the rupture, that of citizenship. In my opinion this question whether approached from a racial point of view or not still revolves around the frontier problem which the Department is not prepared to discuss. This question now appears to be the only point at issue between the approaches proposed by the Department and the Embassy.
The proposed “step by step approach” was advanced with a view to building up confidence between the Polish and the Soviet Governments and a hope of prevailing upon the Soviet Government “to view the matter primarily in the light of its importance in the prosecution of the war”. Under present circumstances I feel we have little chance of prevailing upon the Soviet Government to bring itself to view the question in “the light of a settlement of the complex postwar problems on a just and equitable basis”. At the same time I feel that we must always be vigilant and prepared fully to support the Poles should it become evident that a gradual capitulation of the Polish Government to the basic demands of the Soviet Government was being maneuvered.
It is quite likely, of course, that during the course of the envisaged conversations an appropriate occasion might arise for my Government to make clear its position as to the principles upon which it feels that understanding between the United Nations should be based.
The Department’s immediate instructions are requested on the advisability of proceeding along the lines set forth in the numbered paragraphs 1 to 4.
- In telegram No. 1100, August 17, noon, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that the Australian Chargé had advised him as follows: “(1) The Soviet authorities have permitted a Polish orphanage consisting of 303 children and about 10 adults to depart from Soviet Union for Tehran. (2) From letters received from Polish citizens in the provinces, it would appear that the relief depots are in actual operation and supplies are being distributed to Polish refugees.” (760C.61/2089)↩