Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/2047: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 18, 1943—1 p.m.
[Received 11:13 p.m.]

689. Department’s 427, June 12, 9 p.m. I thoroughly agree that we should synchronize our efforts with the British in an endeavor to solve the Soviet-Polish dispute but feel that we should consider this question more realistically before any approach is made to the Soviet Government. The Department’s telegram under reference appears to me to be based too strongly on the Polish desiderata and does not take into sufficient account the basic Soviet reasons for the breach in relations. At the same time the Department apparently believes that the Soviet Government can be prevailed upon to resume relations with the present Polish Government when as I have reported (see my 415, May 8, 11 p.m.) there seems to be every indication that it will categorically refuse to do so. In discussing the Department’s telegram with Clark Kerr I find that we both feel that unless we are willing to discuss the basic reasons for the break (the composition of the Polish Government and the question of frontiers) no useful purpose will be served by an approach here on the broad basis suggested by the Department. The main purpose of our endeavors is obviously to bring the two Governments together again and we do not believe that this can be achieved unless agreement is reached on at least one of the two principal Soviet reasons for the dispute.

The British Ambassador and I are in substantial agreement that the time has not come for action here on so broad a basis as that set forth in the Department’s telegram and that the only hope of progress lies in a step by step approach. We believe that for our immediate purposes the Department’s suggested approach goes too far in that it touches upon the important question of citizenship which we feel reasonably sure the Soviet Government will not be willing to discuss at this stage unless the frontier question is considered and which if brought up now might give the Russians pretext to turn their backs on our representations.

We feel that our first preoccupation must be to prevail upon General Sikorsky to eliminate from his Government those elements whose presence in it make harmony with the Soviet Government impossible. We both understand the reluctance of our Governments to interfere in the internal affairs of another of the United Nations under normal circumstances but we believe that the present situation is not normal and not subject to normal treatment.

The British Ambassador and I therefore wish to submit the following views in which we are in accord:

1. The American and British Governments should discuss with General Sikorsky the subject of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations and endeavor to ascertain whether he would be willing to choose an appropriate moment to make changes in his Cabinet. We both feel that our Government[s] should endeavor to persuade Sikorsky to examine this question realistically.

2. The relief of Poles in the Soviet Union should for the present time be left in the hands of Soviet agencies (see my 678, June 18⁹¹) although it is doubtful that any effective aid will be rendered the Poles by this action. We doubt that Polish Consuls will be admitted into the Soviet Union even after the resumption of relations but we feel that this question should be left to the Poles to work out with the Russians when the time comes.

3. Since the question of citizenship is closely connected with the frontier problem we feel that it is entirely too delicate a matter to be raised at this stage.

4. While point 1 is being worked out we might with some hope of success approach the Soviet Government with respect to the question of the evacuation of certain categories of Poles from the Soviet Union. The first group (close relatives) mentioned in the Department’s telegram No. 428 of June 12 should present no insuperable difficulties. I believe that the evacuation of the second group (Poles domiciled west of 1939 frontier) would certainly stir up the question of boundaries and should be avoided at this time. The British Ambassador does not share my views on this point and believes that this group might be safely included in our representations. The third (orphans and children) we feel we might take up on humanitarian grounds and especially now with some force inasmuch as our two Governments are doing all they can to ship food to this country and every mouth that can be removed to eat elsewhere will ease the food problem here.

The British Ambassador and I agree that the recruiting of Poles should not be discussed at this stage but should be left for subsequent negotiations. In this connection see my 678, June 18.

Standley

91. Not printed; it transmitted to the Department the texts of letters exchanged between the first Congress of the Union of Polish Patriots (the Soviet-organized group of Poles in the Soviet Union), which had opened in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and Stalin, as reported in Pravda of June 17, 1943 (760C.61/2048).