Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/2022: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)⁸⁹

Washington, June 12, 1943—9 p.m.

427. With reference to your 596, June 4, 1 p.m., the President agrees in principle that we should synchronize our efforts with the British in an endeavor to resolve the Polish-Soviet dispute. It is felt, however, that the problem should be broached from a broader base than the present British proposals.

The Department has not instructed you heretofore to take up this question with the Soviet Government since it was hoped that the breach might be healed. In view of the continued break in relations and in view of the extreme importance placed on the question of the necessity for unity among all United Nations in achieving the primary objective before us—the defeat of our common enemy—it is now felt that an effort should be made to bring the Soviet and Polish Governments together again.

If you concur please consult with your British colleague to ascertain whether he agrees that the approach set forth below may not offer a more far-reaching solution of the question:

The Department feels that the principal object of any attempted solution of this question should be the formal resumption of diplomatic relations on a sound basis under which the grievances of the past would not be permitted to plague the future.

It is believed that an attempt at solution of the practical problems which would lead to a resumption of relations should be approached on the following broad basis which from a study of recent Polish-Soviet relations would, it is felt, eliminate the principal defects in the July 1941 agreement.

1. One of the major defects in the 1941 agreement as supplemented by informal agreements was the setting up of what amounted to an extraterritorial apparatus of a foreign government functioning in the Soviet Union. It is believed, therefore, that a more workable solution could be reached if the Poles would agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations with, of course, the understanding that Polish citizens would receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens in similar circumstances. If the Poles would agree to this, the Russians on their part might be prepared to permit Polish citizens in the Soviet Union to have contact with appropriate Polish consular officers.

2. With regard to the question of citizenship, which must be resolved before any just or lasting resumption of relations can be brought about, it might be more practical and helpful to approach this problem on the following broad lines in order to avoid any reference to the territorial question which must of necessity be eliminated from any discussions at this time:

(a) The Russians and Poles should permit the non-racial Poles to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship.

(b) All racial Poles who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 should be recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens and would, therefore, not be called upon to opt.

3. Particular importance should be placed on the problem of evacuating from the Soviet Union Polish citizens who have close relatives abroad, especially those who are members of the immediate families of men in the Polish armed forces. Similarly every effort should be made for the evacuation, as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care elsewhere, of Polish orphans and other Polish children who cannot be properly cared for in the Soviet Union.

4. The question of recruiting for the Polish armed forces, which is an essential problem in the furtherance of the prosecution of the war, might well be taken up subsequently, provided it appears that agreement can be reached on the other fundamental questions.

In presenting such proposals to the Soviets emphasis should be placed on the obvious necessity of doing everything possible to close our ranks and thus bring our full and combined weight to bear in prosecution of the war. If during conversations relating to this subject, the question of a change in the Polish Government should be raised it should be made clear that since this Government follows a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of any of the United Nations, it cannot bring any pressure on the Polish Government in this respect either directly or indirectly and could not look with favor on any proposal that we interfere in Poland’s internal affairs.

This telegram has been repeated to Ambassador Winant for his confidential information in order that he may be informed of the Department’s views on this question in the event that Clark Kerr should seek instructions in this connection and Eden wish to raise the subject with Ambassador Winant.

The Polish Government has as yet not been consulted in this matter.

Before taking up this question with the Soviets, the Department would appreciate having the benefit of your ideas on the suggested approach as well as those of your British colleague.

Hull

89. Quoted in telegram No. 3663 on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.