760C.61/2045
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to The Under Secretary of State (Welles)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In the belief that it may be of interest and possibly helpful in connection with problems arising from the [Page 425] suspension of Polish-Russian relations, I beg to mention the following thoughts which have occurred to me, and which might possibly correspond to General Sikorski’s views.
In the first place, it now seems clear that the three main points upon which Moscow would insist as conditions for a resumption of relations are: 1/ changes in the composition of the Polish Government; 2/ suppression of part, and a friendly attitude of the remaining section of the Polish press; 3/ tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East.
As regards the first condition, it might, in my opinion, be possible for Sikorski to meet this without impairing the dignity and prestige of the Polish position* provided (a) he carried it out by stages over an extended period, say 6 to 8 weeks, and (b) the changes were effected on the pretext both of differences in matters of internal policy, and of the General’s belief that a “change of guard” is from time to time a wholesome move.†
Furthermore, by proceeding thus Sikorski would be the less likely to appear to be acting under direct pressure from Moscow.
It seems to me, moreover, that provided this procedure were conducted quietly, with a minimum of publicity, and provided the Russians were sincerely willing to accept the fulfilment of the foregoing, among other conditions, as a basis for the renewal of relations, the way might thus possibly have been cleared for a resumption, perhaps by late Summer—early Fall.
In talks with General Sikorski, previous to his very recent departure for the Middle East, where he expects to remain about six weeks, I gained the impression that he was inclined to keep an open mind in the matter. I therefore believe that if he could be brought to feel reasonably sure of obtaining effective results from the application of a formula somewhat along the above suggested lines, he might give it his favorable consideration.
As regards the Russian conditions for a resumption of relations, both Russian Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov, in their conversations respectively with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk and with me, concurred in their insistence upon the reconstruction of the Polish Government. In comparing their statements on this [Page 426] aspect, however, I note a difference in detail. Bogomolov insisted upon a “replacement of the Sikorski Government” by one which would be friendly and more realistic towards the USSR; Maisky told Masaryk he considered that his Government might find its way clear to working with Sikorski and Raczyński; that they were more realistic than other members of the Polish Government. I am inclined to feel that Maisky’s statement corresponds more than Bogomolov’s with the terms upon which Moscow might be willing to settle. In appraising the difference between the statements of the two Ambassadors, I am inclined to ascribe Bogomolov’s more drastic tone partly to the quarrelsome relations which he has personally experienced with the Poles over recent months.
As regards the Polish press, the two Ambassadors were in effect alike in insisting upon its suppression except for one official organ.
As regards the question of tranquilizing the openly anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces, here again the Ambassadors differed, for, I believe, the same reasons as above cited. Maisky said there would have to be a tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude among the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East, and the elimination of the sources of inspiration of this attitude, in view of the long-range as well as of the immediate bearing thereof on Polish-Russian relations. Bogomolov, for his part, said that the Polish military authorities would have to rid the army of the “militantly anti-Soviet, Pilsudski-ist officers” from the forces both here and in the Middle East.
As regards the frontier question, Maisky said this might best be left for discussion later on, or even after the war. Bogomolov said this was a closed question as far as those parts of Soviet White Russia and Soviet Ukraine which had formed part of pre-war Poland, were concerned.
With warmest regards and my every good wish,
Faithfully yours,
- In further regard to the question of a change in the composition of the Polish Government, I have long felt that Sikorski would do well to replace at least several of his Cabinet Ministers. I have in mind particularly Minister for Information Kot, and Minister without Portfolio, in charge of the Department of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda. For your further information, the attached memorandum contains additional details on this score. [Footnote in the original. Attached memorandum not printed.]↩
- “change of guard” is an expression conceived and used by the late Marshal Pilsudski and subsequently used by other Polish leaders, to explain to the people changes they were making in the composition of their respective Governments. [Footnote in the original.]↩