760C.61/2034½
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs
A Secretary of the British Embassy showed me in the strictest confidence paraphrases of telegrams from the Foreign Office which indicated that despite the conversation Mr. Churchill had with the Soviet Ambassador on April 29, the Soviet Embassy’s news bulletin Soviet War News published on April 30 a copy of Wanda Wasilewska’s article in Izvestia as well as an objectionable broadcast to the Poles. The message went on to indicate that the Prime Minister had sent for Mr. Maisky and complained in the strongest terms of this development.
In the course of this discussion Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet Government did not have the intention of setting up an alternative Polish Government in Moscow. (The British Secretary added that as far as he knows no assurances to this effect have been received by Mr. Churchill direct from Mr. Stalin.) The Ambassador added that on the other hand the Soviet Government would not renew relations with the present Polish Government. When asked what he meant by this Mr. Maisky replied that the Soviet Government would be prepared to deal with General Sikorski and Count Raczyński but that there would have to be a reconstitution of the present Polish Government.
In another telegram referring to instructions sent to Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, the Foreign Office stated that if [Page 410] the Soviet Government agreed to the proposals set forth in those instructions it was hoped that the United States Government would help the British in dealing with the formidable refugee problem with which the British would be confronted in the Middle Eastern area.
The British Secretary also showed me a copy of the Foreign Office’s telegram of May 2 which formed the basis of the aide-mémoire which Lord Halifax handed to the Secretary yesterday.63 In this connection it is pertinent to quote the last paragraph of Lord Halifax’s instructions which he did not incorporate in his aide-mémoire to the Secretary:
“It will not escape you that we are in the most difficult position. The Poles have a special claim on us since we have treaty alliance with them64 and it was on their behalf that we entered the war. Although their International behaviour is sometimes unwise they have gallantry and [are] our allies and we are very reluctant to let them down. On the other hand, to assume the protection of their interests in the Soviet Union would be to place a very heavy strain upon our relations with the Soviet Union.”
In discussing the question of the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union I stated that I did not see how any good would be served by either the British or ourselves undertaking such representation since any move of this kind would indicate to the outside world that the break was final and would play even more heavily into the hands of German propagandists. I pointed out that I personally doubt whether the Soviet Government would permit anyone to represent Polish interests in the Soviet Union if for no other reason than that they do not consider that there are any Poles now in the USSR. I added that I felt that the main problem for all the United Nations was to endeavor to use their best influence to heal the breach rather than to try to protect individual interests of Polish citizens.