704.60C61/5½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me an aide-mémoire (copy attached),61 in which the British urged this Government to agree to look after the interests of Poland at Moscow pending the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between those Governments. The Ambassador read the aide-mémoire and when he reached the end of the first paragraph, in which the British Government said it was not in a position to perform this function, I said that this likewise well expresses the situation of the United States.
I then added that both our Governments should be in a position at all times to exert their best efforts and influence to restore relations between Russia and Poland; that this influence is liable to be impaired, as the British aide-mémoire well states, if one of our Governments agrees to represent the interests of Poland at Moscow. I stated that the Russians, being a very suspicious people, were not favorably disposed toward this policy in any respect and that it would be easy for either the British or this Government to jeopardize its good standing with Russia, which is all-important to maintain for the present and the future as well. I went on to say that our two Governments can do much more for Poland and what is of even more importance for the United Nations’ cause by exercising our fullest influence, not only to restore relations between Russia and Poland, but also to persuade Russia that she simply must desist from this sort of flare-up from time to time in the future. I added that the recent Polish-Russian diplomatic break has done great injury to the Allied cause and that to avoid a repetition of it is the most important problem presented now and if Russia can be persuaded to see these broader aspects of the situation in which she and all the United Nations are alike vitally interested, the more or less personal matters between Poland and Russia will almost automatically iron themselves out. In any event, this first broad step is the most important step that can be taken from the standpoint of the differences between Russia and Poland. I said further that Great Britain and the United States should exert themselves to the utmost to solve this paramount question; that in the meantime Poland would have virtually no interests to be looked after and that if she did she would be coming to Great Britain and the United States just as she has frequently done in the past to point out her troubles with Russia and urge both Great Britain and the United States to aid her in getting them solved with the result that each of our Governments would do the best possible without, of course, making ourselves partisans of either side. In these [Page 408] circumstances, I said that it seemed to me that the Polish Government should quickly see that this Government, as well as the Government of Great Britain, can render much more valuable service first to the general cause and second to Poland herself without running the risk of jeopardizing their standing and influence with Russia by either Government agreeing to look after the interests of Poland at Moscow in a formal sense. I said that, of course, this Government like that of Great Britain is most desirous of being of every feasible service to the Poles both as a government and a people and expects to see a new Poland reconstituted at the end of the war.
I promised the British Ambassador that I would confer with the President and let him know the President’s views in this regard. I do [did] so and later spoke with the Ambassador over the telephone and said that the President was in harmony with the views expressed by me to the Ambassador and set out hereinbefore. The Ambassador said that he would send this message to his Government. He did not undertake to argue it. He made very feeble efforts at the beginning of our earlier conversation to press the British viewpoint, but the first paragraph of the aide-mémoire was most difficult for him to get over.
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