760C.61/1064: Telegram
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 2—8 p.m.]
Polish Series [No.] 28. In lengthy conversation with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov, the greater part of his remarks took the form of a tirade against (a) the provocative tone of the Polish press since he had assumed duties here; (b) the attitude of the Polish Government in general, and of the “viciously anti-Soviet element” thereof in particular.
Evaluating the implications both of his comments and of the continued brutal tone both of the Moscow press and of the Moscow-inspired press here, I have the impression:
- 1,
- that Moscow had prepared its case against the Polish Government at the time of or perhaps even previous to the despatch of the Russian note of January 16, 1943, which in effect declared all Poles in the USSR Soviet Citizens;
- 2,
- that Moscow had been merely awaiting a pretext which it might turn to the advantage of its own forward looking interests;
- 3,
- that, from the Russian standpoint, the fundamental issues involved go beyond even the question of the Polish-Russian frontiers, and include other Russian postwar “security frontier” aspirations in the “middle zone”;
- 4,
- that Moscow intends to make the most of the present political crisis with a view to gaining Washington’s and London’s consent to [Page 405] its envisaged territorial “claims”, at a time when, according to the Polish authorities, Moscow reportedly considers that both we and the British would be “reluctant to offend Moscow”; (it was not insignificant, in this connection, that in its stiff note suspending diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, Moscow took the opportunity to state publicly and officially for the first time that it considered Polish Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania as already a part of the Soviet Union).
Holding that the situation called for a reconstruction of the Polish Government, Bogomolov pointedly denied that Moscow had in mind the formation of a “Polish National Committee” on Russian soil. He considered there were sufficient Poles here from among whom a “more reasonable and realistic” government than the present one might be formed here. If the present crisis, he added, led to the removal from the Polish Government of the “fifth columnists” which constantly threatened the solidarity of the United Nations, the situation would have netted a victory for the latter, rather than for Dr. Goebbels.
In this connection, I gained the impression that his indignation is directed particularly at Minister of Post War Reconstruction Seyda and at Minister of Information Kot, formerly Ambassador to Moscow. Bogomolov indicated his suspicion that the request for International Red Cross investigation was conceived by Kot, and that he had written the text of the communiqué concerned. (I am aware of Kot’s responsibility in this connection, and am informed by Sikorski’s closest associates that after Kot had written the communiqué he succeeded in influencing Sikorski over the telephone, at moment when latter was tired and ill, to permit him to release it; that when, on second thought, Sikorski had wished to withdraw it, it was already in hands of the press.)
In this connection, and with a view to the future, I have made clear to Sikorski that it was my personal opinion that this “diplomatic blunder” had offered Moscow a pretext for coming to grips with his Government; that the fact that the latter had failed to consult with either Washington or London or both before releasing the communiqué, had unfortunately created the impression in my mind to effect that when his Government was making trouble it preferred not to consult us; when it got into trouble it looked to us to get it out. In accepting these remarks as my personal reaction he assured me that he greeted them with full comprehension.