Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/1031: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

London, April 23, 1943—7 p.m.
[Received 11:43 p.m.]

Polish Series [No.] 19. Reference my 16, April 17, 6 p.m., and my 17, April 17, 7 p.m. Drawing my attention to Pravda’s attack of April 19 on the Polish Government, Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov stated that the latter’s April 16 [17] communiqué and its appeal for International Red Cross investigation into allegations by Berlin radio broadcasts concerning Russian massacre of Polish officers had aroused a storm of indignation in USSR. Characterizing the Polish Government’s attitude as provocative and unreasonable, he held that by this action, and by the Polish National Council’s April 17 announcement declaring its disbelief of the Soviet Government’s motives in shooting Alter and Ehrlich,¹⁹ the Polish leaders had been inexcusably trapped in the net of the Nazi provocateurs; that their actions could be regarded only as open support of this sinister Nazi invention. The Nazi “stunt” was so clumsy that in his opinion it would not have been attempted had the ground not already been carefully prepared by the “Alter and Ehrlich” agitation. He went on to say that the continued provocative tone of the Papiepnsrumlo²⁰ Polish press, for example Dzennik Polski’s recently published article, under Rome dateline, alleging the Soviet authorities were preparing a French government under Torres²¹ to put into France at the psychological moment, was not helpful in the present situation. He was aware of the Polish leaders’ annoyance over “certain questions” still under discussion in Moscow, but he could not understand why they would permit themselves to go so far as to have issued the aforementioned communiqué. Only the Nazis could profit by this action. For it was clear that these foul Nazi allegations were aimed at fomenting dissension between the United States, Britain and Russia: at invigorating the anti-Soviet crusade; at erasing traces of the crimes committed by the Nazis themselves against the Polish prisoners of war.

I gained the impression from the Ambassador’s aforecited and other remarks that Moscow is concerned over the potential effect of the German allegations and the appurtenant Polish communiqué upon British and especially American opinion.

In conversation with Sikorski, he referred to the Soviet denials and characterized them as vague, and attempts to cover up this grim example of current-day Russia’s reversion to the methods of Ivan the Terrible. Even when he had questioned Stalin concerning the whereabouts of the “missing officers”, in course of their Moscow talks in December 1941, Sikorski had gained the definite impression from the former’s marked evasiveness that he was aware of what had befallen these officers at the hands of the Russian authorities. Sikorski thereupon cited the following additional circumstantial evidence. In their evacuation in spring 1940 of the three prison camps originally occupied by Polish officers, the Soviet authorities had sent (a) a comparatively few to another camp in Eastern Russia wherefrom they were liberated in July 1941; and (b) the rest, some eight to ten thousand, to an unknown destination, later understood to have been the area west of Smolensk. In this connection the present Minister of Justice Komarnicki, who was one of the group sent to Eastern Russia, had been informed by several officers of the other group that the Soviet authorities had indicated Smolensk as their probable destination. Furthermore, at the outset all the Polish officers had been permitted to correspond with their families in Western as well as Eastern Poland. This correspondence, except in the case of the group sent to Eastern Russia, had ceased in the spring of 1940.

Sikorski had addressed a note to Ambassador Bogomolov dated April 21 [20]²² requesting a clearer than hitherto explanation of the situation. Furthermore, in response to a request from the chief of the “underground” in Poland, the General had just sent him a directive to maintain quiet concerning the German allegations; to bear in mind that the Germans were enemy number one and that everything must be done towards their defeat. As regards his Government’s appeal for International Red Cross intervention, Sikorski emphasized that it was made previous to a similar request by the Duke of Sae [Saxe-] Coburg de Gotha, head of the German Red Cross.

Discussing the Polish press, Sikorski concurred with my personal observation that further polemics might react on his own personal position. He could accordingly instruct Minister of Information not [Kot] to “soft pedal” the tone of the Polish press and to give a directive to Polish speakers as well as the press to adopt a line to effect that “regardless of whether or not the German allegations were true, the Germans could be counted upon to paint the picture to suit their own purpose”.

Referring to the continued German broadcasts, Sikorski went on to say that according to the German broadcasts, the Polish commission from Warsaw and Krakow consisting of Goetel, member of the Polish Academy; Surgeon Colonel Gorczycki, medical director of Polish Red Cross and formerly chief of personnel of army medical corps; the representative of the Archbishop of Krakow, Canon Jasinski; and a member of the Warsaw Municipal Council, after having visited the scene of the tragedy had issued a cautious statement to effect that they considered the officers had died in spring 1940. Furthermore, Sikorski added, the broadcasts had hinted (a) that this commission’s statement was based on examinations of documents and diaries which had ended in spring 1940; and (b) that the Germans intended making a ballistic examination of the bullets in the bodies of the Poles. Admitting that Berlin’s timing of this propaganda campaign could hardly have been more cunningly devised for the purpose of boosting Germany’s anti-Bolshevik crusade, Sikorski said he looked for the German Government to go to full length in seeking international investigation; it was not inconceivable that it might even invite British and American representatives for this purpose.

Winant

19. Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, former residents of Warsaw and Lublin, and leaders of the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland, had been arrested and imprisoned by Soviet authorities in Kuibyshev on December 3, 1941, where they were reported to be correspondents of the Jewish Daily Forward of New York. They were executed in December 1942 on charges that they were Nazi agents. For the note of March 8, 1943, from the Polish Foreign Minister to the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, protesting the executions, and the Soviet note of March 31, 1943, rejecting the protest, see Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents, pp. 178–180.
20. Apparently garbled.
21. Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader.
22. Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1948, Official Documents, p. 123.