760C.61/1018
The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to President Roosevelt
Mr. President: I have the honor to refer to the decision of the USSR Government to withdraw the Polish citizenship of Polish citizens deported to Russia during the period of Soviet occupation of Polish Eastern territories which, as stated in the note of the Soviet Government dated January 16, 1943, has been taken in view of the Polish Government’s refusal to recognize Soviet sovereignty over Poland’s Eastern territories described in the note as “Western Ukraina” and “Western White Ruthenia”.
In the course of February and March, acting on instructions of my Government, I had the honor to inform you through the intermediacy of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State about the crisis reached in Polish-Soviet relations as a result of this decision on the part of the USSR Government. I was privileged personally to explain the situation to you when I had the honor of being received by you on February 16, 1943.88
On February 5, 1943, the Under Secretary of State told me that you had instructed him to inform me that you realized the gravity of the situation, that you requested me to ask General Sikorski that the Polish Government should preserve a calm attitude pending the intervention which you intended to undertake at a time and in a manner which you would personally determine. I communicated this decision to General Sikorski.
On February 16th, when I had the honor of being received by you I had the privilege of informing you of all the developments of the Polish-Soviet crisis, and of communicating to you the reply of General Sikorski, who had instructed me to express his gratitude, his assurance that the Polish Government would preserve the calm attitude you had recommended and to draw your attention to the urgency of the situation, in view of the fact that the Soviet Government was applying ruthless measures to enforce Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens and was creating accomplished facts which would be difficult to retract in the future.
You very kindly told me that you realized the gravity of these facts and that you would communicate at once with Prime Minister Churchill with a view to undertaking an intervention in Moscow.
We further discussed the possibility of a restatement of the United States’ policy of non-recognition of territorial changes brought about in wartime by force or threat of force, and, at your request, I discussed this subject with the Under Secretary of State on February 17th and wrote to him some suggestions on February 18th.
[Page 366]Since that time I have kept the Secretary of State and Mr. Welles informed of the rapid and ominous further developments in Polish-Soviet relations and of the conversations of Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador to the USSR, with Premier Stalin and later with Mr. Molotov. These conversations, which have been continuing in Moscow for over a month, clearly show that the USSR Government has no intention of making any concessions in its arbitrary interpretation of the rights of citizenship, that it is decided to disrupt and to liquidate our Relief organizations, to uphold its refusal to allow the previously promised evacuation of some 30,000 persons constituting the families of the Polish soldiers evacuated to the Middle East, and of 60,000 Polish children.
While keeping up the pretense of negotiations, the Soviet authorities are simultaneously proceeding with the liquidation of all Polish Relief centers, of Polish schools and orphanages, are arresting Polish welfare employees, school teachers and confiscating the storehouses and the American relief supplies which they contain. At the same time, under threat of arrest, and by means of beatings, starvation and ejection from their dwellings, they are forcing our citizens to surrender their Polish passports and to accept Soviet citizenship documents. According to the latest information they are actually attempting to force some employees of the Polish Embassy and their families to accept Soviet passports. Polish citizens who succeeded in applying personally at the Polish Embassy have been arrested when leaving the building.
In view of these facts which require no comment, General Sikorski informs me that he is convinced that only your kind support, in the form of an urgent intervention with Premier Stalin, may still save the situation and justify his ceaseless and patient efforts to pursue his steadfast policy aimed at friendly Polish-Soviet relations. Moreover, he feels that the lack of a tangible proof of support on the part of the United States Government and of the British Government serves to encourage the USSR Government in the belief that they can safely pursue their action without risking any protest on the part of the Principal United Nations.
General Sikorski has instructed me to assure you, Mr. President, that he firmly believes that you will not abandon Poland in this very serious situation in which she appears to have been selected by the USSR as a test case of the application in practice of the principles proclaimed by the United Nations. He has instructed Ambassador Romer to do his utmost to keep up for a time the fiction of further conversations pending your intervention.
General Sikorski is aware, however, that the USSR Government is doing all it can to provoke a break of Ambassador Romer’s conversations and will most probably try to place the responsibility for it [Page 367] on the Polish Government, and that the present tension cannot be indefinitely maintained without very serious consequences. He requests me once more to appeal to you for an intervention with Premier Stalin, which alone can change the situation. He asks me to stress the urgency of this intervention and indeed to emphasize that in all probability this is the last moment for an effective intervention.
General Sikorski has also laid the facts before Prime Minister Churchill and has asked him to act without delay.
In view of the gravity of the situation and of its very serious consequences which unfortunately affect not only Polish-Soviet relations, but likewise cannot fail to affect the Polish war effort, the unparalleled resistance to Germany in Poland proper, and, in fact, may react on the unity of the United Nations as a whole,—I take the liberty of asking you, Mr. President, to let me have your answer to General Sikorski’s appeal as soon as possible.
Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.