760C.61/1010: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
Moscow, March
10, 1943—11 a.m.
[Received March 18—5:35 p.m.]
[Received March 18—5:35 p.m.]
175. The following telegram has been received from Kuibyshev.
123. March 10, 4 p.m. For the Ambassador.
- 1.
- Assuming that you have not already received from Polish
Ambassador information with regard to recent developments in
the Soviet-Polish controversy, you may be interested to have
the following given me in strictest confidence by Polish
Counselor:65
- a.
- Although Soviet Government was presumably aware of Polish Government’s Declaration of February 2566 when Polish Ambassador had his interview with Stalin on February 25, it was agreed at the interview that the two Governments would refrain from making further declarations which would tend to aggravate relations between them, and that effort would be made to find basis of discussion with a view to the eventual resolving of the controversy. The Soviet statement published on March 2,67 therefore, came as a great shock to Poles.
- b.
- Although Counselor affects to be optimistic with regard to eventual outcomes, believing as he does that Soviet Government cannot afford (because of probable adverse repercussions in United States and Britain) to take any extreme measure such as to sever relations with Poland he did not disguise his alarm over consequences of successive repressive acts by Soviet Government against Polish nationals in Soviet Union. He enumerated first, the denial of transport facilities to numerous food and clothing depots maintained by Polish agencies in Soviet Union, resulting in inability of depots to function and in deterioration of their stocks; second, directors of Polish schools, orphanages and hospitals in Soviet Union are being replaced by Soviet nationals; and third, large number of Polish nationals who had refused to accept Soviet nationality have been imprisoned and otherwise harshly treated. Counselor has sent three notes since March 1 to Foreign Office protesting against such arrests. The concluding paragraph of the third note, of which he has given me a copy, reads “As the accuracy of the foregoing information is beyond doubt, and being persuaded that the local authorities at Kirov and Kuibyshev are employing methods of coercion which are in contradiction with the intentions of the central authorities, the Embassy is compelled to protest in the strongest possible manner against the creation of faits accomplis of this character[”].
- 2.
- Colleagues with whom I have talked generally take an optimistic view over the short haul, a view I share. Although both Russia and [Page 348] Poland can be expected for time being to maintain uncompromising attitudes and in case of latter to adopt provocative tactics, so long as the territory in controversy is under enemy occupation it would benefit neither country to take a definitive and conclusive position having detrimental effects on Allied unity and from which it could not readily retreat. With regard to possible developments over the long haul I have noticed tendency among some colleagues to urge the need for taking a “realistic” view and for support by United States and Britain of Soviet position on the ground that the latter nations will not feel disposed to intervene by force whatever the merits of the Polish case might be. It strikes me that this view if adopted by American and British Governments before end of the war and before it would be possible to examine a complicated issue in an objective and rational manner would be certain to be Banquo’s ghost in efforts to formulate effective post-war system of collective security.
- 3.
- I feel sure that Department would be interested to have your views on this subject along with all the information you may have available.
Standley