760C.61/1–643
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs
Subject: Postwar Polish-Soviet Borders.
The following is a summary of a conversation I had today with Mr. Arlet, Counselor, and Mr. Lepkowski, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy.
Mr. Arlet, who has recently transferred from Kuibyshev to Washington, discussed at length the accusations made by the Soviet Government against the Polish food distribution delegates who were accused of sabotage. Mr. Arlet himself was accused of being the chief instigator in the Embassy of these alleged espionage activities, and the Soviet authorities asked for his recall from Kuibyshev.
I discussed with him the question of the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit Polish Jews, White Russians and Ukrainians to leave the Soviet Union because they are considered by the Soviet Government to be Soviet citizens. Mr. Arlet confirmed the information that has already been received by the Department that the Soviet Government has steadfastly held to this contention that these persons are Soviet citizens on the basis of the plebiscites held in 1939,17 and for that reason the Soviet Government will not permit them to leave the country.
I asked Mr. Arlet for his ideas as to the motives of the Soviet Government in adopting this policy. He replied that he thought there were two reasons: (1) that the Soviet authorities desired to keep in the Soviet Union all former Polish citizens of White Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish race in order that, on ethnical grounds, the Soviets could hold that eastern Poland ethnically was part of Soviet White Russia [Page 322] and the Soviet Ukraine and thus annex these territories in the peace settlement; (2) that by refusing to allow these persons to depart from the U.S.S.R. as Soviet citizens, the Soviet Government would embarrass the Polish Government and would reduce considerably the population of any future Polish State to be set up after the war.
In view of this policy I asked Mr. Arlet whether he thought that the Soviet Government was going to insist upon annexing all or part of eastern Poland and whether he thought that the Polish Government might be willing to cede this territory, which is not as a general rule of great economic importance, provided that Poland was given compensation in the West. Mr. Arlet spoke with considerable feeling when he stated that no Polish Government would last over night if it should indicate that it was prepared to give up any former Polish territory. He stated that it was not the question of the value of this territory from the economic point of view, but it was a matter of principle. He pointed out that although a good part of eastern Poland is not rich in economic or agricultural resources this area is one of the principal Polish sources of wood, and the southern area in the Ukraine includes some of the richest wheat land in the country. Mr. Arlet stated that the Soviet Union had no real need for these areas, that their annexation to the U.S.S.R. was not vital to Soviet economy or security but that on the other hand the areas were vital to Poland, and their loss would be detrimental to the economic life of Poland.
In regard to this question Mr. Arlet pointed out that in the Polish-Soviet agreement made by the Sikorski Government in 194118 the Soviet Union had agreed to consider null and void the Von Ribbentrop–Molotov agreements of 193919 and that since these agreements provided for the annexation of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union the Soviet Government in denouncing these agreements had denounced its claims to eastern Poland. Mr. Arlet stated that although there was no question that Poland should be given additional territories in the West, i.e. East Prussia and part of Pomerania as well as Upper Silesia, the Polish Government could not accept any arrangement which gave these territories to Poland in compensation for the loss of any eastern territories to the U.S.S.R.
- See note of October 23, 1939, from the Polish Ambassador, and footnote 16, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 209, 210.↩
- Signed at London, July 30, 1941; for text, see Republic of Poland, Polish Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents, pp. 107–108; see also telegram No. 3292, July 30, 1941, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 243.↩
- The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty, with secret additional protocol, was signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 76–78; or Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. vii, pp. 245–247. The German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, with secret additional protocols, was signed at Moscow, September 28, 1939; for text, see ibid., vol. viii, pp. 164–167. The supplementary protocol provided for in this treaty describing the Polish boundary in detail was signed at Moscow, October 4, 1939; for text, see ibid., p. 208.↩