740.0011 European War 1939/30990a
The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
My Dear Admiral Leahy: In conversations which I am reliably informed were undertaken with the knowledge and authorization of the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs,16 a Finnish diplomatic official is reported to have made a proposal17 to this Government of the following general character:
If Finland could have any satisfactory assurances that such a step would not mean its ultimate destruction as a nation, it would be willing by the beginning of September to cut off supplies to the German troops in the north of Finland, thus condemning the latter to eventual exhaustion and destruction. The Finnish Government would like a reaction to this proposal.
The Finnish official who put forth this proposal stated that the American Government was in error in thinking that the Finnish Government was unwilling to contribute whatever it could to the liberation of Europe. Finland’s position, according to this official, was simply: The great part of Finland’s food supply came from Germany and the Germans by deliberately preventing Finland from building up stocks kept it in a position of day by day dependence on German shipments. In these circumstances the Germans were in a position to create at any time and within the space of a few days almost insurmountable food difficulties for the Finnish people and they would not be slow to punish in this manner any demonstration of political independence on the Finnish side. This situation, however, would last only until the end of August or beginning of September at which time enough grain would be available from Finland’s own harvest to tide the country over for some time and the day by day dependence on the Germans would be temporarily removed. It was for this reason, therefore, that the above proposal could be made.
In a further conversation subsequent to the presentation of the original proposal set forth above the Finnish representative explained that when he said his Government would be prepared to “cut off” the [Page 294] German troops in Finland, he did not mean that those troops would not be given an opportunity to return peacefully to Germany through Finland, if they wished to do so. It meant that the Finns would refuse, as of a certain date, to permit these troops to be supplied or reinforced from Germany. This would place them in the same position as that of the German troops in Northern Norway (in view of the recent Swedish declaration)18 and the Germans would presumably be compelled to withdraw them. He also said that the Finnish Government would doubtless wish to make its offer contingent on Allied entry into Northern Norway, since in the absence of such an entry it would be impossible to get supplies to Finland from the outside world and the country would remain at the mercy of the Germans. It was pointed out to him that it was out of the question that our military authorities should consent to reveal in the course of such conversation anything whatsoever concerning our military plans. He agreed to this but expressed the hope that perhaps some arrangements could still be made with the United Nations which while not binding the latter to any specific military action, would become operative if and when Northern Norway were liberated from the Germans.
It seems to me that Allied interest in this proposal may depend for the greater part upon its military aspects. Accordingly, before going further into the political implications of the proposal, I should greatly appreciate receiving an indication from you as to whether the proposal has any substantial military interest in connection with the prosecution of the war.
I may add by way of background that in the present situation in which the Finnish Government finds itself, it may feel that the best solution for its present political difficulties would be a landing by American or even British troops in Finland. The Finns might calculate that such a landing would serve the dual purpose of ejecting or assisting in the ejection of German troops now in Finland and offer some insurance against the entry of Russian troops into Finland. If this is true, the Finnish proposal might well be found upon further exploration to contain the requirement that American or British troops land in Northern Finland and Northern Norway and that Soviet troops would not make such a landing an occasion for operations against Finnish territory. Aside from these considerations, the Finnish proposal might be found of interest and importance in connection with any military operations which might be undertaken by Allied forces anywhere in the Scandinavian area and upon the continued neutrality of Sweden.
Sincerely yours,
- Conversations had been going on for some time in Lisbon between the American Counselor of Legation in Portugal, George Kennan, and the Finnish Chargé there, Taavi Pohjanpalo. The Department was informed by Minister in Sweden Herschel Johnson, in his telegram No. 2676, August 24, that the Finnish Minister in Sweden, Gripenberg, had said that Foreign Minister Ramsay had authorized the Finnish Chargé in Portugal to undertake these conversations looking toward a possible Finnish exit from the war (760D.61/1671). Mr. Gripenberg had replaced Jarl A. Wasastjerna as Finnish Minister to Sweden on April 15, 1943.↩
- The form of this Finnish proposal was worked out at a meeting between Kennan and Pohjanpalo early in August, and was reported to the Secretary of State in a letter from Kennan dated August 10.↩
- For termination of the German-Swedish transit agreement, see footnote 9, p. 289.↩