Office of the Historian

740.0011 European War 1939/30558: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, August 5, 1943—10 a.m.
[Received August 6—9:10 a.m.]

975. The Foreign Minister asked me to see him this morning.

1.
Dr. Ramsay opened the discussion by inquiring my impressions of Sweden following my 4-day visit to Stockholm. I replied it seemed to be generally believed in Sweden that German transit through that [Page 289] country would shortly be terminated.9 The Minister said he had the same impression but professed not to know when the transit agreement would be denounced (his private secretary before I entered had told me his chief thought it might be a question of 2 or 3 months). I said I was entirely without official knowledge and had not discussed the matter with Minister Johnson, but I did have the feeling that German transit through Sweden might stop at any time as otherwise the Swedish Government would not have called up the greatest number of troops on record. When the transit did cease Finland would be in the limelight as the Germans would have only two remaining lines of communication: one, across the Skagerrak from Denmark to Norway and the other through Finland.
2.
The Foreign Minister said he had had these aspects of the matter well in mind, that events were moving rapidly and that “Finland might have to make some quick decisions”. He then came to the main object of the interview which in brief was whether the United States was still interested in helping Finland out of its war.
3.
Dr. Ramsay opened with the comment “You want us to end our cobelligerency with Germany”. I replied we had tried for almost two years to get Finland away from this perilous association but we were not trying any more after negative response he had given to our aide-mémoire of March 20. I recalled that your offer on that date had clearly indicated that it was not one which would be tendered again. The Minister said he knew that very well and that he expected no initiative from the United States in any further effort to extract Finland from the war. However, he wondered, and wanted my personal opinion, whether you might be willing to tell the Finnish Government whether now would be a good time to approach the Soviet Government directly with a view to making peace or whether Finland should wait a little longer. All he wanted was some friendly advice from Washington on “when” not “how”. He thought the question of getting in direct contact with the Russians was one he could easily arrange and added the comment he thought the Soviet Government would prefer that there be no intermediaries.
4.
With the Department’s 102, June 24, and 120, July 30,10 in mind I replied my impression was that you were not greatly interested in the Finnish problem. For a long and laborious period you had sought-without success to get Finland out of the war and very possibly had no [Page 290] particular interest now when or how Finland reached a conclusion of hostilities with Russia. Nevertheless the Minister’s inquiry was of the utmost importance—at least for Finland—and I should not fail to report it to you. If he wanted my personal opinion it was that I doubted if any reaction would be forthcoming from Washington, but that I could of course be mistaken.
5.
Dr. Ramsay said that while he realized perhaps the chances of even such restricted assistance from the United States at this time were “90% against and only 10% for” he, nevertheless, in examining all the possibilities would like to explore this one as well. It would be of the greatest help to him in approaching the Russians, if that became necessary (and clearly he thought it was necessary), to have some indication from us whether or not the time was ripe.
6.
The Minister asked me what our relationship to Russia was, evidently with a view to conditioning Russia’s attitude toward Finland. I replied we were Allies of the U.S.S.R. and that naturally we cooperated more completely with our Allies than with nations outside that association.
7.
Dr. Ramsay said in concluding the interview that he did not want me to get the impression he was on the point of making peace “but he had to consider all the possibilities and it might be necessary to act quickly”. In other words his informal request boils down to this: “Is the American Government willing to tell the Finnish Government that now or some later date is the most propitious time to make peace?”
8.
As for peace terms the Minister made no very specific comment but did say the article in the Stockholm paper Aftontidningen July 31 was not a Finnish trial balloon and that the terms mentioned therein, including the retention by the USSR of the 1940 frontier in Karelia would be quite unacceptable to Finland (please see last paragraph my 942, July 2812).
9.
The Minister made little reference to Germany but in saying once more (my 964, July 30) that he had my note of April 8 constantly in mind did remark that without reference to the Cabinet he had categorically refused a German demand for the admission of 1000 Norwegian laborers into Lapland. This request, which he said originated with the German authorities in Norway, had been turned down at the end of May. He admitted that a German demand for increased transit facilities, particularly in the event of an Allied invasion of Norway, would place Finland in a highly difficult position in the light of my note of April 8 (my 961, July 3012) but averred that no intimation had yet been received from the Germans that such increased facilities were desired. As for the German position in the war he had heard this [Page 291] morning of the defeat at Orel, wondered at the quiescence of the Luftwaffe and gave me the general impression that he was at last convinced Germany was heading for certain and possibly speedy defeat.
10.
My impressions are these.
(a)
The Finnish Government has reached the conclusion it must reach a separate peace with Russia.
(b)
The immediate question is one of timing: “Shall we approach the USSR now or later?”
(c)
A qualified hope is entertained that we may be willing to render one last service, in at least informing the Finnish Government whether we think the time is ripe for peace talks and when that time may be.
(d)
The Finnish Government realizes it must conduct the negotiations alone.
(e)
The Finnish Government is not prepared to make peace on the basis of the boundary of the treaty of Moscow.
(f)
The Finnish Government is willing to run the risk of German reprisal as being less than the risk of staying on with a beaten “co-belligerent” and facing a victorious USSR.
11.
I told the Minister I did not at all know if any reply would be forthcoming to my report of our conversation but that if anything developed I would let him know. Although his inquiry may have been inspired by the telegram mentioned in the Department’s 121, August 2,13 Dr. Ramsay made no reference to that message.
McClintock
  1. Agreement by Sweden to grant Germany the right of German troops and matériel to transit through Sweden was made on June 21, 1940, when the Swedish Riksdag complied with the German request. For diplomatic exchanges between the Swedish and German Governments on this question prior to the agreement, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. ix, pp. 596 and 619. Termination of the agreement was in fact announced by the Swedish Government on August 5, 1943, specifying that transport of war supplies would end on August 15, and of troops on August 20.↩
  2. Latter telegram not printed.↩
  3. Not printed.↩
  4. Not printed.↩
  5. Not printed.↩