Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/29868: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, June 21, 1943—noon.
[Received June 22—1:10 a.m.]

805. The Foreign Minister asked me to see him this morning.

Dr. Ramsay said he wanted to discuss certain aspects of our relations and added the comment which he repeated throughout the interview that “others had sowed the wind and he had to reap the whirlwind”.

I said I was glad he had asked me to call as reports had reached me of a new crisis in Finnish-German relations (see my 802, June 19⁸⁸). The Minister confirmed the fact his Government was under renewed German pressure but said he thought the departure of the German Minister⁸⁹ and his wife had been merely for Blucher’s annual vacation. He said frankly the grain question was still causing difficulty and that the Germans had not yet answered the Finnish request for an additional 30,000 tons (see my 783, June 10⁹⁰). I observed that Finland’s “Vapenbroder” were pretty tough people to deal with and that the way they were treating their cobelligerent at this time was an example of German methods. Ramsay replied that at least in the question of grain it was largely a matter of “technical difficulties”.

The Minister then came to the point of his discussion. He said the question of the Finnish SS battalion (see my 789, June 11 and previous telegrams) was causing trouble and that he wanted me to know in advance that some of these troops would reenlist and return to Germany. The Government had not wanted them to follow such a course but it was “necessary[”.] He insisted, however, that those men who preferred to stay in Finland could freely do so and that there was no element of compulsion in offering new enlistment to them. I said it passed my comprehension why any SS men should want to go back after their costly experience on the Eastern Front but Ramsay said some of the boys “liked” it. He gave me the positive impression that the German Government had demanded the return of the Finnish SS battalion and when I asked if there would be any attempt to recruit new volunteers he said that question had not yet been decided. Reenlistment of the present SS battalion would commence around the first of July.⁹¹

The Minister in response to my question admitted his Government was under present German pressure to issue a declaration of joint solidarity with Germany in the war and a statement of resolve to seek no separate peace. I inquired what policy he intended to follow in this matter. He replied he could make no statement but his Government had stood up to the Germans before on this issue and implied he would like now to resist the demand. I said I hoped for Finland’s sake he would do so as if Finland had resisted before when the Germans seemed to be winning there was all the more reason to resist now when they were most certainly losing the war.

Ramsay uttered the usual expression of hope that I would remain in Finland and added the typical comment that “America could do a great deal to help us” (see paragraph 3, my 753, June 4),⁹² I replied I had heard this on all sides in Finland but that few Finns seemed to realize that in return for help we expected a little help in return. Finland on the contrary had persisted in keeping on the German side. I was pessimistic as to what we could do now to help Finland or why indeed we should help Finland.

I told the Foreign Minister I was glad to have his comments on the situation as it developed as it was better to get these reports from the front rather than the back door. I said however, that although his explanation about the SS battalion would perhaps be understood by my Government, which believed as he knew that the Finnish Government was not a free agent, it would create a bad impression among the American people and he could expect additional unfavorable publicity for Finland from the forthcoming SS reenlistment. He demurred that at the time the SS bog [boys?] enlisted 2 years ago it was “historically necessary” and that although he had to suffer the consequences of the decision made at that time he could not criticise the men who made it. I said in any case it seemed singularly poor policy to send the Finnish volunteers to the SS for as he knew Himmler’s⁹³ organization was one of the most hated bodies of men in the world. It also seemed singular that the head of Finland’s university should be the active organizer of recruitment for the SS.

I asked him what Mannerheim thought about all this. Ramsay made a wry face. My conclusions are these:

1. Finland is under new and severe German pressure at the present time. Supply of food and other essentials probably forms the basic weapon in the German arsenal but the Finns are also fearful of such conversations as that reported in my 803 yesterday.^93a

2. Part if not all of the Finnish SS battalion will soon return to Germany. I am almost certain that recruitment for fresh SS troops will also be made in Finland. The Germans are undoubtedly more interested in the propaganda than the military value of these men, and our own propaganda should seek to counteract theirs.

3. More serious German demands are being pressed on Finland. They include the question of a statement of joint solidarity and they might possibly include a demand for more active military cooperation on the part of the Finns. However, I much doubt if Mannerheim and Ryti are willing to resume the offensive.

4. I think Ramsay has our note April 8⁹⁴ much on his mind although he made no reference to it. Possibly if you were to instruct me to call on Ryti to refresh his memory of this note it might be useful in combatting German pressure at this time. However, on the basis of the analyses set forth in my 547, April 12, and 753, June 4, I am not sanguine as to our prospects of attaining measureably positive results although Ramsay gave me the impression that he would resist German demands so far as possible.⁹⁵ As he put it “We have to proceed by degrees”. Nevertheless the very fact he dared to discuss Finnish-German relations with me on his own initiative speaks something for his desire to retain our potential friendship.

McClintock

88. Not printed; the crisis referred to arose in part from the reported demand by the German Government that Finnish forces participate in an offensive on the Leningrad front, and also from German pressure applied at the time (740.0011 EW 1939/29855).
89. The German Minister to Finland, Wipert von Blücher, left for Berlin on June 8, 1943; he returned, leaving Berlin on August 11 for Helsinki.
90. Not printed.
91. In telegram No. 893, July 13, the Chargé in Finland reported that the Finnish press had published an official announcement that soldiers serving with the SS battalion “have been incorporated in Finnish Army”. (740.0011 European War 1939/30115)
92. Not printed.
93. Heinrich Himmler, Commander in Chief of the Schutzstaffel and Chief of the German police.
94. Post, p. 667.
94. See telegram No. 55, April 8, 2 a.m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 262.
95. In telegram No. 2055, July 3, 9 p.m., the Minister in Sweden indicated that the Finnish Government was actively resisting German pressure (740.00119 European War 1939/1528).