Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1441: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, May 6, 1943—10 a.m.
[Received 3 p.m.]

643. 1. Announcement by BBC⁷⁰ yesterday that Ambassador Davies⁷¹ was leaving for Moscow possibly with end in view of arranging meeting between President Roosevelt and Stalin prompts me to wonder if there might be still a slight chance of getting Finland out of its “separate war”.

2. The objective of our diplomacy in Eastern Europe I believe is to do everything possible to detach the Axis satellites from Germany. Our attempt so far as Finland is concerned was characterized largely by use of negative means and our one recent positive measure, our tender of good offices of March 20, went no further than strictly technical definition of what “good offices” are. Our other pressure consisted largely of threats, warnings and admonishment. We have failed to detach Finland from Germany by these measures and we shall have slight chance of success unless Finnish Government sees a chance of getting out of its “separate war” with some frontier less unfavorable than that of the Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940.

3. In absence of comment from you on analysis of situation expressed in my 547, April 12, I am inclined to believe conclusions set forth herein come fairly close to truth.

4. It is accordingly with no great expectation that anything can be done but with the conviction that it is my duty to pursue our diplomatic objective here to very end that I offer following suggestions:

a. If Mr. Davies’ visit to Moscow presents least chance for discussion of how to end war between Finland and USSR to our advantage, I think we or Soviet Government might offer Finnish Government one more chance. As my recent telegrams have indicated, certain members of Finnish Government possibly believe that by midsummer a new approach might be made directly to Soviet Government (my 576, April 19⁷²).

b. To have any chance of acceptance, Soviet peace terms should offer Finland at least something better than Treaty of Moscow. Hangö is today, as it was in autumn of 1939, the crucial issue. If USSR could relinquish its claim to Hangö, a start might be made in peace conversations.

c. You and Russian Government can better judge than I the relative advantage of breaking up Axis consortium as balanced against the advantage to Russia of regaining 1940 boundary of Finland or even taking over entire country. (In latter case we had better get out of here now.) On basis of my own on-the-spot observation, however, the Russian occupation of Hangö was singularly ineffective in bottling the mouth of Gulf of Finland in 1941.

d. Should peace talks result, Germany might occupy Finland. This would itself be an advantage to us in causing a diversion of German force and creating fresh lack of confidence among the satellite states.

5. If these views commend themselves to you in the light of your knowledge of the possibilities (and as always it is what Russia intends which is finally controlling in this situation), I think it might be worth your while to instruct me very secretly to sound Ryti and Mannerheim as to their views on the question of peace. I might recall in this connection the oral proposals sent to President Roosevelt by President Ryti by Albin Johnson as summarized in my 311, February 19. I would most certainly emphasize that if Ryti sent Ramsay again to Berlin to tell all to Ribbentrop, the password of the Casablanca Conference⁷³ would automatically apply to Finland.

6. If President Ryti were disposed to take this last chance of keeping our friendship by stopping Finland’s collaboration with Germany which can only be done by concluding peace with Russia, he might be persuaded to set forth his terms in writing for consideration of President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin. Such terms would probably have to be delivered by some personal emissary as the Finns, as I have reported on several occasions, think rightly or wrongly that the Germans have broken the codes of this Mission.

McClintock

70. British Broadcasting Corporation.
71. Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1937–1938), visited Moscow on a special mission for President Roosevelt between May 19 and 29, 1943; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 646–665, passim.
72. Not printed.

73. Conference between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, January 1–4–25, 1943. The Chargé’s reference to the “password” of the Conference was presumably intended to stand for the term “unconditional surrender”, which the American and British leaders determined would be imposed on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

    The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.