740.00119 European War 1939/1351: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 20—10 p.m.]
1973. The four top ranking Foreign Office officials with whom I have talked during the past few days have all expressed with enthusiasm their gratification at the reception accorded Mr. Eden in the United States both by our Government and by our press. They seem even a little surprised at the general cordiality with which he has been greeted and by the general agreement on principles between Mr. Eden and his American hosts during their preliminary conversations. They all emphasize, however, that the talks so far have been purely preliminary and that “they have not yet gotten down to brass tacks.” Those, such as Nigel Ronald,32 primarily interested in post war questions [Page 27] are evincing more optimism with respect to our attitude than has been the case for many months. Nevertheless, this optimism is decidedly cautious and we should not forget that every inhabitant of these isles has the events of 1919 deeply engraved on his memory. In fact, I believe it is no exaggeration to say that fear of an American withdrawal from its due interest in the building of the new world is the dominant factor in British feeling toward the United States today. Neither the British public nor the British Government dares count too strongly that the changed world and the lessons of the aftermath of 1919 will effectively prevent another American “back to normalcy” wave with all its power to destroy the spirit of cooperation founded on wartime need. To the extent that the four Senators’ resolution33 implies a consciousness of this danger it has been highly welcomed here and British eagerness to see our Senate go on record against a return to isolationism is genuine indeed. It was this same anxiety which led Richard Law34 to tell me yesterday of his gratification at Senator Connally’s statement35 following Mr. Eden’s meeting with our Congressional committees.
The alternate, or perhaps I should say the corollary, fear of “American imperialism” is likewise real but is, I believe, more inclined to take the form of superficial irritation at utterances across the Atlantic than to constitute any deep-rooted anxiety.
While the feeling in that connection is slightly less strong now, I must point out that the interpretation which the British public placed upon our North African policy has resulted in a certain amount of disillusionment. The fact that, as some of our friends believe, the British Government lacked either the heart or the courage to explain that policy to the press and public or publicly to associate itself therewith may be one of the primary causes. That the British Government permitted free rein to the malicious but highly effective campaign of defamation emanating from Carlton Gardens36 from the middle of November until just recently is likewise a principal reason for the present feeling of the British public. Two years of strong British and Gaullist denunciation of the “men of Vichy” and their policies, and reciprocal virulent attacks on Great Britain from France, provided a fertile soil in which to plant charges of “appeasement”, “pro-Fascism” and “ignorance of why the war is being fought” against American policy in the minds of the people of Great Britain. Whatever [Page 28] the causes, no picture of present British feeling toward the United States would be accurate that omitted reference to the disillusionment (however temporary we may hope it will be) that has followed here in the wake of our North African landings37 or to the feeling that the high ideals of the Atlantic Charter38 may be sacrificed to expediency. My own deep conviction that the policy we have pursued with regard to France is both right and sound cannot blind me to the fact that, whatever the responsibility of the British Government therefor, a majority of the British people today have less confidence in American motives, idealism and understanding of Europe than they had before last November.
- British Assistant Under Secretary of State.↩
- Senate Resolution No. 114, March 16, 1943, regarding a United Nations organization; Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 2, p. 2030.↩
- British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Tom Connally, Senator from Texas and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in a statement on March 19, 1943, expressed approval of Mr. Eden’s view given before key members of Congress that the four great powers were conducting the war in complete harmony and understanding, and hoped that they would be in general agreement after the war.↩
- Headquarters of the Free French Government in London.↩
- November 8, 1942; for correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 429 ff.↩
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941; for text, see ibid., 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩