Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1366

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)³⁹

undated

Recent telegrams from Helsinki furnish ample evidence that the peace terms set forth in Moscow’s 215, March 26, would not be acceptable in the present military situation to the Finnish Government.

The two points which seem to be entirely unacceptable from the Finnish point of view are (1) restitution of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1940 and (2) with all the consequences arising therefrom. The phrase “with all the consequences arising therefrom” obviously refers to the period between the Moscow Treaty of March 1940 and the date of the German attack on the Soviet Union during which period the Finns consider that they were subjected to continuous and intolerable extortion represented by such facts as the Russian right of transit of arms, munitions and men to the leased area at Hangö, the completion of the Salla railroad, demilitarization of the Aaland Islands and the installation of Soviet consuls there with supervisory powers in the Aaland Islands, the establishment of a Consulate at Petsamo for alleged⁴⁰ espionage purposes, the pressure exerted for the control of the Petsamo nickel mines, the carrying on and financing of internal subversive activities and insistence upon the right of subversive organizations in Finland to operate freely under the aegis of the Soviet Union. There were numerous instances of discourteous and offensive interference and conduct by official Soviet representatives in Finland. The insistence of the Soviet Government on its own interpretation of the boundary in the neighborhood of the industrial center at Enso to the detriment of vital Finnish industry and power resources was another example of the Soviet attitude during the period between the wars.

Even the restitution of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1940 would almost certainly not be acceptable to Finland as this provides for the leasing of Hango which the Finns construe as being a threat to them and not a protection for Leningrad. The treaty also provides that the historic Finnish city of Viborg be left in Soviet territory. This city has transcendent significance in the history of Finland besides being of vital importance from a strategic defense point of view. The territory transferred to the Soviet Union under this Treaty comprised about ten percent of all Finnish territory and of Finnish industrial and agricultural wealth. Out of this transfer arose the question of the rehabilitation of about 450,000 Finnish citizens, about fifteen percent of the population. Many of these evacuees have now returned to their original homesteads and to evacuate them again would create an internal political problem which no Finnish Government would care to face.

(2) The question of compensation for damage caused the Soviet Union in the present war is one of unlimited possibilities. Finland is economically prostrate at the present time and to be additionally burdened with tremendous payments of war indemnity would be more probably than she could bear.

The Finns would construe the terms outlined in the telegram under reference as deliberately designed to destroy their national existence and would undoubtedly prefer to perish in resistance rather than to accept them.

Since we are convinced that the Finns would not accept terms of the character outlined by Molotov it would obviously serve no useful purpose to let them know that the Soviet Government has such conditions in store for them. In view of the importance to the war effort of the withdrawal of Finland we believe that we should not let this matter drop without endeavoring to make an effort to obtain from the Soviet Government terms which might at least offer a promise of resulting in the initiation of conversations between the Russians and the Finns.

The attached draft of a telegram has been prepared with this end in view. Minister Schoenfeld concurs.

Ray Atherton

[Annex]

Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow⁴¹

Washington, March 30, 1943.

For the Ambassador. Your 215, March 26, and your 219, March 29.⁴² We have given the statements made by Molotov to you and embodying the Soviet terms the most careful consideration and we still regard it as of the highest importance that no opportunity be neglected to bring the Soviet and Finnish Governments into direct contact for the purpose of hastening Finland’s withdrawal from the war.

Please, therefore, seek an early interview with Molotov and outline to him the results of our sounding out of the Finnish Government as set forth in our telegram 174 of March 27,⁴³ and state that you have also been instructed by your Government to inform him as follows:

1. We appreciate the confidence which the Soviet Government has shown by making known for our exclusive information the terms which it would be prepared to accept in negotiations looking to a separate peace with Finland.

2. We are inclined to agree with the view previously expressed by Molotov that such terms would not be considered by the Finnish Government as a practical basis for negotiations.

3. In view of the immediate and far-reaching advantages which we believe would accrue not only to the Soviet Union but to the entire prosecution of the war against our common enemy from the abandonment by Finland of its association with Nazi Germany and the restoration of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union, we hope that efforts can be continued to find a formula which would offer a basis for early and direct negotiations between the Finnish and Soviet Governments.

4. We would accordingly appreciate Mr. Molotov’s suggestions as to the reply which we might now make to the Finnish Foreign Minister’s inquiry⁴⁴ set forth in our 174 of March 27.

If you perceive no objection you may hand him for his convenience a memorandum containing the substance of the four numbered paragraphs set forth above.

39. Addressed to Under Secretary of State Welles and the Secretary of State. The memorandum is not dated, but was received by Mr. Welles on March 29, 1943.
40. By the Finns.
41. A marginal notation on this draft by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, reads: “This telegram not sent. One was despatched on March 31, 1943. This draft should nevertheless be filed for reference.” For the telegram of March 31, see infra.
42. Latter not printed.
43. Not printed; it recounted the latest exchanges in Helsinki between Ramsay and McClintock, instructed Ambassador Standley to inform Molotov of them, and stated that the American Government would welcome Molotov’s suggestions as to what it should tell the Finns in regard to a basis for negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union (740.00119 European War 1939/1356).
44. Of March 24, p. 255.