Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1349: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, March 20, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received 10:19 p.m.]

453. Your 43 yesterday. With my 450 today²⁹ in view I sought an immediate interview with Dr. Ramsay before his reply to your memorandum of February 13 had been encoded. I embodied all except the last two sentences of the first paragraph of your 43 in an aide-mémoire which was a very close paraphrase of your telegram. I saw Ramsay at 3 p.m. The Foreign Minister upon reading aide-mémoire said this was a matter of utmost importance but that he would refrain from comment other than that he could very definitely assure me that he and the entire Finnish people were willing to trust in the good will of the American Government and people. He said that Finland was a democratic country and the Councils of State functioned slowly and that accordingly he did not think an immediate answer to this message would be forthcoming but he promised to expedite a reply. I had impression that Finnish Government will give us a response within the next week. Ramsay asked how long Mr. Eden would remain in the United States.³⁰ I said I was uninformed on this point.

Ramsay said his reply to your memorandum of February 13 had been sent this morning when he was talking to me and gave me the impression that he did not intend to modify that note.³¹ I asked him if this communication embodied idea of peace for Finland at this time and he said “No”.

I told the Foreign Minister that in my opinion irrespective of what Procopé had been instructed to say in reply to your memorandum of February 13 this present aide-mémoire cast a new light on the question because the Secretary of State had indicated that the American Government was ready to extend its good offices for purpose of establishing contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments. I said I was confident that this time there would be no lamentable misunderstanding as to the nature of this offer as had occurred on August 18, 1941³² adding orally the views embodied in last two sentences first paragraph of your telegram. Ramsay said he clearly understood import of our aide-mémoire and made notes of what he thought the essential elements: (1) the readiness of American Government to extend good offices; (2) the present goodwill of American Government and people which the Government and people of Finland he said were disposed to trust; and (3) the fact that should this opportunity not be taken it might not again occur. I added that from our point of view the most important element was for Finland to stop helping our enemies. He replied that on this point his Government and mine saw differently.

Ramsay said that there were numerous “practical difficulties” in the way of concluding a separate peace with Russia and he likened it to yacht racing where the question of time was an important factor—when to tack or when not to come about. I observed that there was a new weather mark and that it might be time to come about. The Foreign Minister said he did not think that economic aspect of leaving Germany was so important and I had impression he did not regard threat of possible German military reprisals as grave. He said, however, that principal difficulty was that Finns simply could not trust Russians and their experience of Winter War and interim between that conflict and present war had amply confirmed their distrust of Soviet intentions. He said that what his Government feared would be that following the conclusion of a peace even under American auspices they would find that every few months or so Soviet Government would make fresh demands for concessions on the part of Finland. He expressed doubt whether American Government could prevent Soviet Government from following such a policy and said rather than accept such a situation it was better to go on fighting. I said that speaking purely personally I did not think that American Government could afford to take moral responsibility of assisting the two parties to reach a peace and then countenance the later gobbling up of Finland by the Soviet Union. We had signed the Atlantic Charter and intended to see it meant what it said. Ramsay agreed that the question of military guarantees was not to be considered and said that even if we were disposed to extend guarantees they could not be made effective against Russia. The possibility of military guarantees from Sweden he dismissed with contempt.

My outstanding impression of interview is that Ramsay is more worried as to bona fides of Russian intentions than he is of possible German reprisal.

On leaving I stressed again my feeling that time was of the essence. Ramsay replied that it might take at least 76 hours or longer to work out a reply and as I left said “the Finns are a slow thinking people. It takes time to get support for a new policy.”

McClintock

29. Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Minister had drafted a reply to the American note of February 13, and that it was in the process of being encoded (711.60D/177).
30. The British Foreign Secretary arrived in the United States on March 12 for “a general exchange of views with the United States Government on all aspects of the war situation.” See Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1943, p. 216. For correspondence regarding Mr. Eden’s visit, see ante, pp. 1 ff.
31. The note was handed to the Under Secretary of State by the Finnish Minister on March 23, 1943; it repeated substantially the position of the Finnish Government with respect to its policy toward the Soviet Union and to its search for security for Finnish democratic institutions, as stated in previous communications to the United States Government. (740.0011 EW 1939/28840)
32. On that date the Finnish Minister was informed by the Department of Soviet readiness to discuss peace terms with Finland. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, August 18, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 56.