740.00119 European War
1939/1430
Memorandum by Mr. L.
Randolph Higgs of the Division of European
Affairs to the Secretary of State
8
[
Washington
,] February 25, 1943.
Mr. Secretary: Mr. Kingsbury Smith, INS
correspondent covering the Department, came in this morning and
handed me the attached memorandum of a conversation which he had
yesterday afternoon with Mr. Toivola, a Counselor of the Finnish
Legation. I confined my remarks to Mr. Smith with respect to the
memorandum to saying that the memorandum had some very interesting
aspects and that I greatly appreciated his courtesy in furnishing it
to me.
With respect to the Finnish Legation’s alleged cable to Helsinki
“suggesting five points as a possible solution of Finland’s present
difficulties” it would seem that while such a solution might have
been possible in the late summer or early fall of 1941, the Soviet
Union would probably be cold to any suggestions along these lines
under present circumstances, as such a solution would leave Finnish
armed forces astride the southern end of the Murmansk Railroad and
supply lines through Soviet Karelia to Leningrad. It is also thought
unlikely that the Soviet Union would consider for a moment any
solution which would recognize even temporarily any Finnish claim on
Soviet Karelia.
The penultimate and antepenultimate paragraphs of Mr. Smith’s
memorandum also have their interest. I have taken the liberty of
bringing these aspects of the memorandum to the special attention of
Colonel Sands, War Department Liaison Officer.
[Page 244]
[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. Kingsbury Smith, of International News
Service, to Mr. L. Randolph
Higgs of the Division of European
Affairs
[
Washington
,] February 25,
1943.
Mr. Toivola called me Wednesday afternoon10 and inquired whether
he could see me for a few minutes on a matter of importance. I
met him at the Mayflower Hotel. He said Mr. Welles’ statement to
the press on Tuesday11 had created a great
deal of interest and considerable excitement at the Legation. He
wished to advise me of the action taken by the Legation as a
result of the statement. He emphasized that the information he
was about to give me was not for publication in any way, but was
for the confidential knowledge of myself and “my friends” at the
Department.
The Legation, he said, had sent a cable to the Foreign Office in
Helsinki suggesting five points as a possible solution of
Finland’s present difficulties. These five points were:
- 1
- —That Finland declare its intention of withdrawing
from further participation in the war;
- 2
- —That Finland announce it will engage in no further
military operations of an offensive character;
- 3
- —That Finland state it is unable to eject by force the
German divisions on its soil, but that it will not
assist them in any military operations;
- 4
- —That Finland announce it intends to maintain its
present defensive lines pending a final peace settlement
with the Russians;
- 5
- —That if a reasonable settlement cannot be achieved
with the Russians, Finland should declare its intention
to leave up to the United Nations peace conference the
question of what should constitute a just frontier line
with Russia.
Toivola asked whether I thought this action on the part of the
Legation would meet with the approval of the State Department. I
said I thought it probably would; that the Department, in my
opinion, would be pleased with any action Finland took to
withdraw from the war.
Toivola said he thought it was most important that no publicity
be given to the Legation’s action because the Germans might make
it difficult for Helsinki if they thought Finland was reacting
to American pressure.
[Page 245]
The Germans, he said, are a funny people. They are almost like
children. We feel they are prepared to recognize Finland’s right
to independence of action, providing they think Finland is not
reacting to American pressure.
Toivola also said that three “very important” people had been in
contact with the Legation during the day. Each inquired whether
the Legation had any information indicating that a separate
peace between Germany and Russia was imminent. One of the
parties was described by Toivola as having very close contacts
with high American military authorities. That party intimated
that our military people were extremely concerned over the
danger of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. Toivola
declined to reveal the names of the three people.
He said the Legation had been very impressed by the inquiries. He
also thought that Helsinki was concerned over the danger of such
a possibility; and that this concern might have a very direct
bearing on the fact that the Finnish leaders apparently were now
giving serious thought to the question of a separate peace, “The
Germans sold us out once, and we know they would not hesitate to
do so again.”
He reiterated that Finland is not pro-Nazi, and never has been
so. He said that even Witting had told him on one occasion that
Finland could not trust the Germans.
