Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

860D.00/1048: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, January 11, 1943—2 p.m.
[Received 8:27 p.m.]

51. For Under Secretary. My 50 today.⁶ My talk with Erkko⁷ last night followed immediately after his conference with Marshal Mannerheim.⁸ He said he had specifically asked Marshal what his attitude would be in event of Allied invasion of northern Norway. Mannerheim had not answered this question. Erkko then told me he—Erkko—had recently been approached by high officers of Swedish General Staff with suggestion that Swedes would be willing to occupy northern Finland as compromise move provided Germans would withdraw from that area thus checking any Russian advance toward northern Norway.

Erkko said he thought military position in far north was key to Finland’s fate and that one and perhaps last possibility of Finland’s exit from war under viable conditions might be tripartite “arrangement” whereby Germans would shorten their front by leaving Finland entirely, Russians remaining on their side of frontier and Swedes taking at least the north of Finland into protective military custody.

This idea seems far fetched but probably reflects growing conviction here that only desperate measures can succeed if Finland is to get out of its war with Russia before Germany goes down. My informant reflected view of Foreign Office official cited in my 16, January 5⁶ in saying that if Finns were to be granted only boundary established by treaty of Moscow March 12, 1940⁹ they would prefer to die fighting. He went further and said that if this was minimum they could expect they might as well go ahead and take Soroka¹⁰ now.

From this end of the line it seems evident that we are rapidly reaching end of negative phase of our diplomacy in Finland, provided of course a more positive policy suits the Department’s books. With jettisoning of Witting,¹¹ Horelli,¹² and Rangell,¹³ Finns will have cleaned much of their Cabinet slate, then will turn to us asking what next. Should we give them merely negative comfort and repeat that it is up to them to figure out their own salvation (your 84, November 21¹⁴), embitterment will be great and temptation to cast all on single hazard of Russian exhaustion before German defeat may prove greater than desire for maintenance of what may seem to them to be our unresponsive friendship. In this connection I recall conclusions set forth in our telegram 1206, December 8,¹⁵ in particular paragraph 9, on need for positive measures if Finns are to be got out of their predicament to our advantage. It seems at least from this angle that it is well worth while attempting to bring them out of German camp and in this connection estimate of Swedish Foreign Minister¹⁶ as set forth in last sentence of Stockholm’s 3666, December 24,¹⁷ may indeed be an accurate prediction. The Germans’ reaction would depend upon the time element and their own position in the general war.

In the meanwhile I am hewing strictly to the line of your 84 [229], November 21. Last night my only comment to Erkko was that some tangible proposition from the Finns would be of interest to us but that it was up to them to evolve their new policy. To others I have said that the doors of the Legation are open if they wish to come and our ears are open too.

I have criticized Finns in past for their adherence to a static policy in a dynamic situation. They seem now at long last to be on the move within the limitations of their desperate position. A word of encouragement from us, a promise of food, almost any positive act, might hasten the day of their abandonment of Germany. A simple authorization to say directly to Marshal Mannerheim from some very high person in our Government that the Atlantic Charter¹⁸ means what it says and is applicable also to Finland might have considerable effect. The Marshal would however ask “what about the Russians?”

McClintock

6. Not printed.
7. Eljas Erkko, newspaper editor in Helsinki and onetime Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
8. Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces.
6. Not printed.
9. The Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, between the Soviet Union and Finland, and its terms and conditions for Finland, are reported in telegrams No. 281 and No. 283, dated March 13., 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, p. 314. For texts of the treaty and protocol, see Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Finnish Blue Book (Philadelphia-New York, 1940), p. 115, or Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453; or, U.S.S.R. Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy, i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykhs inostrannymi gosudarstvami, vol. x, p. 11.
10. Soroka, an important town on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway and White Sea-Baltic Canal, now called Belomorsk.
11. Rolf J. Witting, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
12. Toivo J. Horelli, Finnish Minister of Interior.
13. Johan W. Rangell, Prime Minister of Finland.
14. In telegram of January 12, noon, the Chargé in Finland stated: “Reference to ‘your 84, November 21’ should have been to ‘Department’s 229’ repeated to us in Stockholm’s 84.” Text of telegram No. 229 is quoted in telegram No. 1015, November 19, 1942, to Stockholm, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 95.
15. Ibid., p. 106.
16. Christian E. Günther.
17. Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 116.
18. Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367. The Soviet Union adhered to the Atlantic Charter on September 24, 1941: see ibid., p. 378.