Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt ^23a

[Washington,] March 15, 1943.

The President, Mr. Eden and I dined last night and discussed, in great detail, the post-war geographical problems of Europe.

Russia. Eden stated he thought Russia was our most difficult problem; that she undoubtedly had two different plans up her sleeve—one based on British-American cooperation with Russia and the other on the assumption that the U.S. would withdraw from all interest in European affairs after the war. Eden said he believed that Russia preferred and hoped for the former because Stalin was not prepared to face the implications of Russia’s control over European affairs, and England would probably be too weak to face Russia alone diplomatically. I asked him what he thought Russia’s demands at the Peace Table would be. Eden said he thought they first would demand that the Baltic States be absorbed as states in the USSR. He felt Stalin would insist upon this for reasons of security and that he would make out a case that there had been a plebiscite in 1939 which indicated the desire of the Baltic States to join the USSR.^23b

The President stated that he thought that this action on the part of Russia would meet with a good deal of resistance in the United States and England; that he realized that, realistically, the Russian armies would be in the Baltic States at the time of the downfall of Germany and none of us can force them to get out. He, the President, said he thought the United States would urge Russia not to take them into the USSR without a new plebiscite but agreed that they would have very close economic military arrangements with the Soviet pending a plebiscite.

Eden thought Stalin would not agree to this and would be insistent that we agree to the absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

The President said he realized that we might have to agree to this, but if we did, then we should use it as a bargaining instrument in getting other concessions from Russia.

Poland. Eden said he thought that Russia would demand very little territory of Poland, possibly up to the “Curzon Line”.^23c This would not affect Poland unduly from an economic point of view. Eden said he believed that Stalin wanted a strong Poland, providing the right kind of people were running it and that their policy at the Peace Table would depend on this.

The President said it would be difficult to work out geographical boundaries on this basis because, while there might be a liberal government in Poland at the time of the Peace Conference, they might well be thrown out within a year.

Finland. Eden thought that Russia would insist on the line which was drawn up at the end of the last war^23d and he even thought this was reasonable and the President shared this point of view. Eden said that Stalin had told him he was going to insist on Hangoe for security reasons. The President said that with the emergence of air power this would not be necessary, but Eden reiterated that he was sure Stalin was going to insist on it. Both agreed that this would be a difficult matter to handle. Eden indicated that he thought there would be no trouble with Russia about the Straits, because, after all, it merely was a way of entrance from one locked sea into another. If Stalin really wanted to find a water route he would go after a new arrangement at the Suez Canal or Gibraltar. Stalin would surely demand Bessarabia. Both the President and Eden agreed that Russia should have Bessarabia because it has been Russian territory during most of its history.

Poland. Eden said that the Poles are being very difficult about their aspirations. He told a story of how the British Government wanted to turn a cruiser over to the Poles and Sikorsky insisted on naming it “The Lemberg”^23e after the city over whose sovereignty Russia and Poland are bound to have a bitter fight. Eden stated that he told Sikorsky that naming this cruiser “The Lemberg”, would merely irritate the Russians and there was no earthly reason for giving it that name because Lemberg is not a seaport. However, Sikorsky insisted and would not take the cruiser when the British refused to permit it to be named “Lemberg”. Eden said Sikorsky was forever meeting with the small states of the Balkans promoting Polish ambitions; that all this was known to the Russians and Eden thinks Sikorsky is doing far more harm for Poland than good. Poland has very large ambitions after the war and Eden says that privately they say that Russia will be so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland will emerge as the most powerful state in that part of the world. Eden thinks this is completely unrealistic. Poland wants East Prussia and both the President and Eden agree that Poland should have it. Eden said that the Russians agree privately with this but are not willing to tell this to the Poles because they want to use it as a bargaining instrument at the Peace Table. Poland will want her original boundaries as they existed prior to the war. The President said that, after all, the big powers would have to decide what Poland should have and that he, The President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference and bargain with Poland or the other small states; as far as Poland is concerned, the important thing is to set it up in a way that will help maintain the peace of the world.

The President said he thought we should make some arrangement to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey after the last war; while this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace and that, in any circumstances, the Prussians cannot be trusted.

Finland. Eden said that the Finns were trying to use both Great Britain and the United States now to approach Russia about peace. He, Eden, thought the Russians would not deal with Finland in that round-about way and Eden thinks that Stalin will not answer the note from the United States Government and that we should tell the Finns to talk direct to the Russians.^23f Eden thinks Russia wants an independent Finland but is going to insist on a line that will not threaten Leningrad. He, Eden, thinks the Finns must give way here. The President said he thought that probably Russia is not too anxious to make peace with Finland now because they are containing 7 good divisions (German) in Finland which, if peace is declared, would move down on the Russian front. The Russians, the President said, were containing these 7 divisions with 5 inferior divisions at the present time. Both Eden and the President expressed the belief that the Finnish post-war problem would be difficult to arrange.

Serbia. The President expressed his, oft repeated, opinion that the Croats and Serbs had nothing in common and that it is ridiculous to try to force two such antagonistic peoples to live together under one government. He, the President, thought that Serbia, itself, should be established by itself and the Croats put under a Trusteeship. At this point Eden indicated his first obvious objection to the Trustee method which the President is going to propose for many states. Eden did not push it but it was clear to me that the British Government have made up their minds that they are going to oppose this. Eden thought the President’s opinion about the inability of the Croats and the Serbs to live together a little pessimistic and he, Eden, believed it could be done.

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece. Both Eden and the President thought that none of these countries offered real difficulties from a geographical point of view.

Austria and Hungary. Both agreed that Austria and Hungary should be established as independent states. Eden said he thought Stalin would want to be pretty arbitrary about Hungary because the Russians do not like the Hungarians, and that Stalin would be unwilling to give them any favors at the Peace Table.

Germany. Eden said that the most important thing we had to get a meeting of the minds on in regard to Germany was the question of whether we were going to be able to deal with Germany as a unit after the war, disarming them, etc., and also for the peace, or whether we were going to insist that it be broken up into several independent states. Eden said that from the conferences he had had with the Russians he was sure that Stalin would not trust the Germans; that in his speech the other day when he said the Russian armies were going to stop at the German Border, this was for propaganda purposes inside Germany (Eden believed); that he, Stalin, has a deep-seated distrust of the Germans and that he will insist that Germany be broken up into a number of states. The President said he hoped we would not use the methods discussed at Versailles and also promoted by Clemenceau^23g to arbitrarily divide Germany, but thought that we should encourage the differences and ambitions that will spring up within Germany for a Separatist Movement and, in effect, approve of a division which represents German public opinion.

I asked what they would do if that spontaneous desire did not spring up and both the President and Eden agreed that, under any circumstances, Germany must be divided into several states, one of which must, over all circumstances, be Prussia. The Prussians cannot be permitted to dominate all Germany.

Eden said he believed that one of the reasons Stalin wanted a second front in Europe was political; that if Germany collapsed he had no desire, in Germany, to take the full responsibility for what would happen in Germany or the rest of Europe, and he believed it was a fixed matter of Russian foreign policy to have both British and United States troops heavily in Europe when the collapse comes. Eden expressed this purely as his private opinion and said that he was sure that in Russia a different view was held in some quarters but, nevertheless, he thought he had stated Stalin’s position.

We, then, discussed, at some length, the political effect of our troops being in Italy as against France at the time of the collapse of Germany and, while both Eden and the President thought it would not be as advantageous it was far better than not being there at all.

I told the President it was important that we have the frankest kind of talk with Mr. Eden about potential differences in Europe and that, at the moment, I saw two—1, The people of Serbia and Croatia and, 2, the problem of what countries, free and otherwise, should be disarmed in Europe. I felt that from what Mr. Eden had said he would not believe in a disarmed Poland or France and I thought it would be very unfortunate if he went back to London without fully understanding the President’s position in this, even if he did not fully agree and that he, Eden, should tell the President, frankly, what his objections [were] to the disarmament of countries like France and Poland. The President reiterated to Eden what he had told Churchill, that after Germany is disarmed what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?

I suggested to Eden, in the light of this evening’s conversation, that he articulate in his own mind the potential differences which the British and ourselves might have in Europe and, secondly, the differences which either or both of our countries might have with Russia in Europe and see if we could not come to grips with those, even though they would not be decided with definity at this conference. I suggested that we not explore anything beyond the European situation tonight and that we give two more evenings—one to the problems of the Southwest Pacific and the Far East and a third evening to Africa. I said it was clear that in these latter two areas there were bound to be conflicts of opinion but, nevertheless, I thought that we should exchange, with complete frankness, our points of view about such ticklish subjects, as

Hong Kong, Malayan Straits, India. I said I thought no useful purpose would be served at this stage of the war, and surely no useful purpose at the Peace Table, by Great Britain and ourselves having no knowledge of our differences of opinion. Both the President and Eden agreed to this and plans will be made for these conferences soon.

In the meantime, I suggested that Hull, Eden and the President meet tomorrow for tea and the President asked me to arrange it.

Eden and I left and went to the Carlton for some oysters and reviewed the evenings conference. Eden thought that some real progress was made and he was surprised that he and the President seemed in as much agreement as they were about the European situation. He realized that the rest of the world might not be so easy to get a meeting of the minds on. Eden expressed his amazement at the President’s intimate knowledge of the geographical boundaries of Europe and said that this knowledge would be of tremendous advantage in any conference.

1. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
2. For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 357 ff.
3. In regard to the origin of the Curzon Line, and for a description of it, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 793–794. Further details are in H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, (Oxford, 1924), vol. vi, pp. 233–283, 317–322, and summary descriptions are in S. Konovalov, Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey (London, 1945), pp. 33–38, 57–63.
4. For summary of peace treaty signed at Moscow on March 12, 1940, see telegram No. 283, March 13, 1940, noon, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, p. 314.
5. Wladyslaw Sikorski was Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London. He later agreed to name the cruiser Gdansk.
6. For the conversation on March 12, 1943, between Ambassador Standley and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhai-lovich Molotov, when the Ambassador read “a carefully prepared statement” on the American interest in bringing about peace between Finland and the Soviet Union and proposing that the United States might act as an intermediary to work for direct discussions, see telegram No. 155, March 13, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union p. 249.
7. Georges Clemenceau; lie became Premier of France on November 16, 1917.