I enclose copy of memorandum I thought of taking up with the Prime
Minister.24
[Annex]
Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill
[Washington,] May 8,
1943.
I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the Bride25
continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is
well nigh intolerable.
The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any
material aid from De Gaulle and the civil situation with all its
dangers seems to be working out well.
I think that Macmillan concurs in this.
However, De Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda
staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various
elements, including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present
group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and
even riots.
Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these
disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British
Government funds.
De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex.
Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are
strongly behind him personally.
This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free
French Movement; that they do not know De Gaulle and that their
loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was
started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration
of France. If they only knew what you and I know about De Gaulle
himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its
present leader in London.
That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued
machinations of De Gaulle.
In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French
National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be
impossible such as Philippe, and include in it some of the strong
men like Monnet and others from Giraud’s North African
Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar,
etc.
Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France
itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by
British and American generals.
In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of
Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and
departments. But the top line, or national administration must be
kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I
[Page 112]
think that this may be
necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France,
thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of
government. The old form simply will not work.
I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received
from North Africa relating to De Gaulle.
[Here follow paraphrases of excerpts from telegram No. 805, May 6, 5
p.m., from Algiers, printed supra.]
All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable
problem and establish a common policy.
I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French
Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and
me.
I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government,
but could be called advisory in its functions.
Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and
Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National Committee. I
think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in
Casablanca.
I do not know what to do with De Gaulle. Possibly you would like to
make him Governor of Madagascar!
F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]
P. S. I hear the rumor that Leclerc forces in Tunisia have been
permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud
because Leclerc offered more pay and better rations and clothing
than Giraud’s men got. I do not know if this is true. The same
source reports that the De Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to
have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective
propaganda. F. D. R.
