Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

103.917/4711: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, November 20, 1943—midnight.

7367. From Department and Stone, FEA. Reference your 7898 of Nov. 12 and Stockholm’s 3539, Oct. 29¹⁵ repeated to you as the Legation’s 713. Department, FEA and the military authorities are most disturbed about the very high level of iron ore shipments in 1943. Department and FEA thoroughly agree with the Embassy and MEW as to the desirability of making immediate representations to the Swedes regarding this matter. However, we would prefer to have a joint memorandum along the lines set forth below presented to the Swedes. Even if Mallet has already made representations we believe the joint memorandum should nevertheless be presented.

Although we may not be able to prevent exports in 1943 from reaching the level mentioned by Hägglöf¹⁶ we fear that protest is futile unless accompanied by a request for positive remedial action on the part of the Swedes. We should attempt at least to reduce the harmful effects of the high and unexpected rate of export in 1943 by insisting on a low figure for the first quarter of 1944. Therefore, while leaving to you and MEW the exact wording we believe the following points should be strongly emphasized in the communication to the Swedes:

1. The United States and the United Kingdom Governments even before the signing of the new agreement¹⁷ fulfilled their obligations in full, even in cases where the supply sacrifice involved was substantially greater than had been anticipated during the negotiations.

2. The Swedish Government in Section IV of the new war trade agreement undertakes to take measures to reduce Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories until the end of 1943 wherever possible within the framework of existing obligations.

3. The United States and the United Kingdom are at a loss to reconcile exports of iron ore in 1943 at the level forecast by Mr. Hägglöf with the commitment cited above in Section IV of the Swedish Declaration or with the spirit of the agreements reached in London. Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories averaged 9,116,000 tons during the 3 years, 1940–41–42. If Mr. Hägglöf’s forecast proves correct, and shipments of 8,893,000 tons during the first 10 months of 1943 give every reason to anticipate that it will, Swedish shipments of iron ore for 1943 will be at a very substantially higher rate than during any war year.

4. The two governments are most concerned regarding the greatly increased shipments this year since they tend to nullify the reduction which the ceiling agreed to for 1944 was expected to achieve. As a result of the discussions in London the Allied Governments assumed that Swedish iron ore exports in 1943 would not exceed the 1942 level of 8.6 million tons. Thus one of the most important benefits which we obtain in the new agreement to compensate for our supply sacrifices is being undermined.

5. The United States and the United Kingdom Governments appreciate the action taken which resulted in the recent reduction of shipments from Northern Baltic ports. They wish, however, that it might have been possible for the Swedish Government to develop an equally successful method of similarly limiting shipments from southern Baltic ports.

6. The United States and the United Kingdom have always understood from statements made by the Swedish authorities that the Swedish Government has made no specific commitment to Germany on iron ore exports other than a price agreement. The text of the German-Swedish War Trade Agreement for 1943¹⁸ presented to the United States and the United Kingdom negotiators in London confirms this and indicates that Swedish coal imports are tied to Swedish exports of wood products rather than of iron ore.

7. In view of all the above circumstances the United States and the United Kingdom Governments urgently request assurances that:

(a) The Swedish Government will make every effort to keep shipments of iron ore during the full year 1943 as far below the ceiling limit of 9.9 million tons provided in the old Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement as is possible at this late date;

(b) The Swedish Government will not permit shipments of iron ore during the first quarter of 1944 to exceed 488,000 tons and that no more than 200,000 tons will be shipped in any one month. (This proposed first quarter ceiling is based on the average of first quarter shipments in 1941 and 1942, the last climatically normal war years. We cannot include figures for the first quarter of 1943 in the average as we consider 1943 shipments abnormal.)

It might also be pointed out that the proposal outlined above is in the nature of an application of the provision of the new war trade agreement limiting exports in the first half of 1944 to the ratio of previous years.

If you and MEW concur in the above suggested procedure, please telegraph to Stockholm the agreed wording for the memorandum, requesting the Legation (unless it has strong views to the contrary) to join with the British Legation in presenting it to the Foreign Office, also repeating to Stockholm your 7898 of November 12.

Hull

15. Latter not printed.
16. Gunnar Hägglöf, head of the Economic Division, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs; he served as Chairman of the Swedish Trade Delegation in London.
17. On September 23, 1943, the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden was initialed in London; for texts, see enclosures to despatch No. 11348, September 24, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, pp. 806, 807, and 809.
18. Signed on December 19, 1942.