Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

740.00112 European War 1939/9621: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, November 13, 1943—8 p.m.
[Received 9:37 p.m.]

7930. Personal for Secretary, Under Secretary⁶ and Stone, FEA, from Riefler.⁷ Reference Department’s 6734, October 27, midnight, and Embassy’s 7595, November 2.⁸ There follows the substance of a memorandum given Embassy on most recent Anglo-American and British activity to assure that Germans do not make up for losses in production of bearings brought about by our air raids through purchases in neutral countries. Inasmuch as Swedish Government actively abetted preemptive contracts in Sweden, Department and FEA will thoroughly understand why this report must be given minimum distribution in Washington, and be treated with utmost secrecy. Embassy is giving copies of report to Military Attaché⁹ and G–2 ETOUSA.¹⁰ Memorandum follows:

Ministry of Economic Warfare has attached during last 2 years greatest importance to German ball-bearing supplies being reduced, for which destruction of Schweinfurt is first essential step. It became apparent this summer that Eighth Air Force would carry out such a raid, and then steps were taken in order to make certain that enemy could not replace losses by placing in Switzerland and Sweden additional orders. During May and June this year a Swedish trade delegation was in London to negotiate with American Embassy and MEW.¹¹ Notwithstanding strong pressure, this delegation refused to agree to undertakings which would restrict during 1943 exports to Axis countries of ball and roller bearings. For 1944, however, they have agreed to accept following restrictions on exports to all Axis countries:

(Title) Limitation to [of?] Ball and Roller Bearing Exports to all Axis Europe including Italy.

Read in three columns. Commodities; 1944 limitation; 1942 exports (all figures in thousands of Swedish crowns). Ball bearings, 19,689; 31,062; roller bearings, 9,338; 20,550; balls and rollers, 241; 343.

It was necessary to deal directly with SKF¹² inasmuch as Swedish delegation was reluctant to agree to accept restrictions to be imposed by the Government during 1943. Such an arrangement became urgent subsequent to raids on Stuttgart during spring by RAF,¹³ which resulted in local ball-bearing factories of SKF (Norund), being damaged. At that time London learned that endeavors were being made by Germans to place additional orders with SKF in Sweden. British orders, therefore, had to be placed with minimum delay. Because in June weather over North Sea was perfect, and because German fighters would with virtual certainty shoot down ordinary civilian aircraft, two experts on ball bearings, who were sent to Sweden for this purpose, were flown there in mosquitos bomb racks. Never before had passengers traveled that way. The experts were successful in placing orders worth 1,000,000 pounds sterling while there. This sum is in addition to large orders SKF had previously received from British Government. Due to very large reserve manufacturing capacity which Swedes have, a manoeuvre of this order could not possibly have tied up standard type ball-bearing production, therefore, purchases by British were concentrated in preempting smaller bearings of type used in aero engines, instruments and aircraft controls, and on as large a possible range of special heavy types used in aero engines (e.g., spherical bearings for aero crankshafts) and tanks. MEW is satisfied that Germans cannot possibly appreciably increase purchases of types of this order before late summer next year. In fact subsequent to Schweinfurt’s first raid, when Germans attempted to make such purchases, somewhat bitter complaints came from SKF for firm found itself compelled to refuse orders from Germany which were offered at a considerably higher price range than those which had been accepted from British by them.

In Switzerland output of ball and roller bearings is smaller to quite some extent than production in Sweden. Anglo-American-Swiss agreement for 1943,¹⁴ however, restricts Swiss steel ball and roller bearing export for rest of this year in following manner: between August 1 and December 31 to Germany to 33⅓% of 42 exports by value that is Swiss francs 2,367,000; to other Axis countries between July 1 and December 31, 1943, (allowance yet to be made for Italy), to 50% of exports in 1942 that is Swiss francs 682,000. It is our expectation that Government of Switzerland will accept agreement of similar nature covering 1944 with this difference, that American and British negotiators will do their utmost to achieve limitations of a more drastic nature.

Subsequent to first, not very successful, Schweinfurt raid in middle August, it is learned that Germans made during September repeated attempts to place bearing orders with leading firm in Switzerland (SRO in Zurich), and that these orders were essentially for aircraft industry requirements. Swiss company has refused all of these orders.

Swiss-Swedish supplies taken together represented approximately 7½% of German Europe’s total requirements in the past, according to estimates made in London. End of memorandum.

In an annex to memorandum, MEW states that examination of a provisional nature of result of October 15 Schweinfurt raid shows: That UKF Werk 1 sustained heavy damage in stores and assembly shops. UKF Werk 2 all departments sustained very heavy damage; Kengelfischer subsidiary buildings, but not main producing shops, sustained considerable damage.

It is concluded here on rough computation that whole Axis Europe lost approximately 1 month’s supply of ball bearings, because of production delays arising from this. Should decision be taken that Schweinfurt works should be dispersed, a larger loss will be sustained. On assumption that loss is spread over period of 6 months the result will be during such a period approximately 15% to 20% reduction in ball-bearing supplies of Axis. Since then there has been an extension of attack to Italy to two Riv (Fiat) factories. Evidence subsequent to Schweinfurt attacks points to enemy’s more intensive utilization of these plants and that attempt may be made to cover approximately one-twentieth of total Axis requirements there. It is believed in London that attacks in Italy have been successful, although details of damage have not yet been received here. [Riefler.]

Winant

6. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
7. Winfield W. Riefler, Special Assistant for Economic Warfare to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, with the rank of Minister.
8. Neither printed.
9. Brig. Gen. Paul E. Peabody.
10. Intelligence Organization, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.
11. See pp. 755–781, passim.
12. Aktiebolaget Svenska Kullagerfabriken, a major Swedish ball and roller bearing corporation with holdings in a number of countries; its main offices are located in Gothenburg, Sweden.
13. British Royal Air Force.
14. For text of Anglo-American-Swiss War Trade Agreement, effected by an exchange of letters dated December 19, 1943, see pp. 888–892.