740.0011 Pacific War/3440: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:24 p.m.]
1711. Embassy’s 1674, September 11. I have seen Dr. Kung, Vice President of Executive Yuan; Dr. Sun Fo, President of Legislative Yuan; General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of the CEC; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, former Foreign Minister and now Secretary General of Supreme National Defense Council; and Dr. K. C. Wu, Acting Foreign Minister.39 They received my remarks in most friendly fashion; some of them showed concern and considerable interest and said they would see if they could do anything to be helpful. Dr. Wang said that he would have a thorough discussion with the Gmo.40 Dr. Wu has told me that he went immediately to the Gmo.
I was, I believe, able to communicate to some of them the perturbation felt by our military. But while there may possibly ensue some improvement in airfield and road construction, I am much afraid that in general the attitude of the Gmo and other military and political leaders is in line with that of Dr. Kung from whom I gained the clear impression that the surrender of Italy has confirmed the widespread Chinese feeling that there is no longer need for China to put forth greater effort in the war and that China can continue with increased complacence to sit back and wait for U. S. and British to crush Japan. (The Gmo’s extraordinary optimism as to the early termination of war and in regard to the economic situation as he is quoted in Embassy’s 1692, September 12,41 is a reflection of this feeling.) Dr. Kung indicated that he considered the question of a Burma campaign was now of comparatively minor importance and that even the recapture of Burma would not, because of transport limitations and difficulties, greatly affect China one way or other. He felt that the surrender of Italy now made it possible for British and American fleets to come very soon to Indian Ocean and he suggested that recapture of Singapore and then occupation of Haiphong would be appropriate steps for Allies to take looking to a nearly direct attack upon Japan. When I remarked that the problems of defense and [Page 119] of a Burma campaign were immediate, he said that there was no reason why the naval campaign he has suggested could not be undertaken and accomplished this year.
I venture to suggest that if consideration is being given to recommending that the President send General Chiang congratulations on his assumption of the Presidency of China, this might provide springboard for a message such as suggested in our 1674.