740.0011 Pacific War/3425: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12—2:43 p.m.]
1674. 1. General Hearn, in the absence of Stilwell, came to see me last evening. He said Stilwell and he were much concerned over situation here in respect to military matters. The current CEC35 [Page 116] session was apparently failing, through lack of interest, to give even lip service consideration to prosecution of war in this theater (a circumstance which Embassy has so far hopefully refrained from reporting) and the gathering here of military leaders from all parts of French [Free] China seemed to be chiefly for the purpose of discussion of Kuomintang-Communist differences (Embassy’s 1664, September 936). He said that Chinese were doing practically nothing to help military situation; even construction of absolutely essential airfields and roads (such as the Kunming–Proshan road) was far behind because of lack of push by Chinese Government, failure to allocate sufficient funds for the work, failure to provide labor to do the work and failure to prevent hoarding of construction materials and to keep prices down to a point where such materials could be obtained.
Hearn said that the Generalissimo and other Chungking high military authorities well knew how Stilwell and he feel about the whole picture but apparently Chiang hesitated to attempt to launch effective military, administrative, financial and other effort (including conscription of labor) because he was not certain of adequate backing from below. Hearn asked if there was any way in which I could help cause improvement in situation by approaching civil officials of Government who might at this time be in position to exert influence or by other means.
2. After some discussion I said I would be glad to make the effort and would privately and informally approach officials (such as Kung, Wang Chung-hui,37 Wu Teh-chen,38 Sun Fo) who might be willing and able to accomplish something. I said that I could mention to them the apparent lack of interest of CEC in vital problem of getting on with the war against Japan; that I feared this would be noted abroad especially with the Burma campaign in offing; that Lord Mountbatten was reportedly coming to China to survey the situation and our military feared that he would receive a most unfavorable impression of it; that our military felt that Yunnan Province was in a very vulnerable position due to lack of adequate measures for defense or offense including protected airfields and roads; that airfields and roads in question were of vital importance to Chinese and American forces in undertaking a campaign in Burma; that it was common belief among foreign military observers that under present conditions the Japs if desirous of making the effort and if willing to pay the cost could succeed in capturing or cutting off Kunming; that with Kunming [Page 117] isolated or in Jap hands, it would be impossible to fly further supplies into China from India and Chungking could be readily bombed; that I was accordingly approaching Chinese leaders quite frankly and with unconcealed perturbation in earnest hope that they would exert influence to rectify it. Hearn asked that I carry this suggestion into effect and I am accordingly calling on Kung and others as soon as calls can be arranged.
3. Another suggestion in which Hearn heartily concurs is that a message from the President to Chiang might be very helpful as giving Chiang both armor and ammunition with which to take necessary forthright action. (Although CEC session is about to close the People’s Political Council is to meet within a few days.) Such message (in comparatively mild form) might be to the effect that on the occasion of the formal gathering of Chinese leading statesmen and generals in whose hands rest the direction of China’s war effort in partnership with the United States and other Allies, the President wishes to assure the Generalissimo that in forthcoming joint military effort in this theatre against Jap forces the United States (and Britain?) forces are not fully prepared but are wholly determined to fight through, side by side with Chinese until objective of reopening the land route to China is attained; that in North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy it has been by supreme test of all-out effort, wholehearted mutual assistance, unrestricted pooling of resources and complete coordination of American and British forces acting as one that success has been achieved; that the supreme test in offensive against Japanese forces in Burma will be whether the Allies there can similarly muster and weld together their resources and energies in a task whose success is so vital to China and in general to advancing of Allied march on Japan. (Hearn suggested the matter might also be brought to attention of Mr. Churchill.)
4. It is reported by a reliable informed source but not confirmed that the group in Government which has been advocating use of force against Communists has succeeded in having the CEC agree to issuance of a manifesto which is to be in nature of an ultimatum to the Communists.
5. As stated in our 1649, September 7, failure of an attempt to recapture Burma would be a disaster to Chinese morale of first magnitude. I recommended with all earnestness that something along the lines suggested in paragraph 3 be taken without delay in conjunction with such efforts as we may appropriately make here. In this connection I mention our recent reports indicating the surprising influence and weight which American opinion and criticism can have upon Chinese Government and leaders—surprising perhaps because we may not heretofore have fully realized how acutely aware the Chinese are [Page 118] of the extent to which they are and will continue to be dependent upon us.